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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NOTICE TO READERS: The United States Government recognizes the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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Arms Control & Disarmament

Minimal Nuclear Deterrence Called New Strategy

LD1311161591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 9 Nov 91

[By Radio Moscow military analyst Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov]

[Text] Nuclear deterrence is turning into the pivot of Soviet nuclear strategy. At a seminar on military doctrines just held in Vienna, the Soviet representative, Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, declared that in the post-confrontation period the Soviet Union's security in the nuclear field would be ensured through a minimal nuclear deterrence. Here is a comment on this by our Radio Moscow military analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov:

The first deputy chief of the General Staff used the new terminolgy not just out of a desire to please his Western counterparts, Colonel Sergey Kozlov said. The evolution from seeking a Soviet nuclear parity with NATO to a minimal nuclear deterrence is quite logical.

This can be explained first of all by considerable reductions in the Soviet Union's mass destruction weapons potential. In keeping with the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union has destroyed over 2,000 missiles. The START agreement also passed a verdict on scrapping more than 4,000 more nuclear charges, and in response to the American initiative President Gorbachev has announced the elimination of several thousand tactical nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union's decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament are not the only arguments in favor of changing both its military doctrine and its terminology. In fact, the elements of deterrence have always been present in Moscow's strategy, though the military leadership preferred not to use the term deterrent for purely ideological reasons.

That was stressed one year ago by (Michael Quinlock), an assistant to the British secretary of defense, during his visit to Moscow. This leading NATO analyst delivered a lecture to the Soviet General Staff of that time on a future deterrence and nuclear weapons in Europe.

It would be appropriate to mention at this point, Sergey Kozlov went on, the main step taken by NATO in this field. NATO ceased looking at the Soviet Union as its potential enemy. This alliance now treats the Soviet Union as a partner, and possibly a future ally in the military field. NATO's summit in Rome, where the basic principles of the military bloc's strategy were expected to be reviewed, including the role and place of nuclear factors among them, promised to be another step in that direction.

Regretfully, Sergey Kozlov said in conclusion, we'll have to live in a nuclear world for a long time yet, but the fact that the leading members of the nuclear club now address each other in the language of restraint, and begin using common terminology such as nuclear deterrence, adds more peace and security to our lives.

Worldwide Issues

Republics, G-7 To Open New Talks 18 Nov

OW1311135191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1235 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The next round of talks between the leaders of sovereign republics and representatives of the G-7 will be held in Moscow on November 18-20.

According to IF's [INTERFAX's] sources the new round of "12 plus 7" talks will again be devoted to the Soviet Union's external debt. One of the Soviet experts said the parties would focus on "the short-term aspects of foreign debt payment."

The previous meeting yielded a memorandum whereby the sovereign republics assumed collective responsibility for the country's external debt. Observers believe the G-7 may now offer the USSR credits for the payment of foreign debt interest.

NATO Strategists Fear Instability

PM1311165191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 91 First Edition p 7

["Russia and the World" article by Aleksandr Golts: "NATO Strategy Mirroring Our Situation"]

[Text] An event which recently occurred in the life of NATO is possibly the most important event since its conception. The leaders of the West European states, the United States, and Canada have just approved a fundamentally new strategic concept for this military-political alliance.

This concept has a direct bearing on our country. After all, 40 years ago NATO was set up to counter what the West regarded as the "Soviet military threat." And willy-nilly all subsequent actions by the Atlanticists reflected the way Brussels perceived Moscow's policy. And NATO strategy mirrored—sometimes with distortions, sometimes very correctly—our policy. Thus, NATO's deployment of intermediate-range missiles and chemical munitions was evidence that they thought the Soviets had these weapons. And when statements suddenly appeared in NATO documents about "expanding the bloc's area of responsibility," this meant: The USSR has begun to pursue what the Atlanticists consider an over-active policy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Well, what does the NATO mirror reveal now? Needless to say, a drastic easing of confrontation. It is no coincidence that Atlantic strategists decided to give up "forward basing" and the concept of "flexible response" that presupposed measured first use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, NATO decided to give up 80 percent of its nuclear tactical weapons potential. All this reflects the indisputable conclusion: A surprise massed attack against the bloc countries can be ruled out.

But that is only part of the picture. It is not that optimistic on the whole. The bloc's new concept does, after all, presuppose the existence of some threat to the security of NATO states, to defend which NATO will have fewer but highly mobile and well-equipped armed forces. There will still be tactical nuclear munitions in the air force arsenal. U.S. troops will also remain in Europe.

What threat does NATO see? It is now called more mildly "possible risk." It stems from the Mediterranean and North Africa (the reference is to S. Husayn's and M. al-Qadhdhafi's regimes) and from East Europe (the reference is above all to our country). The NATO strategic concept points to the risk and uncertainty accompanying the process of change in the USSR which cannot be viewed in separation from its military might and nuclear arsenals.

In other words, NATO strategists are most unequivocally afraid of instability in the former great nuclear power. Our country has been honored not only with a place in NATO's strategic concept but also with a separate statement from the NATO Council. In this statement NATO members not only express their satisfaction with the changes taking place in the USSR. Nor do they hide their concern, urging outright all organs of power in the USSR to abandon steps that may cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Atlanticists unequivocally advocated not only reliable control over nuclear arms but also that this control should be concentrated in one organ's hands.

A fairly tough statement was issued in Rome to the effect that control over Soviet nuclear weapons affects the security interests of the entire Atlantic alliance. Moreover, this statement says none too diplomatically: "The governments of the USSR and the republics must take decisive steps to avert the export of nuclear and other military technology."

We have often ignored NATO's warnings in the past. Perhaps, we should take a more careful look at the new NATO strategy today in order to glimpse the seeds of possible clashes.

Interior Minister Comments on Refugee Issue

LD0211210891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 31 Oct 91

[Excerpts] An international conference on the issue of illegal immigration from the countries of central and Eastern Europe came to a close in Berlin today.

[Correspondent V. Mostovoy] [passage omitted] Over two days, the ministers of internal affairs or the justice ministers of the 27 European countries participating in the Berlin conference have discussed measures to counter the uncontrolled flood of refugees from Eastern Europe into the countries of the Common Market. Their numbers are constantly growing, and according to figures quoted by Barannikov, the USSR minister of internal affairs, in 1992 alone, about 5 million people from the republics of the Soviet Union are expected to go abroad either on a temporary basis or to take up permanent residence. To a certain extent this arouses the concern of our neighbors.

[Begin V.P. Barannikov recording] You know, if we are talking about freedom to travel and about freedom of the individual, then we really need to establish freedom of movement and freedom of the individual so that people can leave the USSR and go to London, to the United States, or anywhere where they have relatives. To achieve this, we need to tackle very seriously both monetary and financial problems and transportation problems also need to be tackled very seriously. [end recording]

United States & Canada

Gorbachev, U.S. Officials Discuss Agriculture

LD1311181791 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow November 13 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev received U.S. Under Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder and the U.S. President's special aide and senior director of the European and Soviet Affairs Department at the National Security Council, E. Hewett, at the Kremlin today.

The sides discussed aspects of the Soviet-U.S. cooperation in upgrading the Soviet agricultural production, as well as specific programs of consultative-technical assistance embracing the whole range of issues, from the output of agricultural products to their delivery to the customers.

The talks focussed, in particular, on projects of the creation of wholesale markets, the establishment of a typical farm in the suburbs of Saint Petersburg with participation of U.S. state and private experts, the use of U.S. experience in personnel training, and the direct participation of U.S. specialists in the Soviet agricultural production.

Gorbachev informed the U.S. guests on the preparations of the Union treaty, and the upcoming meeting of the State Council to examine the draft Union treaty.

The public opinion in the Soviet Union is increasingly favoring a single renovated Union, stressed the Soviet president.

The West has assumed a persistent and clear stand that it is interested in the preservation of the USSR's unity, which is of essential significance for the prospects of the new world policy.

General on Chemical Disarmament Cooperation

LD1211193491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0000 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Interview with General Yevstafyev, chief of the General Staff for Chemical Troops, by unidentified station reporter; place and date not given—recorded; Yevstafyev speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] At the talks in the Kremlin last week, the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, offered the American undersecretary for defense, Mr. Donald Atwood, to unite efforts for destroying chemical weapons. Asked to comment on this proposal, chief of the General Staff for Chemical Troops, General Yevstafyev, told this:

[Yevstafyev] In recent years the two countries actively cooperate in destroying chemical weapons through exchanges of experience and know-how. We have agreed with the American colleagues matters relating to sufficient security and risk-expulsion [as heard], highest permissible concentration, and discharge volumes. American experts visited a number of Soviet objects and Soviet experts visited an American object at the Johnston Atoll.

[Reporter] What does General Yevstafyev think are the results of these exchanges?

[Yevstafyev] I must say bilateral cooperation with American experts has been useful for our scientists, especially in the areas of risk assessment and production safety. Our side was lagging in that area and is still behind.

[Reporter] What is the general's opinion of the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation in chemical disarmament?

[Yevstafyev] Concrete steps should follow, such as purchases of the American technology. During our visit to the United States, we realized that the American industry is much better equipped to solve the problem of discharge purification. In 1990 and 1991, a number of American firms and state organizations offered us on a commercial basis individual elements of technologies and even turnkey projects for destroying chemical weapons. The offers were interesting, but the matter is we cannot solve the problems on funding these projects, currency payments and the like. All these problems are listed in the state program for chemical disarmament submitted to the government.

U.S. General's Visit, Stealth Aircraft Viewed

PM0811150591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kostin "Military-Technical Review": "Can the 'Invisible' Be Seen?"]

[Text] USAF [U.S. Air Force] Chief of Staff General [Gen] Merrell McPeak recently paid an official visit to our country. This visit received fairly extensive coverage in the Soviet press. One of the results of the high-ranking U.S. general's stay in the USSR was a preliminary agreement on an unprecedented event in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations: An exchange of visits by strategic and tactical aviation aircraft next year.

On his return home, Gen M. McPeak made a statement that passed almost unnoticed in our mass media. And yet it has profound significance, since it sounded like a confession: "In all likelihood, our aircraft employing Stealth technology are not invisible to Soviet radar." What has prompted the U.S. military leader to draw this conclusion? What circumstances forced him to state such an unpalatable fact? Unfortunately, no details about this are being reported. But it seems that this information gap can be filled in.

It is widely known that the B-2 heavy bomber and the F-117A fighter were developed [sozdavalis] using the costly Stealth technology for just one purpose—to make them invisible to enemy radar detection, which would enable them to overcome the enemy's air defense system without particular difficulty and deliver strikes against installations located deep in the rear. In order to achieve this aim, the designers sacrificed specifications like speed (both Stealth aircraft are subsonic) and bomb load (that of the B-2 cannot compare with that of the B-1B and B-52 bombers).

But in making these sacrifices, have the aircraft designers managed to solve the problem of ensuring they remain "completely unnoticed" by radar? Certainly not. In order to understand this certainty, it is necessary to address the physical principles underlying the detection of aircraft in flight. Detection can be made possible by receiving energy that is either reflected from the surface of aircraft or that emanates from aircraft themselves. Detection is also possible by registering changes in the environment associated with the aircraft's passage through it.

The most widely used is the phenomenon of energy reflection, when the exposure of an airborne target to a stream of electromagnetic energy makes it possible to receive the signals reflected from it. Until recently there was no doubt that the size of the exposed object is almost directly proportional to the stream of energy reflected from it, that is to say the greater the geometrical dimensions, the greater the strength of the stream, and hence the more noticeable the target on radar indicator screens. Radar involves the notion of effective reflecting surface which characterizes the aforementioned relationship and has the following approximate values for various types of aircraft: strategic bomber—10-20 square meters; fighter—1-2 square meters; cruise missile—0.01-1 square meters.

The designers of Stealth program aircraft strove to minimize the effective reflecting surface as far as possible and reduce it to practically zero. To this end, they used new component materials, a radar-absorbent coating, and also developed an unusual fuselage configuration to ensure optimal dissipation of electromagnetic emissions. According to the designers' intention, these innovations were to have ruled out the very possibility of the aircraft being detected using conventional radar. And in this shpere, it must be admitted, U.S. scientists and industrialists managed to achieve significant results, as witnessed by the successful use of F-117A aircraft in the Persian Gulf zone.

At the same time, now it is already possible to claim with total certainty that the task of developing an aircraft that is absolutely "undetectable" by radar was not completely resolved. First, as Pentagon experts have concluded, the "invisible" aircraft are surrounded in flight by something resembling a "cloud" that can be registered by certain types of radar. And second, even these supermodern aircraft have an effective reflecting surface which, although it may be insignificant, is nevertheless sufficient to be reliably detected by experienced operators. This is also indicated by the fact that, in the Americans' assessment, the Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which operates on classic radar principles, is entirely capable of waging successful war on airborne targets using Stealth technology. It this connection it is appropriate to stress that our country's Air Defense Forces are equipped with the S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which is similar to the Patriot and in no way inferior to its overseas counterpart as regards technical capabilities.

It should also be borne in mind that an aircraft can also be detected by different kinds of emissions produced by the aircraft itself as it moves along (emission from onboard sources, heat emission from fuselage heating, emission from the jet engine plume, sound emission). The aforementioned phenomena make it possible to develop passive detection systems for airborne targets in the radio, optical, and sound spectrums. Moreover, a nuclear weapons carrier acts as a source of nuclear radiation which can be picked up by highly sensitive detectors, and consequently the location of the carrier can be established.

And last, it is impossible to ignore the fact that an aircraft's flight is accompanied by changes to the environment (change in the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the ionization of the earth's gravitational field, and so on). These phenomena may potentially be used to detect an airborne target if methods are developed to register the phenomena. And this is already on the cards in the near future.

China

Fifth-Round of Border Talks Resume in Moscow

LD1211140291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1346 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 12 Nov (TASS)—The fifth round of Soviet- Chinese negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and strengthening of trust in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region began in Moscow today [12 November].

Delegate Previews Talks

OW1211111291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1100 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Interview with (Griyev), leader of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet border talks, by station reporter Kalibov; from the "Current Event and Commentary" program—place and date not given]

[Text] The fifth round of Soviet-Sino talks on reducing each other's armed forces in the border areas and on strengthening mutual trust is set to begin in Moscow on 12 November. On the eve of the talks (Griyev), leader of the Soviet delegation and special ambassador of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was interviewed by station reporter Kalibov. The following is his report:

[Kalibov] Comrade ambassador, what results have been achieved since the first round of talks began in 1990?

[(Griyev)] To put it briefly, we have achieved positive and constructive results. The first point I want to mention is that both sides are determined to conclude a general agreement on the mutual reduction of troops in the border areas and on strengthening mutual trust. This is a big step forward because it is the first time in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and China that the question of reducing each other's troops in the border areas has been discussed in detail. In the fifth round of talks, efforts will continue to draw up a general agreement. This is not a simple matter since it is a very sensitive and delicate question which concerns the security of the two countries.

The second point I want to make is that the Soviet side is determined to continue, in a constructive spirit, towards a speedy conclusion of the general agreement, which the Soviet side is prepared to sign. There is another very important element among the political experiences accumulated during these talks—the mutual understanding and cooperation of the two delegations and their efforts to solve very complex questions by seeking a mutually acceptable compromise. I think during the fifth round of talks, as in the previous ones, we will reach a mutual understanding on specific questions in connection with some of the provisions of the future agreement. In this regards, I want to emphasize that we will begin specific work in Moscow to (draw up) the agreement because conditions will be ripe for us to do so after both sides have expounded on each other's principled stand regarding this document.

[Kalibov] In general, after the conclusion of talks the other party is invited to visit some military units. Is the Soviet side prepared to do so this time?

[(Griyev)] Yes, we are. We feel that by inviting the Chinese delegation to visit Soviet military units, the other side will be able to witness life in the armed forces of our country. In general, we will invite the guests to visit Soviet troops and military academies that reflect to a large extent the condition of the Soviet Armed Froces. Besides, we will invite the guests to visit military areas so that they can see the true conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces which we have intentionally hid. This shows that trust has been growing and has been strengthened.

Incidents Mar Soviet-Chinese Border Situation

PM1211134191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 91 Union Edition p3

[Correspondent B. Reznik report: "No Limits on the High Banks of the Amur"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—Last spring's decision by the Khabarovsk Kray Soviet of People's Deputies and Amur Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies to ease restrictions in the border zone was literally greeted with a shout of joy by many people living in the Far East.

It has radically changed life in the border region: Bans and restrictions have been reduced to a minimum and people now have free access to rivers along the border, from whose banks all barbed wire has been removed. They can fish, relax, and enjoy nature to their heart's content.

But border guards are sounding the alarm. Many people living in the Amur region have interpreted democratization processes as giving them total license. Hardly a day goes by without some incident on the border rivers. Border violations from both the Soviet and the Chinese side have assumed massive proportions. Illegal barter is thriving and contraband deals are regularly made. People on the Soviet side of the river are apparently prepared to give the clothes off their back in exchange for a bottle of Chinese vodka. They hand over their goods and chattles—and state property. Someone from the village of Zabaykalskoye exchanged his "Minsk" motorcycle for 15 bottles of vodka. Other tipplers delivered 20 cubic meters of timber to a Chinese island in exchange for 70 bottles of vodka. Fishing in one of the Amur channels, a team of fishermen from a village on the Soviet side of the river agreed to "lease" this channel to some Chinese fishermen in exchange for a drink. The crews of ships belonging to the Amur River Shipping Line make all kinds of deals with Chinese citizens. Incidentally, these "trade contacts" and "friendly ties" do not always end peacefully. There are frequent conflicts between the neighboring sides. First our citizens beat up some Chinese fisherman they take a dislike to and steal his nets—together with any alcohol they happen to find. Then the Chinese steal a Soviet boat. Border incidents involving juveniles have become more frequent recently: Young people go to China "for chewing gum, " to "learn karate," or to "travel-around."

What is happening? Why have these incidents suddenly begun to occur on the Far Eastern Soviet-Chinese border, where order and discipline have prevailed in recent years? I think there are a number of reasons. First, the general low standard of living in our country—the lack of food and industrial goods. Second, the fact that local residents are totally unprepared for the new border regulations; for decades, they have only seen the opposite shore through barbed wire. Third, the helpless, unenterprising attitude taken by local bodies of authority. The border district administration has repeatedly suggested organizing legal channels for border trade and exchange and setting up trade "areas" on several islands to put an end to contraband. This suggestion has not been put into practice, however, despite the fact that the Chinese side has set a good example by opening a trade fair for Soviet tourists on the island of Daheihedao opposite the city of Blagoveshchensk.

Economic ties must become deeper and better considered. Common use of natural resources in the Amur flood plain requires a special approach. Peace and calm on the Soviet-Chinese border is a great, gratifying achievement of recent years. It must not be clouded by any incidents.

Northeast Asia

Baker Visit to Tokyo, Stance on Kurils Viewed

PM1311162791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by S. Agafonov: "Japanese Deeply Offended. U.S. Secretary of State Baker's Explanations Why President Bush Did Not Visit Tokyo Did Not Satisfy Them"]

[Text] Tokyo—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker has been in the Japanese capital since Sunday. The trip is, as they say, "planned"—it was prearranged that the secretary of state would go to Tokyo to prepare for President Bush's visit, and, although the President's visit was suddenly called off last week, Baker has not altered his program, but has merely added yet another point to it, albeit not the most pleasant—explanations concerning the nonarrival of the head of the U.S. Administration.

Monday was the busiest day of Baker's Tokyo trip. He had meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa, Foreign Minister Watanabe and his namesake, who heads the foreign trade and industry ministry, and with the head of the Japanese finance ministry, and, "for dessert," a lecture on the concepts behind U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world in general.

What interested observers most of all was the following details: The accord reached between Washington and Tokyo to employ the so-called "4 plus 2" option when dealing with Korean peninsula issues; differences on the question of economic aid to Vietnam; Japanese "renunciation" of the Malaysian blueprint for creating a regional economic bloc without the participation of the United States.

The "4 plus 2" formula implies actively promoting the development of an inter-Korean dialogue under the patronage and with the mediation of the four great powers interested in stabilizing the situation in the Korean peninsula—the United States, China, Japan, and our country. This formula is already "operating" in fact.

Japanese and U.S. feelings and interests converge on this point, which was not the case during the discussion of the problem of economic aid for Vietnam. Baker insisted that Tokyo refrain from making economic "inroads" into Vietnam until the question of the fate of U.S. prisoners of war is settled. The Japanese politely turned down the request, confirming once again that, when it comes to opening up Indochina, they do not intend to cede the laurels to anyone.

The U.S. call for Japan to mediate in relations with China is worthy of attention among the topics addressed during Baker's Tokyo conversations. The secretary of state will be going to Beijing soon, and, clearly in preparation for this trip, he placed special emphasis on the need to influence the Chinese authorities on human rights, and also on the question of exports of conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction. Noting that Tokyo has a special relationship with Beijing, Baker urged it to exploit that factor.

The territorial issue in relations between Japan and our country also featured at the talks. Baker confined himself to expressing support for the Japanese demands, and then the hosts came up with a new slant— Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe noted that, if the Soviet side were to recognize Japanese sovereignty of the southern Kurils, Tokyo would be prepared to display greater flexibility on the question of the islands' formal handover (in terms of time, form, and preconditions). To all appearances, this innovation, tested on Baker, will now be a permanent element, entering the context of Soviet-Japanese relations as a "compromise" option.

By and large the secretary of state's visit was a quiet affair, and Baker left Tokyo for Seoul and the regional conference on economic development, promising, in his farewell to the Japanese, that Bush's aborted trip to Japan nonetheless will take place either at the end of December or in January, or, perhaps, in February. But the Japanese were deeply offended, and one of the country's most influential politicians, former ruling party secretary general Ozawa, demanded that the premier immediately ask Washington why Bush's trip was called off. Evidently, the explanations Baker had brought did not satisfy Tokyo....

Southeast Asia & Pacific

UN Mission in Cambodia; Sihanouk Returns

Arrival of Troops Viewed

BK1311063391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1100 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Commentary by observer Vladimir Viktorov]

[Text] The first unit of UN peacekeeping troops has arrived in Cambodia. Here are comments by our observer Vladimir Viktorov on this event.

From words to deeds, the faster the better. This is how implementation of the agreement signed in Paris to build peace in Cambodia should be assessed. The first step along this road has already been made. An Australian Air Force C-130 transport aircraft has landed at Pochentong Airport with 40 soldiers, part of the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia [UNAMIC]. Joining this mission in the near future will be nearly 230 other troops from the Soviet Union, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other states.

UNAMIC deals with various issues, first of all supervision of the process to implement the agreement on the cease-fire in Cambodia. Concerning this point, I would like to recall that Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, chairman of the Cambodian Supreme National Council, has already ordered the demobilization of all Cambodian sides' Armed Forces. Each Cambodian group should demobilize 70 percent of its troops; the remaining 30 percent will be under UN administration. UNAMIC units will leave for various areas in Battambang and Siem Reap Provinces where countless mines, planted on Cambodian soil during the years of armed conflict, will have to be extracted. This is a matter of life and death for many Cambodians, including tens of thousands of refugees who are now returning to their homeland. This is why this issue must be resolved very quickly.

According to a preliminary assessment of UN specialists, the extent of the mine-clearing operation is immense. This task will have to be carried out in a complicated situation. Another major task facing the UN mission is control of the process to organize general elections in Cambodia and the defense of citizens' rights. These are important and topical issues because the danger of the past in this country still forces people to think about it. This danger was originally caused by the Khmer Rouge's desire to grab all the power. A warning was given a few days ago by former Singapore prime minister Lee Kwan Yew in an interview with the Indian news agency UNI [UNITED NEWS OF INDIA]. According to him, in order to prevent a recurrence of the tragic antidemocratic administration in Cambodia, UN forces should remain in Cambodia for some time, even after the elections planned for early 1993.

Another thing we would like to talk about is that over the past few days it is not just UN representatives who have been received at the airport in Phnom Penh. The United States has now decided to reopen its embassy in the Cambodian capital, the first official representation the U.S. has had in Phnom Penh since 1975. Already arrived in Phnom Penh is Japan's experienced Ambassador Yukio Imagawa. It is expected that he will present credentials to Samdech Sihanouk on 18 November. These activities can be taken as signs showing the international community's confidence in the irreversibility of the process toward normalization in Cambodia, concludes our observer Vladimir Viktorov.

PRC Role in Return 'Important'

BK1311063191 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1100 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Commentary by observer Oleg Alekseyev]

[Text] According to reports by various news agencies, His Excellency [HE] Hun Sen, head of the Phnom Penh Administration, arrived in Beijing on Tuesday 12 November for a visit. Here are comments on this event by our observer Oleg Alekseyev.

This visit by HE Hun Sen is related to the finest event in the current process to normalize the situation in Cambodia. The purpose of this visit is to accompany Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's return to Phnom Penh after a 13-year absence. Samdech Sihanouk is currently in Beijing. From there, along with HE Hun Sen, the samdech will leave by plane on 14 November for the Cambodian capital to lead the Supreme National Council's [SNC] activities.

I would like to recall that in accordance with the agreement on Cambodia signed in Paris on 23 October, the SNC, in cooperation with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC], has the task of administering the country until the general elections there. It is very symbolic that Samdech Sihanouk, accompanied by HE Hun Sen, will return to Phnom Penh from Beijing. This seems to underline the important and constructive role currently being played by China in solving the Cambodian problem.

As is known, Beijing's policy over the past years has to a fair extent influenced the situation in Cambodia. However, at that time, Beijing's policy was clear cut in the form of confrontation both in Cambodia and outside this country. Also not conducive to a solution to the Cambodian problem, was the differences over many years between Beijing and Hanoi.

Now the situation has completely changed. Last year, China, in cooperation with other major powers and the permanent members of the UN Security Council, became one of those who took the initiative to draft the framework plan for a solution to the Cambodian problem. The plan has served as the basis for the program stipulated in the Paris agreement on Cambodia. Furthermore, with Beijing's active assistance, Cambodian parties agreed in principle in the middle of this year and, as expected, this led to the signing of the agreement in Paris.

Another noteworthy circumstance is that HE Hun Sen's visit to Beijing took place right after the Sino-Vietnamese summit there. This summit, as is known, determined the full normalization of relations between the two neighboring states. It is clear that the key factor pushing China and Vietnam to become good neighbors is the solution to the Cambodian problem.

Of special importance is the fact that, at this summit meeting, Beijing and Hanoi have expressed readiness to closely cooperate to promote implementation of the agreement signed in Paris. HE Hun Sen's visit to China undeniably serves this purpose, concludes our observer Oleg Alekseyev.

Danger of Khmer Rouge Indicated

BK1411091991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1100 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Dear listeners, leaders of Son Sann's group called the Khmer People's National Liberation Front [KPNLF], which is one of the Cambodian resistance factions, arrived in Phnom Penh on 12 November. Also expected to arrive within the next few days are leaders of another resistance faction, that is the Khmer Rouge group.

Our observer Oleg Alekseyev has the following comments:

At present, the phrase "for the first time" has often been used in the reports from Phnom Penh. In my opinion, this matter correctly reflects the events which are taking place there. At least, this is the first time that leaders of the resistance groups are returning to the capital city of Phnom Penh, judging from the time the armed conflict broke out.

Within the next few days, there will be another "for the first time" for the Cambodian SNC [Supreme National Council] to hold its meeting with all of them attending.

For the first time after an absence of 13 years, the former Cambodian head of state, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk who is currently SNC chairman, will soon be arriving by plane at Pochentong Airport in the capital of Cambodia on 14 November. It is also the first time that the UN mission has begun to arrive there.

There might be more lists of this phrase "for the first time," because many new things are being seen more often in Phnom Penh. There is nothing to doubt about this because active preparations are being made for the implementation of the steps in the agreement on Cambodia signed in Paris three weeks ago under the UN auspices.

It is thanks to this agreement that the Cambodian people themselves and the entire world community hope that unfortunate Cambodia, battered by a war that has lasted for several years, will finally turn into a peaceful, independent, and nonaligned state.

I have used this word "hope" because I am not yet fully assured that everything which has been planned will proceed smoothly as expected.

For example, it has not yet been definitely confirmed what attitide the Khmer Rouge will adopt. Outwardly, leaders of this largest resistance group seem to favor strict implementation of the Paris agreement. But recently, the public learned about a document saying that the Khmer Rouge ringleaders still adhere to their atrocious political program which, during the second part of the 70's, had plunged Cambodia into a deep abyss of bloodshed. Moreover, judging from the existing documents, their real, unchanging nature has been confirmed by the experts. Until now, the Khmer Rouge group has not abandoned its design to monopolize power in Cambodia.

How to prevent such a design from being materialized?

According to one of the most famous politicians in Asia-Pacific—former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—in his recent interview to Indian journalists, to prevent the Khmer Rouge from seizing power in Cambodia, it is necessary to quickly set up a very powerful government which knows its duty and is capable of smashing any schemes of those who want to seize power.

According to Lee Kuan Yew, it is also necessary for the United Nations which takes part in the process of normalizing the situation in Cambodia to remain permanently and vigilantly alert to the danger of the recurrence of the Khmer Rouge regime. Such a position, in my opinion, is certainly based on sound thinking, concluded observer Oleg Alekseyev.

Postwar Situation in Southeast Asia Assessed

BK1011031291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Cambodian 1230 GMT 8 Nov 91

[Text] The process to normalize the situation in Cambodia is now in the final stage. The elimination of the last tension in Indochina will undeniably influence the political situation in all of Southeast Asia. Here are the views of our commentator, Aleksey Kondratyev, on this issue.

It is no secret that war and conflict in Indochina over the past few decades have caused tension in all Southeast Asian countries. In these countries' views, the real danger is that Indochina has become a stage for superpower confrontation, primarily among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. This is why it is not difficult to understand the joy expressed in Southeast Asia toward a solution to the Cambodian conflict, which is the last hurdle of the cold war in the region.

In my view, a new geopolitical situation with a new quality is now emerging in Southeast Asia. First of all, people are no longer concerned about any threat. The so-called Soviet threat is no longer there. After the full normalization of Chinese-Vietnamese relations, the danger of the two countries' confrontation spilling over to other states in the region no longer exists. Furthermore, there is some improvement in the relations among the United States and the Indochinese countries, first of all with Vietnam. In brief, the era of confrontation in Indochina has ended.

To my way of thinking, in their nature, these positive changes are directly linked to the final stage of a solution to the Cambodian conflict. Furthermore, new favorable conditions have emerged in Southeast Asia for cooperation in various fields among countries in the region. A noteworthy event in this respect is the recent visit by the Vietnamese Prime Minister to a number of ASEAN countries. In these countries' capitals, people have welcomed Hanoi's desire to join ASEAN. It cannot be ruled out that this example could be followed by Laos, and after a peaceful solution, Cambodia as well. Thus a kind of new common economic sphere is being established in Southeast Asia. And finally, the political situation in the region is also being influenced by the latest initiatives of Moscow and Washington.

A few days ago, Moscow said that it will reduce Soviet Armed Forces in Asia by 200,000 men while Washington is firmly bent on implementing President George Bush's initiative on reducing nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific region. Other positive events should also be noted, such as Beijing's pledge to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In my view, the factors cannot fail to influence the issue of ensuring security in Southeast Asia.

Be that as it may, ASEAN countries are more and more inclined to set up a common security network in the region. I think such a network will certainly include the Indochinese countries. As for the peace initiatives of Moscow and Washington, they are creating new possibilities for ASEAN to make contributions to transforming Southeast Asia into a region of peace, freedom, and neutrality, and shortly after that, a nuclear-free zone.

This could be the result for Southeast Asia after the last source of tension in Indochina has been eliminated, concludes our commentator Aleksey Kondratyev.

Near East & South Asia

Bovin Appointment as Envoy to Israel Expected

OW1411051791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As IF [INTERFAX] correspondent has learnt at the presidential press service, Mikhail Gorbachev has signed a decree appointing the Soviet Union's ambassador to Israel. The ambassador's name is usually kept secret until the other side gives its official consent.

According to IF's sources, the USSR invited Israel to consider the candidacy of Aleksander Bovin, political analyst for the newspaper IZVETSIYA, who is known to be a consisent worker for the restoration of Soviet-Israeli relations and a fair settlement in the Middle East.

His appointment is expected to be officially approved by Israel within the next 2 or 3 days, which will be a token of respect for both the sending country and the ambassador's personality.

Interval in Talks With Mujahidin Delegation

Interval in Negotiations

LD1311211291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1930 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Excerpt] There is an interval in the negotiations with the delegation of the transitional government of the Afghan opposition. Over to Vladimir Pasko, our diplomatic correspondent.

[Pasko] It is believed that members of the delegation needed some time to discuss a package of proposals put forward by the Soviet side after yesterday's second round of negotiations. Apart from representatives of the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomats from Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia took part in the meeting.

The package includes proposals on the solution of the problem of hostages and on the Soviet side's approach to the progress of the process of the peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan. The Soviet side believes that a cease-fire in Afghanistan is very important, because it is one of the conditions for involving the mechanism of negotiations with the participation of international organizations, including the United Nations. This, according to Pankin, USSR minister of foreign affairs, is exactly what can lead to the creation of a government which would meet the requirements of the Afghan people. Pankin stressed that the Soviet Union does not insist on any definite make-up of this government or on its political or religious orientation. We are interested, he said, in assisting them in creating conditions for the Afghan people to resolve all these issues independently and freely. [passage omitted]

Too Early for Major Achievements

OW1311163391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From "Bulletin 2"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Afghan opposition delegation to Moscow and leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, told IF [INTERFAX] Wednesday [13 November] that it is too early to speak of any major achievements in the negotiations with the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Ministry representatives, and that debates have not gone beyond exchanges of views on how to settle the Afghan crisis and have Soviet and Afghan POWs return home.

According to him, the mujahidin set up a working group to promptly discuss Soviet proposals.

Asked by IF's reporter whether the degree of reciprocity was sufficiently high during the talks, Mr. Rabbani said that although each side had made a few paces towards agreement, considerable differences between them were still there.

Mortazawi Hopes for 'Constructive Stand'

OW1311162691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From "Bulletin 2"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The outcome of Wednesday's [13 November] round of talks between mujahidin leaders and the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministers will show how seriously the Soviet Union is determined to deal with the Afghan problem. IF's [INTERFAX] reporter heard this view from Seyed Rahmatullah Mortazawi, leader of an Iranian-based Shiite group of the mujahidin.

Mr. Mortazawi said his delegation had accepted the Russian leadership's invitation to come to Moscow in the hope to see the Soviet side adopt a more constructive stand on the Afghan problem.

The mujahidin leader expressed readiness to accept Foreign Minister Pankin's proposal to open a permanent Soviet mission at the Afghan opposition headquarters.

Afghan Fundamentalists Refuse To Free POW's

LD1311133591 Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Islamabad November 13 TASS—Any accords that may be reached between the mujahidin delegation visiting the Soviet Union and Soviet officials on the release of prisoners-of-war would be non-binding for fundamentalist groups of the Afghan armed opposition that boycotted the talks in Moscow, the Peshawar-based newspaper FRONTIER POST reported today.

According to the newspaper, such a tough stance has been taken up by the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, headed by Golbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, headed by 'Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, as well as some Iran-based groups.

They explained their decision by reasoning that the talks taking place in the Soviet capital will not, in their view, yield positive results as regards efforts towards a political solution to the Afghan problem.

Earlier, these groups and their leaders made a good deal of effort to frustrate the delegation's trip to Moscow, seeking to prevent the establishment of a productive dialogue between the USSR and the Afghan armed opposition.

A refusal by the militant wing of the Afghan opposition to release POWs may in many respects complicate a solution to the problem of repatriating Soviet officers and men taken prisoner by the mujahidin because, experts believe, it is precisely these groups that hold captive the majority of POWs.

Belonogov, Iranian Ambassador Discuss POW's

LD1111164891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1605 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov (TASS)—Current questions of Soviet- Iranian relations, and also of an Afghan settlement, including the problem of the release and the return home of the Soviet POWs who are in the hands of the Afghan opposition, were discussed today by Aleksandr Belonogov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Nematollah Izadi, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the USSR. The ambassador's attention was drawn to the particular significance the Soviet Union attaches to the earliest solution of this humanitarian problem. Hope was expressed that the talks with the delegation of the Afghan opposition now in Moscow will further its solution.

The Iranian diplomat was received at his request, the information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports.

Union Agrees To Hold Iraq's Enriched Uranium

OW1411134091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to IF's [INTERFAX] sources, the Soviet Union has consented to temporarily store on its territory the Iraqi reserves of enriched uranium discovered by the UN inspectors. Under this purely commercial deal with the United Nations, the USSR will keep all the reserves of nuclear raw material found in Iraq, including those the USSR itself earlier supplied to that country.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has confirmed that the Soviet Union used to supply Iraq with enriched uranium which was used at the Soviet-made nuclear reactor built for training purposes near Baghdad. The ministry says that this nuclear facility, now being checked by experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, used to train only Iraqi specialists and employed no Soviet personnel.

If the UN inspectors are convinced that the reactor has been used for exclusively civilian purposes, the USSR will return the uranium to Iraq with UN permission. In that case, it will be entitled to a reward for keeping the nuclear stuff.

Indian Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow

LD1411141791 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 14 Nov 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Alexey Tabachnikov]

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS—Indian Minister of External Affairs Madhavsinh Solanki arrived in Moscow today. During his working visit, which will last until November 19, he will meet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Inter-Republican Economic Committee Chairman Ivan Silayev and Foreign Minister Boris Pankin.

Talks will focus on a wide range of issues, including prospects for the development of trade and economic ties and scientific- technical cooperation between the two countries. The sides will also discuss some international issues.

Solanki plans to meet Russian leaders. He is expected to hold talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and possibly Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

East Europe

CSFR Deputy Minister in Moscow on Visit

Gorbachev Sends Message

LD1111221791 Prague CSTK in English 2144 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow Nov 11 (CSTK correspondent)—A bilateral agreement on Czechoslovak food aid to the Soviet Union could be signed within a week if Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel accepts a Soviet invitation to come to Moscow to sign it, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said in a message today to Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky.

Rychetsky, who arrived in the Soviet Union for a five-day visit on November 9, received the message from Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin.

The planned food aid will be financed through the European Community (EC). Details are to be discussed here with Czechoslovak experts Tuesday [12 November].

As part of a 600-million-dollar humanitarian aid package the EC agreed Friday [8 November] to grant the Soviet Union credits worth 150 million USD for food purchases from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

The EC did not specify how the credits should be divided. The Soviet Union can choose its suppliers according to the economic advantageousness.

The first proposal of this kind was made by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier in a speech at Harvard University in May 1990.

In meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of Gorbachev's Political Consultative Council, Rychetsky said the Soviet Union is currently going through one of its most difficult periods, which also affects the future of Czechoslovakia.

On Tuesday, Rychetsky will meet Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Committee for Operative Management of the National Economy. On Wednesday [13 November], Rychetsky will end his visit with talks with St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak.

Gorbachev To Visit CSFR

LD1211213191 Prague CSTK in English 2000 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow Nov 12 (CSTK correspondent)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will visit Czechoslovakia before the end of the year, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky told CSTK here today.

Gorbachev accepted an invitation to visit Czechoslovakia during a meeting today with Rychetsky, currently on a five-day visit to the Soviet Union.

A new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty is to be signed during the visit. The treaty was initialled in Prague on October 3 by the Czechoslovak and Soviet foreign ministers, Jiri Dienstbier and Boris Pankin. It replaces a 1970 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the then Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union.

Rychetsky said Gorbachev hailed Czechoslovakia's quick response to Friday's [8 November] decision by the European Community to earmark one- quarter of its 600-million dollar humanitarian aid package to the Soviet Union for food purchases from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

The "triangular" operation was first proposed by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier in a talk at Harvard University in May 1990.

Rychetsky on Gorbachev Meeting

LD1211212191 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Interview with Pavel Rychetsky, CSFR deputy prime minister, by correspondent Jan Smihula in Moscow following Rychetsky's meeting with USSR President Gorbachev on 12 November—recorded; Rychetsky speaks in Czech]

[Text] [Smihula] Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, although a journey to St. Petersburg is still ahead of you tomorrow, your 50- minute meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev today was undoubtedly the climax of your visit to the Soviet Union. During your conversation you also touched on the signing of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

[Rychetsky] There was only one reason why we did not talk about a specific date. President Gorbachev showed an unequivocal willingness to sign the treaty along with our president practically immediately. He himself, however, is unable to come to Prague until December at the earliest. I was told that if we had an urgent interest in signing the treaty President Havel could arrive at any time and the act of signing the treaty could take place in Moscow. In view of the fact that since 17 November 1989 President Gorbachev has not as yet visited Czechoslovakia, while President Havel visited the Soviet Union roughly a year ago, I conveyed to President Gorbachev an invitation to visit Czechoslovakia. President Gorbachev accepted it and promised to pay the visit this year, even if his visit is to be a short one of one or two days.

[Smihula] You have also spoken today with President Havel by telephone.

[Rychetsky] I reported to the president this morning. He was conducting his affairs at that time in Bratislava Castle. He asked me to convey his cordial greetings to President Gorbachev. He also asked me to convey to him our concern whether we shall have a partner in the Soviet Union in the future or whether a marked process of disintegration will occur which might destabilize the situation in Europe, and to convey to him at the same time the invitation to visit Czechoslovakia.

Rychetsky Comments on Visit

LD1411053791 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Federal Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky continues his visit to the Soviet Union. His stay there is reported by our correspondent, Jan Smihula, who asked Pavel Rychetsky the following:

[Begin recording] [Smihula] You said at a news conference that a feature of your visit was to look not only to the past but also to the future. What is your view after your meeting in Moscow? Is it one of a pessimism or optimism?

[Rychetsky, in Czech] It is very difficult, having been here for two or three days, to draw any definite conclusions. I must say that the developments, especially in the Ukraine, cause concern. This is especially true since in the Ukraine there are nuclear tactical and strategic weapons. The Ukraine recently demanded not only independence and sovereignty, but also wanted its own army, which would have a head count greater than that of the Bundeswehr. It is through the Ukraine that all the main oil and gas pipelines travel toward our territory. In case of a conflict between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, Russia could put an embargo on the Ukraine and thus affect our country.

The Soviet side fully realizes that in Brussels a decision on aid to the Soviet Union was made. The European Community is neither able nor willing to back the process of destabilization and fragmentation. Such a process would mean thay would have to start weighing their aid on a pharmacist's scale to divide it among newly emerging subjects. I also realize that even though the situation in our country is not nearly as dramatic, should our state break up it would markedly thwart all integration efforts on the part of West European countries toward our economy and country. [end recording]

West Europe

Defense Minister's Visit to Germany Appraised

Shaposhnikov Says Talks 'Substantive'

PM1311211991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Chistyakov report "especially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Our Talks Were Very Constructive"]

[Text] Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the Soviet defense minister, has described as "very fruitful and substantive" the talks held on the first day of his official visit to Germany.

"Our talks with the FRG defense minister were very, very constructive," Ye. Shaposhnikov said. "This applies both to the one-on-one talks and to the meeting of the delegations. My talks with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl were interesting and substantive too. Despite his busy work schedule, the meeting lasted around 40 minutes, during which we both agreed that we had managed to frankly discuss a whole range of issues of mutual interest— including the prospects for further cooperation between our countries and armies. The importance of a civilized and constructive solution to the problems facing our country at the present crucial stage of its social development was repeatedly stressed during all the talks. We also agreed on the need to preserve the USSR's unified defense space in order to ensure internal stability and international security, and to prevent a dangerous development of disintegration processes."

The fact that Ye. Shaposhnikov's first foreign visit as Soviet defense minister was to the FRG was brought about, as he put it, primarily because unique contacts in the military sphere already exist between the USSR and unified Germany: After all, this is the only NATO country in which Soviet troops will be present until the end of 1994. Second, the current visit also recognized the important role which Germany is playing and will continue to play on the European continent and in world politics.

The German side, Ye. Shaposhnikov noted, showed great interest in the ambiguous processes currently taking place in the Soviet Union. Defense Minister Stoltenberg, in particular, expressed concern about the centrifugal trends which typify the current domestic political situation in the USSR. "This too is probably justifiable, since not just foreigners but people in our own country now have the most varied opinions about what is happening at the center and in the republics, about who will be the future partner for foreign states, and so forth," Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov said. "This was probably one of the most important topics raised during the talks."

The defense minister briefed his interlocutors on the latest decisions in the USSR State Council, which has adopted the concept of building a unified Armed Forces while simultaneously delegating some rights in this area to the sovereign republics. "But at the same time I reemphasized that this decision in no way affects Soviet nuclear forces—either strategic or tactical—complete control over which will be maintained by the central leadership," Ye. Shaposhnikov continued.

During the discussions with Chancellor Kohl and military chief Stoltenberg, the Soviet minister reaffirmed that all treaties previously concluded by the USSR will be carried out to the letter, from the troop withdrawal from German territory to nuclear arms cuts. The marshal pointed out that complete mutual understanding was reached with the leadership of the sovereign republics on these issues.

An important subject of the talks at the Defense Ministry and the Federal Chancellery were the prospects for cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in the military sphere. "We were united in the view that collaboration between our two countries in this most important of spheres will be intensively developed," Ye. Shaposhnikov continued. "The basis for cooperation at the moment is, of course, the presence of Soviet troops on German territory. This will allow us to create a firm foundation for the further development of qualitatively new relations even after the last Soviet soldier has left the FRG."

Also discussed in Bonn were specific forms of cooperation, including promising forms such as the expansion of direct contacts between the two countries' servicemen. Ye. Shaposhnikov believes that meetings should take place not only and not so much between ministers as between soldiers, officers, military colleges, and academy students. "The aim of such contacts is to gain a better understanding of one another and to create in the relationship between the two armies that highly necessary climate of trust and openness without which the building of new collective security structures in Europe will be inconceivable," the minsiter stressed. "I believe that the accords reached in this area are one of the main results of my trip to the FRG."

"I must admit that today's Bundeswehr no longer brings to my mind the 'enemy image,'" Ye. Shaposhnikov said. "Judging by the atmosphere and content of the meetings, the German side does not see us as a likely opponent either."

However, the Soviet and FRG defense ministers by no means intend to restrict their contacts to "humanitarian" links, despite their importance in the context of the expanding "people's diplomacy."

"We are prepared to go much further in this area," Ye. Shaposhnikov noted. "For example, we discussed possible ways of sharing experience in areas which had been absolutely secret until quite recently. This could take the form, for instance, of mutual briefings on various aspects of military training in the two armies or on flight safety. This last point is particularly topical, since certain models of Soviet military hardware which had previously been in service with the GDR Volksarmee are now being operated by Bundeswehr soldiers."

"It may sound strange, but the development of contacts with the FRG Armed Forces could be a source of valuable experience for us," the Soviet defense minister believes. "We do not want to copy anything blindly, but isolation from world experience inevitably leads to certain losses. That is why we are confident that exchanges of information in the military sphere will be interesting and useful for both sides and will ultimately serve to strengthen our common security."

'Atmosphere of Trust' Noted

LD1311213891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Video report from Germany by correspondent V. Mostovoy—from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Mostovoy] The possibility of creating a joint brigade of the Bundeswehr and the Soviet Army, given favorable conditions in the future, along the lines of the German-French formation, should not be ruled out. This was the reply to a journalist given by German Defense Minister Stoltenberg. Nevertheless, the majority of the questions to Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and his German colleague at the news conference concerned the problems of today. The interest of officials and representatives of the German media in preserving the unity of the Armed Forces of our country was particularly tangible, as was the concern at the actions of individual republics. Our minister's well-argued, convincing answers inspired hope and optimism in those present in the hall. This was the end of the visit. [passage omitted]

[Stoltenberg, in German with superimposed Russian translation read by Mostovoy] I think that my colleague and I can regard the result of this visit very positively. Our talks took place in a genuinely open atmosphere of trust. We have achieved specific agreements which will help us to considerably broaden the program of cooperation which has already begun between our Armed Forces. They include many various aims, but it is very important that we exchanged opinions in such an atmosphere. Much has become clear, let us say for me personally, as regards your future military reform and structural changes in the Soviet Armed Forces. We can now continue the discussion on military and strategic problems at a higher level, both bilaterally and with other states in the West and the East. And of course a large role in international affairs is played by personal contacts. If you associate with each other for many hours, then of course you get to know your partner better, and you understand better.

German Visit 'Significant'

LD1311164191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Commentary by Valeriy Chebotaryev]

[Text] What's significant is that the first foreign country the new Soviet defense minister is visiting is Germany. It's also important that this is the first visit of a Soviet military official of such a rank to Germany. Today our countries have many mutual interests, including those in the sphere of defense. This has become possible in the context of the new military and political situation in Europe following the changes for the better in relations between the East and the West.

It is no secret that only recently West Germany was viewed as a potential enemy in the Soviet military quarters. Even after Germany had became a unified state some people in the Soviet Union still could not give up this conviction, and it's understandable. Soviet people remember the Second World War. The cold war also contributed to this end. In this context the most remarkable is the Soviet defense minister's announcement that he does not view Germany as a potential enemy.

During the visit discussions centered on the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Germany, and the two sides have demonstrated common approaches and pledged the process will be completed by the end of 1994, as was earlier planned. The German side has expressed its concern about the fate of the Soviet nuclear weapons. Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov informed that there is no Soviet nuclear weapons in Germany any longer. As for the nuclear weapons on the territories of the Soviet sovereign republics, neither [as heard] of them, he said, claims the right to control nuclear weapons systems, so the control over the Soviet nuclear weapons will remain centralized.

The two sides believe Soviet-German cooperation in the military sphere is successfully developing and will become ever more active in the future. According to the German defense minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, military ties between the two countries should promote stability in Europe. He believes a way to greater security on the continent lies through confidence-building measures and better relations between states. Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov in turn has stressed that the Soviet Union will fulfill all obligations under the treaties it earlier concluded on disarmament and control over armaments. This will be the Soviet Union's contribution to confidence-building and cooperation on the continent, believes the Soviet Defense Minister.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Arrives in Vienna

LD1311054991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1400 GMT 12 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 12 Nov (TASS)—At the invitation of the National Council (parliament) of Austria, a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Konstantin Lubenchenko, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, arrived here today.

The delegation will be received by President of Austria Kurt Waldheim, and will meet National Council Chairman Heinz Fischer, deputies of the parliament from various political parties, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alois Mock, and representatives of business circles and trade unions.

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent, K.D. Lubenchenko expressed the conviction that widening of Soviet-Austrian ties will continue to develop, especially in the economic area. Much attention during the talks will be devoted to questions related to the deepening of interparliamentary contacts.

French Food-for-Fuel 'Barter Deal' Signed

PM0811141791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Nov 91 p 5

[TASS report: "We Exchange Raw Materials for Food"]

[Text] Paris, 6 Nov—In November 1992 and October of the following year the USSR will supply France with 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil, 1 million tonnes of petroleum, and 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in exchange for sales of 227,000 tonnes of foodstuffs to the USSR this winter. These details of a recently signed government agreement between the USSR and France on the granting of credit to the Soviet Union to the tune of 1.6 billion French francs have emerged from a joint communique by two French firms—Sucre et Denrees and Interagra.

Before the end of next March, France will supply 100,000 tonnes of beef, the same amount of sugar, 20,000 tonnes of powdered milk, and 7,000 tonnes of baby food. The aforementioned two firms will deliver them. The French petrochemical giants Elf Aquitaine and Total will receive Soviet energy carriers.

This essentially barter deal, with an element of credit for the Soviet side, was prepared on the initiative of the French Government.

Latin America & Caribbean

Ustinov Delegation in Cuba for Withdrawal Talks

LD1411043791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0118 GMT 14 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sereda]

[Text] Havana, 14 Nov (TASS)—A Soviet delegation headed by roving ambassador Vyacheslav Ustinov arrived in the Cuban capital last night for talks on the withdrawal of the Soviet training brigade from Cuba. The delegation was met at Havana International Airport by Alcibiades Hidalgo, Cuban first deputy foreign minister, and a group of officers of the republic's Revolutionary Armed Forces headed by divisional General Sergio del Valle.

Talks May Cover U.S. Naval Base

LD1411055491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0320 GMT 14 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sereda]

[Excerpt] Havana, 14 Nov (TASS)—[Passage omitted] The Soviet delegation consists of three diplomats and seven military officers. Answering journalists' questions at the airport, Vyacheslav Ustinov recalled that the decision to withdraw the Soviet training brigade was announced on 11 September by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. By mutual agreement, dates were set for the holding of talks at which we hope to resolve all the issues in a very amicable way. Asked whether any document would be signed at the end of the talks, the Soviet roving ambassador said everything depends on the decisions made at the talks. "We are not ruling out any options," he added.

According to Vyacheslav Ustinov, the principal question he is authorized to discuss is the withdrawal of the Soviet training brigade. But this does not rule out the possibility that other questions may be touched on during the talks, which will last 7-10 days. The Soviet diplomat noted that during the protracted talks on a settlement in southwest Africa he had worked in close contact with many Cuban colleagues, including Alcibiades Hidalgo. "I think that these contacts have been maintained and that our talks will be held in a highly amicable spirit regardless of possible differences in approach," he noted. Asked whether the topic of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo would be touched on during the forthcoming talks, the Soviet diplomat said he could not rule this out. "Any other questions" would be broached at them, he added.

In his turn, Alcibiades Hidalgo stressed that the closure of the U.S. naval base on Cuba was "a key aspect of the questions which we are to analyze."

Supreme Soviet

Gorbachev Given 'Cold Shoulder' on Credits

LD1311202791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has as a matter of fact given a cold shoulder to President Gorbachev's request for a credit of 30 billion rubles from the USSR State Bank to the Finance Ministry.

Debates on the issue revealed that the president had already given such instructions concerning credits of dozens of billions in loans on several occasions in the past.

The money was urgently required following the suspension of contributions to the Union budget by the republics.

The parliament disapproved of those measures and asked the president to discuss draft measures concerning interrepublican spending at a session of the State Council on Thursday [14 November].

R90 Billion Said Spent Without Approval

LD1311205691 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1745 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Report by correspondent V. Kukushikin]

[Text] It is possible that all civil servants will not be paid this month. This has become known at a news conference at the USSR Supreme Soviet, where representatives of the USSR Control Chamber and people's deputies revealed major violations of the law by the USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR State Bank. It has been established by documents that money amounting to around 90 billion rubles [R] was spent without the Supreme Soviet's permission. This is approximately the amount of our military budget. And now, apparently, the Supreme Soviet will not have enough time to approve an emergency budget for November and December this year and, consequently, to pay salaries to workers and office staff.

[Begin recording] [video shows Kukushkin interviewing unidentified man] You have been talking now about practically secret accounts, this money which was allocated by the president as well [word indistinct]. These are the closed accounts. On the whole, is this problem being considered by the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Man] Of course, this was under discussion yesterday, and the USSR Control Chamber has already been verbally instructed to finish the investigation. In the next few days, we will prepare written instructions to the USSR Control Chamber to continue the investigation regarding the above accounts. [end recording]

Incidentally, it also has been announced that, apparently, the USSR president knew about the secret accounts in which R52 billion were kept. He also knew about the circulation which was constantly being done by the USSR Ministry of Finance. I must tell you yet more news: The Ministry of Finance will not bear responsibility for a disastrous situation in the country—in two days this ministry will be liquidated and, as always, there is nobody to blame.

Audit Chamber Chair Addresses Session 12 Nov

LD1311144491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1730 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Address by Aleksandr Kondratyevich Orlov, chairman of the Audit Chamber of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the USSR Supreme Soviet proceedings in Moscow on 12 November; from the "Parliamentary Diary" program—recorded]

[Text] In our opinion we could not talk about an emergency budget—and I am absolutely convinced of this—but about emergency measures to finance a number of areas of all-Union management in November and December 1991. Second, a budget always means a certain correlation between revenues and spending. Without revenue, there can be no spending. Or, as they say, you have to cut your coat according to your cloth. Unfortunately, even this basic truth was not adhered to here, nor is it at present. For the fourth quarter, the USSR Ministry of Finance has defined budget revenues as 32.8 billion rubles [R]. Incidentally, different Ministry of Finance documents contain different figures. However, that's as may be. Expenditure is set at R97.1 billion. This means—work it out—that monthly spending in the fourth quarter will amount to R32 billion to 33 billion. Taking the two funds into account as well—that is, the single stabilization fund and the fund for social support to the population—monthly expenditure should be R41.1 billion.

In October budget revenue, excluding the funds, amounted to R11.5 billion, and all in all R463 billion were actually spent, including the funds for stabilization and support to the population. We were told here that 25 billion had been advanced—15 billion, even—although in another of their documents the figure is 17 billion. Of the R46.3 billion I can give you every figure, exactly, for what the money was spent on in October. In that month, the deficit amounted to R34.8 billion. As you can see, the credit taken out by the president wasn't even enough, although at the moment they are trying to persuade us that it still hasn't all been spent.

Because in November and December the budget revenues will not exceed a total of R22-23 billion, the stabilization fund 1.8 billion, and the social support fund zero, we will not get anything. During the last two months expenditure was usually on the increase, taking into account our tendency to do panic work. This will constitute, in our estimate, R90-91 billion. That is excluding the 21.5 [not further specified] remaining expenditure for the last months. In the near future the

Supreme Soviet should expect the USSR president to make a new request for loans, to the value of R68.073 million. That is the situation we may find ourselves in. We must ratify 93 [not further specified] now. These constitute the loans taken by the president, and in order to survive for two months—November and December—there will have been a further sum of 68-73 [not further specified], according to our calculations.

Third, in his 1 November appeal to the president, the chairman of the chamber displays the desire to take thorough stock of all expenditure for the fourth quarter, with the aim of reducing it. That is a very correct idea. But it has to do with two very serious issues. The first issue is this: To put it mildly, for many years running, while this Supreme Soviet has been in existence, the Ministry of Finance has by no means given any objective information about the fulfillment of the budget. They present figures and calculations according to the principle of writing one, and carrying two in their head. For some reason the Ministry of Finance has revised the budget, violating the law on the Union budget for 1991. Why has the fund for the social support of the population been included in the budget? It is included in the budget even though the law does not allow this. It must not be included, as it is not a budget fund. The Ministry of Finance gives the figure of 810 [not further specified] for the state loan. We go to the statistics directorate, and see the figure of 866 [not further specified]. How is one to interpret these things? Back at the end of the last year, the Budget and Finance Commission attempted to analyze the figures of the Ministry of Finance—but only by using the papers and accounts submitted to the Ministry of Finance. And to tell you the truth, we were messed around with, and they are still messing around with us, even now.

We need the original documentation, the bookkeeping analysis, and the working documents for all accounts. We tried to do this on our own. I think that in the future the Supreme Soviet should not have blind faith in the so-called official figures. Everything has to be checked and subjected to expert analysis. And in connection with this, there is the question of the secret accounts.

For the first time in the entire history of the USSR Ministry of Finance, the Audit Chamber carried out this year a documentary check on the execution of the budget for nine months—we will be presenting it to you shortly, absolutely exhaustive information, running to 30 pages—and came to some unexpected discoveries. Two secret accounts were uncovered, amounting to R51.9 billion as of 1 January 1991. That is, it is as if a second, parallel budget—an underground budget—existed. The primary leaders of the Ministry of Finance and the USSR State Bank now assert that there is nothing secret about these accounts. The money in them, they say, is a budget carryover from previous years, a practice which has always existed. Perhaps. But to begin with, why did the Supreme Soviet know nothing about these funds—and we are talking of almost R52 billion—in the two and a half years of its existence, and why did the president not know? Why were they not included in the figures? Why were they not included in the accounts when the budget deficit was being summed up, or mentioned, as something was stated about working funds? Comrades, the cash in hand amounts to only R2 billion, and that should not be confused with R52 billion. Second, what carryover can there be from past years, when officially our budget has been in deficit for four years in a row? Why were these carryovers not used to reduce the deficit, in 1990 or 1989, for instance? Third, why is it that since 1939—one of the accounts began in 1939—only ministers of finance have been able to make use of this sum, without supervision?

Since these accounts were discovered the USSR Ministry of Finance and the State Bank have no longer been allowing Audit Chamber staff anywhere near their offices. We cannot do a thorough check of the sources of incoming funds and movements within the accounts. We cannot elucidate the movement of currency funds, for instance in the Vneshekonombank. We cannot check the gold reserve. Perhaps they are refusing entry to the Audit Chamber because the Ministry of Finance and the USSR State Bank still have a few secrets from the Supreme Soviet? I think that the new Supreme Soviet should express its attitude to this kind of prohibitive behavior and infringement of the Law on the Audit Chamber.

Political & Social

Gorbachev, Republic Representatives Meet 14 Nov

LD1411112391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1023 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Unscheduled news bulletin]

[Text] Good morning. Today it seems that the Novo-Ogarevo process, which was literally interrupted by the tragic events of 19 August, is being resumed. At this moment representatives of republics which will discuss questions concerning the conclusion of a political agreement are meeting at the Novo-Ogarevo estate near Moscow. As you know a political agreement should back up the economic program that has been signed by the republics.

Our correspondents have just reported that the republics of Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are represented there. Ter-Petrosyan, the leader of Armenia, is currently in the United States. The Ukraine and Uzbekistan are not represented. [announcer's voice fades away]

[Begin recording] [Gorbachev, fading in] ...of the republic. He ought not to participate either in the activity of the Supreme Soviet until 1 October [as heard] while elections are taking place or in the activity and the work of the State Council. Although I want to make you aware of this. I express...

[Yeltsin, interrrupting] The Ukraine...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Yes. So it will not be taking part in the sitting. Comrade Karimov—I don't know, the aircraft is there, we had assurances from him that he would be leaving early in the morning by air, but for some reason or other he isn't here. I think this will be cleared up. But since we agreed that it would indeed be just the members of the State Council and a small number of experts who are involved in the preparation and working through of these questions and no one else, in fact we can already begin this work.

I thank the press for being present at this start and until we meet on the results of the work and as the day proceeds. Thank you. [end recording] [video shows leaders taking their seats at a long table; Gorbachev at the head of it addressing the assembled leaders]

Complaints by Kazakhs, Russians

LD1411110391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] The session of the State Council will commence in Novo-Ogarevo today at 1200 under the chairmanship of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. Remarks put forward by the republics on the new draft Union treaty will be discussed. Replying to a question by an INTERFAX correspondent, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the most serious complaints were lodged by Kazakhstan. First and foremost, they touch upon the redistribution of powers among central and republican bodies of administration. The Russian Federation made just as many complaints. Partially, in can be explained by the fact that Russian specialists took an active part in the working out of the draft treaty.

During his meeting with trade union representatives on 13 November, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the Ukrainian representatives' participation in the session is in doubt. It is caused by the fact that an election campaign is taking place in the Ukraine, and the carrying out of any sort of political activities is prohibited for the period of its duration. Even the holding of the session of the republican Supreme Soviet is not allowed.

Yavlinskiy To Report

LD1411051191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0430 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Among other things, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA report on today's Novo-Ogarevo meeting of heads of state and government on the draft political Union treaty between them. According to MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, the conference is scheduled to hear a report by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy on the state of play as far as the follow-up agreements to the Economic Community Treaty are concerned. This will probably take the form of a verbal summary of the memorandum already submitted to Gorbachev. Its contents have been learned from a well-informed source. Today, the newspaper publishes extracts from this document. I will merely draw your attention to a date mentioned by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. If the treaty does not come into force by 20 December at the latest, this will severely complicate efforts to end the crisis and bring about reform both in Russia and in other states. [passage omitted]

TASS Observer on Process

LD1411112991 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT 14 Nov 91

[By TASS observer Boris Grischenko]

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS—Novo-Ogarevo is opening its winter political season with a discussion of the latest amendments to the draft Union treaty suggested by former Soviet Union republics. As Mikhail Gorbachev put it at the presentation of his book about the August coup attempt, a completely new type of Union treaty is now under consideration."

None of the recent political projects can boast such a difficult and even tragic fate. Published in March this year, the draft treaty became the focus of intense debate by the preparatory committee set up under a decision of the 4th Congress of People's Deputies. In spite of major difficulties the draft treaty was ready to be signed on June 17 but the attempted coup aborted the process.

The document in its present version capitalises on the Ogarev experience of compromise and on the lessons of the August coup forming a background to one of the most important processes of the perestroyka era.

Gorbachev Meets With Trade Union Leaders

Social Contract Demanded

LD1311211991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Video report by correspondent V. Stepanyuk on President Gorbachev's meeting with representatives of sectoral and republican trade unions on 13 November—from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] The conversation began almost with an ultimatum. The union leaders told the president that if during the switch to free prices—even though they are already rising without any announcement of liberalization—no new acts on the social protection of the population are adopted, then the unions will not support the reforms.

The president, agreeing with the way the question was put, nevertheless considers that the unions, as the only public organization in the country, could have much greater influence on republican governments in order to stop the process of breaking economic links and the complete collapse of the economy, especially at such a time when tomorrow a session of the State Council in Novo-Ogarevo begins to discuss the draft of the Union treaty in its first reading.

[V.P. Shcherbakov, chairman of USSR General Confederation of Labor] We prepared proposals on a social contract, a social contract which must be examined by the State Council and confirmed by all participants in the economic union and which will guarantee the social protection of people during the period of the switch to market relations. I was very pleased by information in today's TRUD newspaper where it was said, literally in the first few lines, that the Russian Council of Ministers, headed by Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, will at its very first session examine a package of social acts that will protect people during the period of the transfer to market relations.

'Threats' Rejected

OW1311210891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet trade union leaders have demanded that President Mikhail Gorbachev and the State Council should give an act of legal guarantees of social protection for the population during the transition to market economy. Spokesmen of industries' and republics' trade unions met with M. Gorbachev in the Kremlin on Wednesday [13 November] and suggested setting up a body responsible for social problems including control over privatization, indexation, distribution of foreign aid, and so on. The chairman of the General Confederation of Trade Unions Vladimir Shcherbakov warned the president that "if the masses driven to despair by falling living standards come out into the streets, a disaster would be imminent which could throw us back to a totalitarian state".

On his part, President Gorbachev parried that "the best social protection is not a legal act, but a chance to earn. We must give the people economic freedom, not acts". He criticized the trade union speakers to their adherance to the old methods of running the economy. "Free with their accusations of disrupting the economy, the trade unions fail to realize that they are also partly to blame", he said. He rebuffed the threats of street violence stressing that would in no way help solve the problem.

M. Gorbachev rebuked the trade unions for making no attempt to oppose "isolationism pushing us on to a perilous path" Experience has shown the people that isolationism breaks down the supplies of goods and materials disrupting the economy.

The Soviet economist Grigory Yavlinskiy present at the meeting said he had written a memo to the president warning that unless the Economic Treaty is ratified soon, a complete economic breakdown will come in mid-January "My impression is that instead of forming a single economic space we are stuck in aimless talk—from the state and republics' leaders to trade union branches.

Arkadiy Volskiy, a member of the Committee for Operational Management of National Economy, has appealed to trade unions for social partnership. "If the trade unions really want to contribute to improving our life, they should attend to labour agreements and economic contracts". According to Volskiy, only 17 contracts between enterprises within the same republic have been signed and only 7 of those between different republics. "We may not last even till January 15, as Grigoriy Yavlinskiy hopes", he said.

Labor Union Discusses Failure of Reform

OW1411062091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1235 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Vera Plushch, co-leader of the Inter-Republican Labor Staffs' Union (ILSU), said at the ILSU presentation in Moscow Tuesday [12 November] that the recent reforms had failed to improve the position of working people in the USSR. She complained that the "wild privatization" campaign, whereby state property had been flowing on a large scale into the hands of ex-CPSU functionaries and industrial head-managers, had left labor staffs largely uninvolved.

The ILSU leaders insist that workers are entitled to receive some of the privatized property free of charge and the rest in the form of shares. Turning workers into proprietors can help mitigate the effects of unemployment and price liberalization.

According to the presentation's organizers, the ILSU is a public organization called upon to unfold a mass worker campaign in support of economic reform, the formation of a government of popular trust and the introduction of factory self-management based on full economic independence. The ILSU, founded less than 1 year ago, is said to unite labor staffs numbering 4 to 6 million people.

Commission Reports on KGB Involvement in Coup

LD1311150891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Excerpts] USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev believes that the Union treaty may be concluded in December of this year. He stated this—as reported in an exclusive interview with Russian People's Deputy Army General Sergey Stepashin by an INTERFAX correspondent—at a meeting held on 12 November with members of the USSR state commission to investigate the activity of KGB bodies during the period of the August coup. Stepashin is leading the work of this commission. [passage omitted]

According to General Stepashin, the commission presented the USSR president with materials testifying to the active involvement in the coup d'etat of former members of the KGB—namely Kryuchkov, his first deputy Ageyev, and his deputy Grushko—currently under arrest. Stepashin stressed that the state commission had sufficient grounds to conclude that by its activity the Union KGB had long stood above state power.

The facts presented by the commission testifying that state security bodies tapped the conversations not only of deputies, but also of representatives of the higher echelons of power—if, in Stepashin's words, these did not stun, then in any event they convinced the president that the situation was akin to that which had taken shape in the 1930's.

Stepashin also reported that the decision had been made to prolong, for the transitional period, the activity of the state commission headed by him, including within its makeup representatives of sovereign republics.

According to Stepashin, the USSR president agreed with the conclusion of the state commission that one ought not be hasty in setting up an interrepublican security committee. The question of its formation, financing, and functions can only be resolved after clarifying the view on this score of all the republics that have signed the Economic Community Treaty.

Pankin Remarks on Resignation Rumors

PM1311133591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 3

[Report by K. Stanislavskiy: "'Sensation' on Smolenskaya Ploshchad"]

[Text] In response to a request to comment on a television report claiming that the USSR foreign minister may resign, Boris Pankin merely shrugged his shoulders and suggested we ask those to whom the authors of the "sensation" refer.

I contacted Eduard Shevardnadze's assistant, Sergey Tarasenko. "The Foreign Policy Association had nothing to do with these rumors!"—he declared categorically, adding that Shevardnadze has not told him personally of any plans to return to the foreign policy department. Neither did Teymuraz Mamaladze, another assistant of the association's president, offer any basis for the rumors.

Crimes By, Against Foreigners Increase

LD1411115591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0000 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Excerpts] There were 7,500 crimes against foreigners reported last year. This is five times the average level a decade ago. This year the number of reported incidents is even higher despite a small decline in the number of foreign visitors. The vast majority of the crimes involve thefts of money, clothing, electronic goods, or other property. A quarter of the thefts were from cars. Almost half of all the crimes against foreigners were committed in hotels, dormitories, and camp grounds.

New crimes are also appearing in this country, such as credit card fraud. The illegal use of credit cards accounted for $3.4 million worth of purchases last year.

The number of crimes by foreigners is also growing. This year they have committed 345 crimes, that is 25 percent more than in the same period of last year. Foreign nationals are especially active in illegal trading, money changing transactions, and smuggling, including the smuggling of arms to nationalists in the troubled Chechen-Ingush region of southern Russia. Ninety-two percent of all the smuggling out of this country is done by Poles and Vietnamese.

Opinion Poll on Existence of Soviet Union

OW1411073891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0700 GMT 14 Nov 91

[From "Viewpoint"—transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] **USSR: Myth or Reality?**

The DATA news agency has reported an opinion poll showing that most Russians are convinced that the USSR as a single state has completely disintegrated. The poll was conducted on 9-10 November among 1002 people in 13 Russian cities by the National Public Opinion Studies Center in conjunction with the "Public Opinion" Foundation. 63% of those questioned said the Soviet Union no longer exists.

1 in 5 believes the USSR continues to exist.

17% are undecided.

Margin of error—3%. [passage omitted]

TASS Carries Press Review for 14 Nov

LD1411074891 Moscow TASS in English 0721 GMT 14 Nov 91

["Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 14 TASS—The Soviet Union's economic difficulties are the main subject of the materials published by today's newspapers. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article entitled "The West is Ready To Save Republics of the Former USSR From Bankruptcy (but only on condition of their joint responsibility)". It deals with problems of the country's foreign debt, specifically, difficulties with the balance of payment in hard currency, short-term debt problem, long-term debts and a possible financial strategy.

PRAVDA publishes the results of an express-poll held in Moscow, which reflects a negative attitude of most of the polled to the decision of Moscow authorities to raise the price of bread. The newspaper also publishes an open letter sent by a Muscovite to Gavriil Popov, in which he strongly criticises the economic policy of Moscow leaders.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA writes in detail about the energy crisis in eastern Siberia. Khabarovsk, one of the largest cities in the Soviet Far East, has been left without fuel. The city of Chita, one of the major industrial centres of the Baykal region, is also on the verge of an energy crisis.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA also writes with concern about the energy crisis in eastern Siberia and the Far East.

Newspapers continue to devote much attention to problems of inter-ethnic relations. The situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic is in the focus of attention. It improved a little after the lifting of the decree of the Russian president on imposing the state of emergency on that area. Nevertheless, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA describes the situation as uncertain in its report from Groznny. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA recalls that, despite the lifting of the decree of the Russian president on imposing a state of emergency, marshal law, imposed by Chechen President Dzhakhar Dudayev, remains in effect. The newspaper carries an interview with Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, who actually expressed disagreement with the decision of the Russian parliament to lift the Russian president's decree.

Andranik Migranyan, a politolovist [as received], writes in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA about prospects of the Russian national movement. He believes "the economic collapse, the disintegration of the country and the deepening of a crisis in inter-ethnic relations after the failure of the putsch are paving the way to power for national-socialist forces."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries an interview with L. Plyushch, one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalists, who favours an unconditional separation of the Ukraine from the Union. He believes "democracy and nationalism are the two movements that coincide in the Ukraine."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes in detail about the conflict in the Baltic region over the property of the Soviet Armed Forces, the value of which is estimated by specialists at 150 billion dollars.

Economic

Budget Deficit Financed 'Illegally'

OW1411105491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2202 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From "Soviet Business News"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [13 November] in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mr. Aleksandr Orlov, chairman of the USSR Control Chamber, announced that the USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR's State Bank exceeded the budget deficit cap several times over in 1991 without permission from the Union parliament and without corresponding corrections to the budget law.

Mr. Orlov noted that these departments financed the budget deficit by illegally forming intergovernment loans, that is, without receiving formal assent from the Union parliament. In the first nine months of this year, 84.6 billion rubles of excess government expenditure was created in this way. It is expected that the USSR budget deficit will exceed this year's 26.7 billion ruble budget deficit cap by 200 billion rubles.

Country's External Debt Problems Examined

PM1211154191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 7

[Interview with Doctor of Economic Sciences Ivan Korolev, deputy director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute, by Vladimir Kuznetsov, under the "Russia and the World" rubric; place and date not given: "Our Debts—Our Wealth"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In recent years, the Soviet Union—once considered one of the most reliable partners—has undermined the confidence of Western creditors once and for all. The country's external debt, which was the "stumbling block" at the G-7 talks, stood at $32 billion as far back as 1986. By 1989 it had already increased to $47 billion, and now it has broken a record indicator—$67 billion. Three years ago the World Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO) predicted that the external debt would reach $100 billion in 1992, but this predicition was not mentioned three years ago and it is not mentioned now. "Unfortunately, information on our domestic situation, which the State Committee for Statistics willingly sells abroad for hard currency, is still as difficult as ever for Soviet specialists to obtain," Doctor of Economic Sciences Ivan Korolev, deputy director of IMEMO, stated.

[Kuznetsov] Is information once again being withheld from us? It is rumored that Uzbek President Karimov recently asked Gorbachev what had been purchased in the last 10 years to have produced the USSR's external debt, and the latter could not answer.

[Korolev] The composition of our debts is no secret. It is generally believed in our country that they currently stand at 42 billion foreign currency rubles. Long-term credits amount to 25 billion foreign currency rubles or 60 percent of this sum. This is the money used by us to purchase various goods. The rest of the debt is made up of credits obtained to repay old debts. Interest charges on these debts alone account for one-half of all our payments. According to some estimates, this sum now accounts for 70 percent of all foreign currency earnings, and this is determined by several factors—the reduction of export revenue, the decentralization of foreign economic relations, and the illegal outflow of foreign currency abroad.

[Kuznetsov] Is the extent of this outflow known?

[Korolev] Western specialists estimate that it is at least $5 billion. Moreover, this has happened literally within the last two years.

[Kuznetsov] A few years ago the local drugs mafia in Colombia tried to buy off the government by repaying the country's external debt—around $15 billion. How do things stand with such theft in other debtor-states, and what does the future hold for us in this sense?

[Korolev] In developing countries, such currency outflow is approximately equal to the total amount of their external debt. But compared to many of them, living conditions in our country are worse. Money has limited functions—you cannot buy land with it, nor can you build a large farmstead. Against this background, we may even break their records for the illegal outflow of foreign currency from the country!

[Kuznetsov] The Western press is saying that independent republics are concealing foreign currency revenue from the center.

[Korolev] Yes, this happens quite often. How is it done? They sell oil, for example, at obviously reduced prices, falsify the specifications, and credit the difference to various accounts in foreign banks. Auctions were held quite recently to supply Kemerovo coal to Turkey, in which—strange though it may seem—there were bids by four Baltic organizations. The Ukraine also trades with Kemerovo coal. The situation is much the same with oil and metal. According to some estimates, our foreign currency reserves have already been reduced to $5 billion. But imagine how large they might have been, when even a tiny state like Taiwan has reserves totalling 70-80 billion [currency not specified].

[Kuznetsov] Nowadays everyone in our country is hoarding anything that comes to hand: oil, foreign currency, gold, and even nuclear missiles. But how, meanwhile, is the problem of apportioning the debt between republics being resolved? This, incidentally, was what brought the G-7 representatives—the "seven horsemen of the apocalypse" as REUTER dubbed them—to our country recently.

[Korolev] Even before the conference it was clear that it is actually impossible to apportion the debt. The problem is not the inability to find a basis. It is primarily the creditor banks that disagree with such an apportionment. The loans were granted on the security of the Soviet Union's ability to pay. And what is happening now? Foreign currency revenue is earned mainly from sales of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] raw materials, although the economic situation there is already difficult enough without that. Thus, the burden of debt lies mainly upon Russia.

[Kuznetsov] Are you actually hinting that Union debts will have to be repaid wholly by the Russians?

[Korolev] Strange though it may seem, this is the only option which, in certain conditions, may be advantageous for everyone, above all Russia itself. I will single out four such conditions here. First and foremost, the RSFSR should assume control over all the Soviet Union's assets, including the debts owed by developing countries which, incidentally, only Russia is capable of calling. Second, the republics should transfer part of the Union property to Russia within the context of, for example, joint ownership. This could comprise a portion—specified by a treaty—of shares in ports and other projects. Since the problem of debt will be resolved in conjunction with creditors, such shares could be held as guarantees that obligations will be honored by the republics. What is most important, however, is that Russia itself could bank on deferring payments insofar as it will also become a guarantor for Western creditors that debt obligations will be honored. Ultimately, all parties will have a commercial interest. So that at last we will move onto a level of civilized relations in this problem too.

[Kuznetsov] Is there any hope at all regarding the recovery of our Communist credits? Incidentally, who owes us what exactly?

[Korolev] Cuba has the largest debts—$16 billion. Mongolia is next with $10 billion, Vietnam with $9.5 billion, India...

I cannot rule out that some might even refuse to repay us. Therefore, a comprehensive and sensible economic policy is required for each debtor-country. Here it is possible to take one of several avenues. One avenue is to obtain repayment in the form of consumer goods. Syria is already prepared to supply us with such goods now, but another problem emerges—organizing the deliveries. Our own fleet requires foreign currency. Chartering other countries' ships would also require foreign currency which we lack.

The second avenue is to convert our credit balances in other countries into some kind of long-term investment. In Vietnam, for example, where we have made large capital investments to build many plants. Foreign capital is actively flowing there. The country is on the upswing.

Third and last, with the debtors' consent we could sell these debts on credit markets to various other firms or countries at a discount. This has already been done to some extent. But here, again, an individual approach is required. For some countries there is a high probability—maybe up to 80 percent—that the debt can be repaid, while for others the probability of this happening is zero.

[Kuznetsov] Can these countries' promissory notes serve as a guarantee for our own external debts?

[Korolev] Yes, but then their nominal value will have to be reduced by a factor of five. This is a rough estimate, of course. The point is that the $90 billion we are owed and our own external debt of $67 billion are two incomparable figures. We have to pay our creditors in freely convertible currency, but the debts owed to us are usually repaid in goods deliveries, often at inflated prices for poor quality products.

[Kuznetsov] Should there be some kind of levers to pressure debtors?

[Korolev] There are only a few. And they should be applied more flexibly than before, taking into account mutual commercial interests, not ideological interests. One such lever could be our military supplies. It would be very difficult for countries which traditionally purchase weapons and military hardware from us to gear themselves to other suppliers. They depend on us, including for spare parts which we sell them.

[Kuznetsov] Our debt is the largest in the country's entire history. But even so, it would comprise a mere fraction of the massive U.S. indebtedness to its creditors. What is the difference between them?

[Korolev] Like the distance separating Heaven and Earth! Although in fact our external debt is not the worst problem. The question of our domestic commitments is far more acute and could be severely exacerbated if the republics introduce their own national currencies. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to begin not with an Economic Community Treaty, but with a civilized apportionment of our economic legacy which would lead republics into the joint ownership of property. This in turn would create a base for preserving those links which are of interest to all republics.

Yes, the U.S. foreign debt amounts to several hundred billion dollars. Moreover, the total U.S. debt—foreign and domestic—is in the order of $12 trillion. But the actual figures mean nothing. They should always be viewed in the context of the given economic conditions. For America, with its extremely wealthy domestic and foreign markets, all this merely testifies to the high development of its financial system.

But take a country like Brazil, which is the world's largest debtor. This country's government was successful in correctly managing the credits it received, setting up modern sectors in the economy and, above all, saturating the domestic market. Now they produce virtually everything. Their exports to the United States currently stand at $5 billion, and this is by no means entirely from coffee and sugar. And in our country? You know, no other country today has such an empty domestic market. Our primary task is to saturate it, and it can be solved by attracting Western investments into our economy and repaying our own debts with their help. Many countries, including South Korea and Japan, traversed just such a path without having to sell off the entire country for foreign currency, as we are doing.

[Kuznetsov] One final question, although not on the same topic: What will your institute be doing now that Union structures, including scientific structures, are in fact collapsing?

[Korolev] At the moment we are tackling Russian topics. Specifically, a Russian Center for External Economic Research is being founded on the basis of one of our departments, and we are trying to attract specialists from all regions of the country to work in it.

Economic Impact of Industry Conversion Viewed

PM1311092191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1525 GMT 1 Nov 91

[Report by Aleksandr Abramov; from the "Conversion and Us" newscast]

[Text] [Abramov] Advanced technology. Top-class specialists. Goods that we all need. All this is to be found at the Lukhavitsy Machine Building Plant. These goods will probably soon be appearing in the stores. But for the time being the plant's main product isn't washing machines—it's the MiG-29 fighter, recognized worldwide as one of the best in its class.

Yes, we can make MiG's, but we need washing machines too. Yes, this is top-notch military technology, but I'd rather buy this greenhouse for my dacha—cucumbers and tomatoes are terribly expensive even in state stores. If you're richer you might even want to buy a yacht. Straightaway I realize that my simple human wishes are in conflict with the collective's interests at this major military production facility. This shop, fitted with unique equipment, stands idle half the time. Orders for the plant's main products—MiG's—have fallen off. And it's a very bad thing if people who make fighters recognized around the world have to set themselves the task of surviving. [Video shows Abramov with three interviewees]

What is conversion? What will you gain from it? What will happen to you? If you don't find this subject a bore, could you say a few words about the conclusions you have reached?

[V.I. Nungezer, shop chief] As far as conversion goes, when it started we thought it was a good idea. We all supported it, of course. Now that the concept has been developed, as it were, we can see that it's a tragedy for us. The state has trained us, invested considerable amounts of money in us, and now, unfortunately, we can see that it's all going to waste. We've now realized that what is most important at the moment is not what has been invested in the way of training and other assets, but the ability to work out how to save yourself. We've been left to fend for ourselves, as it were. Look, we're talking about a big plant—every shop, every subunit is designed to ensure the smooth, uninterrupted operation of the plant as a whole. The plant is like a living organism. Unfortunately, we're now reaching a point where it's every man for himself. Take our shop producing components in composite materials. Without our shop the MiG-29 we've just been talking about wouldn't exist. Now we're having to look for products just to survive. We're assimilating production of windsurfing boards. We've cleared an area and are starting up a shop to produce disposable syringes. What's that got to do with aviation? Nothing! Yes, we're having to do all this for just one reason—survival. This is the task we're now setting ourselves. Our generation, engineers, so to speak. The one thought in the chief engineer's mind is to make sure our labor collective survives. Survival for us, of course, means surviving here, in this environment.

[Abramov] Perhaps you're a bit slow off the mark, what do you think? Isn't it the old attitude that you want to be told what to do, and if no one tells you you'll sit around doing nothing?

[Nungezer] There probably is something to that. After all, this is what we were trained to do for a long time, our contracts were always readymade—we just performed them without adding any ideas of our own. Nonetheless... Well, we admit this to some extent. But to say that we should accept part of the blame, say 50 percent of it, we simply cannot do this. Around three years ago we realized that hard times were coming. And if we hadn't taken steps back then and started looking for ways to ensure self-preservation, we wouldn't even be in the state we are in today—50 percent of the collective wouldn't be here any more.

[A.V. Volkov, deputy shop chief] We're convinced that the aircraft industry just cannot be allowed to collapse because it represents in concentrated form all the technichal and technological developments, as it were, thus acting as the mainspring of progress in our country. I am talking about the aircraft industry. Therefore, we believe, it is not up to us to decide how it will develop in the future. This is beyond us. It is for statesmen to decide how it will develop, in what form—military, civilian, or mixed—and our task at the moment, in my opinion, is to preserve the collective, to preserve the existing production facilities in running order, in a combat-ready state, so to speak.

[Abramov] Naturally, the aircraft industry is not just the MiG-29. Civilian aircraft will also be built here, including small, comfortable, and inexpensive ones like this one, with a name straight from a fairytale—Leshiy [wood-goblin].

However, in order to start up their production, the leadership of the country and especially the military, and even the plant director, will have to decide a number of things for themselves. [turns to plant director] You know, if it were not for conversion, this shop for the production of light aircraft would probably not be here. But we will talk about that later. For the moment I would like you, as the director of this huge plant, to tell us what solutions you see and what are the ways out of the situation in which management from above, or simply our history, have landed enterprises like yours.

[S.S. Tektonidi, plant director] There are ways out. The first and most important one, in my opinion, is to find a way to sell our machines. There is a demand for them. Let me give you a simple example: The Japanese foreign minister came to our country and brought along a billion [currency not specified] in exchange for a solution to the question of the Northern Territories. What do we need this billion for, when we have machines worth a billion ready to be marketed. They must be marketed. It is true, of course, that the old state system is unable to resolve these questions along the old lines. If we were given complete autonomy as regards marketing, we would be able to solve this question. To be specific, what we need is for someone to come forward, take on responsibility, and sign a document which would authorize our plant to sell aircraft.

[Abramov] All kind of moral misgivings arise here, ordinary people might say that we are turning into "arms dealers," as we used to describe the West. Now we are thinking of selling ourselves. What is the answer?

[Tektonidi] If we do not sell these aircraft, other companies will take our place, including what we describe as our Western "marketing teachers" or humanitarian aid suppliers. After all, there is no vacuum in the market. It is essential, therefore, that we engage in trade.

[Abramov] Would you be able to do this, are there any buyers?

[Tektonidi] There are buyers. Take Czechoslovakia, for example, a very small country, you might think, but it is acting sensibly. There, the director of a defense enterprise is authorized to sell his output for two years, and thus to establish funds during this two year period, including the wage fund, the development fund, the fund for the reorganization of production. That is to say, to create the necessary preconditions for the plant's existence. After all, a plant is a living organism. Apart from the main production tasks it must also ensure housing construction and the solution of social tasks. In addition to this, directors in our sector have found out that they must even be familiar with the various grades of meat. That is to say, we have to take an interest in all sorts of questions. And we are willing to do this. Unfortunately there is this foot-dragging in the solution of questions, especially as regards the marketing of our main output... But there are would-be buyers, and thére are plenty of them. It is necessary to market our output.

We have a complaint to make to the Ministry of Defense. We would like to say to them—you have no right to push us into the production of different output, you should help up in this case, specifically as regards prices. If you cannot do this, then say clearly that the Ministry of Defense has no need for our plant. In that case we will set up a joint-stock company and we will sell aircraft for which there is demand in our opinion.

[Abramov] It seems to me that perhaps they have no idea what to do themselves.

[Tektonidi] But they ought to know. After all, there is a specific leadership which is responsible for this job. If all the minister of defense understands by perestroyka is that it is necessary to attend news conferences in civvies instead of shoulder boards, then this is not enough. It is necessary to understand the difficulties being experienced by the plants which were at one time feeding our defense. Production, unlike a politician, cannot sit on two chairs at the same time. It constantly needs to have clearly defined tasks.

[Abramov] What you have said is constructive criticism. Let us move closer to your small aircraft. Over here perhaps, please. So this is your Leshiy.

[Tektonidi] The aircraft is called SL-90 Leshiy. Our first clients, forestry workers, have dubbed it Leshiy. They highly value the specifications of this machine which will help them in forestry work. It is really a multipurpose plane. It is suitable for forestry surveys, surveys of water reservoirs and power lines, it can be used for aerial photography, and if necessary it can transport two [word indistinct] passengers. The aircraft has very goods specifications. All it needs for landing or take-off is a 300-meter clearing, no more, with a grassy or any other surface.

[Abramov] What about its range?

[Tektonidi] Its range, fully loaded, is 520 kilometers. Speed is 150 kilometers per hour. That is to say, it is a very handy aircraft. Furthermore, according to the latest legislation relating to aircraft, we have the right to sell these machines also for personal use. We have now organized training at the plant for anyone who wants to learn to fly and work as a pilot.

[Abramov] And how much will this aircraft cost? Is this a difficult question to answer?

[Tektonidi] Yes, it is difficult. We started out with a small figure in the region of 180,000 [currency not specified]. However, now that prices for materials and finished products have risen sharply, this price will be higher, of course. This is the situation as regards this machine. We are planning to begin selling these machines literally as from next year. There are certain difficulties, of course, with the delivery of engines, for example. But as for next year, we already have a contract for the necessary number of engines to be delivered by one of the plants in our sector. Furthermore, this machine also has a future. We have a good outlet to foreign markets. Czechoslovakia, for example, and Britain. And what is more, under the agreement, the British will also supply Lycoming engines. So basically, all we have to do is some adjustments in connection with the new engine, and then to market these machines.

[Abramov] The talk about the future of the plant is theoretical only at first glance. The future of the aircraft plant enables us to glimpse also our own future, and certainly that of its workers and engineers. [turns to trade union official] If conversion progresses successfully, it may happen that some of the people around you here, and the workforce of your aviation complex as a whole, may find themselves out of work. And this applies even more to the engineers. What does the trade union intend to do in this situation? This is a very complex situation not just for us civilians, but also for you civilian people working at a defense enterprise.

[V.A. Telerovskiy, trade union committee chairman] Above all, it is our task to retain the people, to retain the collective without moving away from the aircraft-building specialization. To stay put, and to retain the cadres who are producing the equipment which you have just seen and also the equipment which you saw a few minutes ago in the parking lots.

[Abramov] But there is a big difference between the MiG-29 and your Leshiy. The latter, in any case is much lighter and cheaper. Where will you get the money to retain this kind of workforce and these engineers

[Telerovskiy] There is no question about it, there will have to be both staff cuts and retraining. Above all, retraining. New jobs will have to be created. Possibly some joint ventures will also have to be established with a view to providing employment for people. Especially since there are no major machine-building complex plants in our city. Therefore it could happen that some of the people might find themselves out of a job as regards their requirements and their professional training. Our task consists of ensuring that people are not left in the lurch, that they are not left outside the factory gate. This will involve training, retraining, and the acquisition of new skills.

[Abramov] This means that the trade union may have to fight management, or go along with management, but the main question is where to go from here?

[Telerovskiy] Well, you know, there is no need to fight management in this case since we are looking at one and the same problem from the same angle. That is to say, neither management nor we are interested in losing people.

[Abramov turning to worker] Have you been working here for long?

[unidentified worker] This is my 26th year.

[Abramov] It appears that we do not need as many MiGs as you can produce. We feel very sorry for you because you may find yourself out of a job. What should be done in your opinion?

[unidentified worker] What do you mean, what is to be done? We will look for work, we will seek to switch to and retrain for new production. We are already making new products. There may be others. We will carry on working and learning.

[Abramov] But you are not very keen to retrain, are you?

[unidentified worker] What do you mean we are not keen? We need to work. That's life. Our airliners are getting old, there are no small engines, there is no industry to make them...

[Abramov] Could you do it?

[unidentified worker] It is necessary to pool efforts with the aircraft specialists who have worked here for so many years. It would be simpler to retrain them than to take people from the street and train them for the aircraft industry. It is necessary to retrain old workers, that's all. We are paying out hard currency for Boeings. We could be buying other things...

[Abramov] "Conversion and Us"—everyone can draw their own conclusions, having watched this program. This is what occurred to me: If defense industry enterprises are given, in addition to a precise state order, also freedom of action in the new market economy, if they are not overburdened by fantastic plans from our military, not only will they be able to survive but they will also demonstrate top-notch work and possibly help to extricate our whole economy from its troubles. But that lies in the future. At present it is necessary to give them a whiff of the oxygen of freedom, that is to allow them to operate at their own risk and peril.

Funding Problems for Overseas Operations Viewed

PM1211143191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 91 Union Edition pp 1, 12

[Article by M. Berger: "Bank for Foreign Economic Activity Promises to Fight to the Bitter End; Who Will Be Carried Out First?"]

[Text] For some time now, Western suppliers of goods to the USSR have not been the only ones affected by delays in routine payments. The victims include our own so-called overseas personnel: diplomats, people working in trade missions, and journalists. Moscow is not sending their wages or money to cover running costs....

Talks between the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity and its clients have recently come to resemble scenes from family life. Increasingly often, the classic question "Where's the money?" is met by the classic response "What money?" In reality, of course, the questions and answers are formulated somewhat differently, but the thrust of the dialogue is exactly as I have described. Naturally, the first thought that enters your head in these situations is that the bank has either squandered or pocketed the hard currency designated for payments. However, according to Anatoliy Nosko, deputy chairman of the bank's board, without whose signature not a cent leaves the country, there is simply nothing to "squander": The state does not have the money it expected to have at its disposal.

I should point out that we are talking about the currency problems of organizations which receive hard currency from centralized sources, i.e. in line with the government-approved currency plan. This plan provides for centralized purchases of food, medicines, equipment, and a great deal more. It also allows for the cost of maintaining overseas establishments and missions, including the pay of journalists working for central publications, many of whom are now without a livelihood and the means to cover day-to-day expenses. There is no one abroad from whom they can borrow a thousand or so until their next pay packet. Besides, they do not know when it will arrive and, indeed, whether it will arrive at all.

In response to a direct, rhetorical question as to whether our colleagues are threatened with "debtors' prison" (IZVESTIYA's foreign correspondents are also in a difficult financial situation), Anatoliy Nosko said, without any rhetoric, that we should not count on the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity transferring money to our people. Not in the immediate future, at least. There is no hard currency available. So what is going to happen? The bank estimates that hard currency receipts will be 60 percent less than anticipated by the end of the year. If you consider that the currency plan for 1991 was originally drawn up with a deficit of seven billion rubles (more than 11 billion dollars), the answer to the question "Where's the money?" becomes perfectly obvious: There is no money, there never has been, and there could not possibly be.

There are objective reasons and convincing explanations (those who are interested will find them later on in this commentary). There is also the habit, evolved over generations, of suffering fools and contending with the absurdities of our life. For all that, the government should honor its commitments.

"Tell me, are your overseas personnel—of whom there are quite a few—receiving any money?"

"They are," Anatoliy Nosko replied. "Not because they are our personnel but because the bank earns hard currency for foreign assignments, including long-term assignments. You should do the same yourself."

This is fair advice, of course, but it is also true that a bank which handles billions on the state's behalf has far greater possibilities to earn a living than a foreign correspondents' center or an embassy, which are forbidden to engage in commercial activity as a matter of principle.

Anyway, what has happened has happened, and those who do not want to look like a government of state dreamers dreaming about nonexistent receipts should work on the basis of what is, rather than on the basis of what might have been. But was it really impossible to warn people of the impending hard currency shortage, so that they could at least have had time to moderate their affairs accordingly and not be placed in such a ridiculous position?

[Berger] Which payments are you still making?

[Nosko] The government decides how hard currency should be used. We simply obey instructions.

[Berger] And what are your instructions?

[Nosko] In view of the very serious currency crisis, we have been given three priorities: food, medicines, and cargo ships for their transportation. All other payments have to take second and third place and so on. [Nosko ends]

The decline in export revenues began a long time ago, but the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity was able to deal with the situation in the past. It did this in two basic ways: Using deposits, i.e. capital invested in the bank for a certain period, and trading in gold. However, the development of the economic and political situation in our country has led to a dramatic withdrawal of deposits: some 10 billion dollars in the past year. Lack of confidence is costing our country very dear. As far as gold is concerned, operations have now been suspended, as the republics have raised the question of dividing assets (gold, hard currency—although there is none—and debts owing to us: almost 150 billion dollars, but most of that is unlikely to be recovered).

There is another channel offering a solution to our difficult situation: financial credit, which, unlike tied credit, may be used at the borrower's discretion. We were due to receive several hundred million from one of the Arab countries literally the other day. We were on the point of receiving the money when the creditor read the Economic Agreement and failed to find the name of the body borrowing on the state's behalf: the USSR State Bank. Naturally, the credit was suspended. All in all, some two billion dollars have been held up for reasons like this.

[Berger] Is there not a danger that, finding itself in a difficult situation, the government will decide to freeze the currency accounts of enterprises, firms, and even citizens? It is generally rumored that there has been no mention of this currency for a long time.

[Nosko] If anyone does have any currency, it is in enterprises' accounts. In considerable sums too: several billion rubles. This money is not lying idle, of course: It is in circulation, but I can assure you that it is there and could be issued to the possessors at any time. As far as freezing accounts or any other compulsory measures are concerned, I can well imagine the consequences of such action. Our bank will fight to the bitter end to prevent that from happening.

[Berger] And if you are unable to hold out?

My last question went unanswered. Or, at least, I did not get any answer that could be totally reassuring.

Decision Adopted To Facilitate Production

LD1311195391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1559 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 November. (TASS)—In order to equip the national economy with raw materials and products which are in very short supply in the context of the country's limited foreign currency resources, the Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy of the USSR has adopted a decision on insuring the commissioning of vital capacity for manufacturing import-replacement products this year.

What is being accepted, specifically, is the proposal submitted by those republics' governments on whose territory is being established the ability to manufacture import-replacement products and concentrate essential material-technical and labor resources at these installations, so as to commission them this year.

Republican governments have been instructed to examine the question of freeing profits from taxes on building organizations, received from the on-schedule construction of installations at which vital capacity for manufacturing import-replacement products is being established.

The decision, conveyed to TASS today, was signed by Ivan Silayev, the committee's leader.

Inter-Oblast Deals Transcend Republic Borders

PM1311131191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[By correspondent Viktor Chemodurov; "Commentary": "Outbreak of Sovereignty"]

[Text] Belgorod Oblast—It looks as if this is a positive sign of the times: Having come face to face with economic disaster, neighboring oblasts are realizing all the more clearly that they can resolve at least some of their problems by pooling facilities and resources and elaborating and implementing targeted programs. And in realizing this they are reaching out to one another and, what is particularly valuable, are already uniting.

The example of Belgorod Oblast, which by dint of its geographical position has found itself at the juncture of "political fractures," is particularly revealing in this respect. In October V. Berestovoy, chairman of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, placed his signature on two documents. First, Belgorod Oblast joined the Central Chernozem Oblasts' Association for Economic Cooperation. And a few days ago, in Kharkov, it became party to the Treaty on Strengthening Economic Ties, concluded by a number of Ukrainian oblasts. It exercised its right to do so as a neighbor.

As far as the Central Chernozem Region is concerned, the idea of an association had been coming to maturity here long ago. The experience of Kursk's "Kozhobuv" Concern, which had invested money and had already built a plant on Belgorod Oblast's territory to produce dyestuffs which are in shortest supply and are being acquired for currency, showed the way.

All the signs point to the Ukrainian oblasts also obeying the "law of regional gravity," since they dispatched their representatives to Kharkov to strike a deal. And I think that the people from Belgorod were invited not as a special favor but simplv from elementary economic necessity.

The neighbors' traditional ties have recently become complicated, and both sides felt the impact of this immediately. Belgorod construction workers were left without ballast because the oblast used to receive all its ballast from the Ukraine. Everything associated with textiles also came from there, and these goods have also disappeared as there were no other suppliers. On the other hand, sealing jars of children's fruit food became a problem in Poltava when the Belgorod plant, which should have been delivering chalk with special properties used in the production of high-quality rubber for sealing rings, was now in a neighboring state...

This is on the economic level, but partition is altogether unimaginable on the daily life level. By the way, inhabitants of Belgorod are totally unaffected by the fact that coupons have been introduced in Kharkov's trade network. Just as Belgorod residents' cards pose no obstacle to Kharkov's inhabitants. These cities are linked so much by blood ties that when their inhabitants visit relatives they can acquire goods in any store without difficulties. And it hard to imagine a son grudging his mother some coupons. Or a brother not lending his brother a resident's card.

No, officials in Belgorod took the actual fact of the proclamation of sovereignty calmly. "Gone are the times" G. Seleznev, acting first deputy chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], noted in a conversation with me, "when someone whom nobody knew decided somewhere else how people should live. If they want to live as a separate state, that is their right—let them do so. This in no way affects our mutual good-neighborly relations."

And so four oblasts—Poltava, Sumy, Kharkov, and Belgorod Oblasts—have so far joined the interoblast council of economic cooperation which was created in Kharkov. It is to be expected that in the near future they will be joined by at least three more (their observers participated in the constituent meeting, and only the absence of their senior leaders prevented a treaty being drawn up). As soon as this happens, additional opportunities for cooperation with the very extensive region of the eastern Ukraine will open up to Belgorod's inhabitants.

Even now this cooperation is acquiring a definite outline. Up till now Belgorod's inhabitants have been able to alleviate the inconveniences caused by the appearance of Ukrainian customs posts along the highways thanks to personal contacts with the three neighboring oblasts' leaders. Now they have officially agreed on everything. In order not to offend the population, Ukrainian customs officials will not inspect their Russian neighbors' personal transport and effects, and Belgorod highway patrolmen will not pick on drivers of cars with, for example, Kharkov license plates and try to find out why they have parked outside some store... With regard to shipments of contractual deliveries to enterprises, the interoblast council's executive directorate takes on the task of their unfettered movement. Or consider the following fact: Belgorod's inhabitants will not have to find at least 5 million rubles and build their own gas range plant—Poltava, having a smooth-running production unit, will take metal from the Russians and will do everything itself, and the finished product will go to Belgorod. It has also been decided to study the question of processing pig and cow hides. Other ideas are also in the pipeline.

But the economically autonomous enterprises will have the last word. The executive directorate is setting itself the task of helping them find one another and suggesting the best possible types of business contacts. In other words, it will coordinate and create conditions for fruitful cooperation.

Sovereignty is fine, but life must go on.

Strikes Throughout Country Observed, Detailed

PM1311160791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

[Roundup of PRAVDA and TASS correspondents' reports: "If You Don't Help, We Will Strike!"]

[Text] People are increasingly forced to resort to extreme measures like strikes to protect their social rights. We do not regard such a protest as the best means to solve our numerous problems. But you can understand desperate people. Here are a few alarming on-the-spot reports.

Sayanogorsk (Khakass SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic])—Teachers and workers in the city's school establishments started an indefinite strike in defense of their social rights yesterday. They had previously submitted a number of demands concerning notably questions of increasing wages, granting housing to people in need, and ensuring a certain minimum level of foodstuffs and staple goods. But talks with the republic leadership, which had the day before ratified a program to develop the public educational system in Khakassia, have become deadlocked.

Kaunas (Lithuanian Republic)—Participants in the strike by drivers of scheduled city buses have demanded a wage increase. The strike came as a surprise to most people in Kaunas, especially since it began in the morning. Many people consequently arrived late for work. True, the strike was soon over, but the drivers' demands remain. The possibility of those demands being met will be discussed with the city fathers.

Kamensk-Uralskiy—A two and a half hour warning strike was staged by the city's medical workers. At a rally held in front of the city soviet they demanded a fivefold salary increase, a payment of 40 percent compensation for living in an environmental disaster zone, and a reduction in the working week to 30 hours.

Sovetskaya Gavan (Khabarovsk Kray)—The strike by city bus drivers planned for Tuesday [12 November] was cancelled. The local authorities found a means to almost double the wages of passenger transport workers and thus meet the strike committee's basic demand.

Chelyabinsk—Convicts in several corrective labor establishments intend to declare a strike. Those who guard them immediately threatened to strike too. The convicts are demanding the abolition of all restrictions on receiving parcels and improved conditions of detention.

Companies Aim To Multiply Gold Production

Ask for End to State Monopoly

PM0811170591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by M. Krushinskiy: "I Am Following, Following Tumanov. It Cannot Be Ruled Out That Thousands of Russian Gold Miners Will Soon Start Singing This"]

[Text] Market economy activists have set themselves the goal of quickly gilding Russia. They are undertaking to increase production of the precious metal several times over, while not spending a single state kopek.

I will remind you: Our October article (IZVESTIYA No. 246) devoted to the same problems spoke of the imminent creation of a consortium to fund the activities of prospectors' artels. The idea has even begun to be put into practice in a more solid form: The joint-stock company "Rossiyskoye Zoloto" [Russian gold] is being set up, combining bank and industrial capital of 500 million rubles [R]. Its founders include the USSR Association of Enterprise Leaders, the Moscow Commodity Exchange, the Association of Russian Banks, a number of production and construction cooperatives, and also the Russian Geology Committee with its rich experience of prospecting in the Soviet interior. Vadim Tumanov, founder of the prospectors' movement, who enjoys a reputation among his colleagues as a general who is never defeated, has agreed to head the new firm.

"Our potential is sufficient to arm ourselves with the necessary equipment and begin work as early as next spring," Mark Masarskiy, well-known industrialist and public figure and one of the project's authors, said. Himself a former member of Tumanov's "Pechora" artel, he will hold the post of first deputy head of the joint-stock company. "We are reckoning on obtaining the number of bulldozers that we need to start with in exchange for construction materials and other scarce goods produced by the founders. And then we ourselves will invest in the production of these machines (we will need, in all, about 500) and subassemblies for them, maybe starting with rolled steel..."

The firm intends to settle accounts with future suppliers in money, "in kind," and with a share in future profits. And, on the other hand, to act in the goldfields not only as a miner but also as a construction worker, prospector, and even planner.

According to Masarskiy, in the comparatively poor deposits in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic prospectors have extracted an average of 10 kg of gold per bulldozer during the season. In Amur Oblast, where, in particular, the new firm plans to develop work, this figure will double. It is planned to operate with minimal costs—using the tour-of-duty and expedition method. Having "pumped up its muscles" on placer deposits, the company will subsequently go over to opening up primary deposits, which are more labor-intensive and attended by major capital expenditure.

"We are not going hat in hand to the state, saying: Hire us. There is no need to hire us! And we do not require any concessions—either in taxes or in credit. We want just one thing: Give us equal conditions with the state structures. Pay us as much for the gold we produce as you pay them..."

The discrepancy in gold miners' pay ranges between R15 and R120 per gram of metal produced, Masarskiy maintains. Naturally, the minimum rate is for prospectors, the maximum for state enterprises. As a result, the former frequently work at a loss, while the latter are able to maintain an unnecessary (rather, necessary only to themselves) social infrastructure and, at the same time, the apparatus of those very higher departments which control prices and issue licenses for extraction rights and funds for materials and equipment. It really is a "vicious circle" leading to stagnation in the sector and also, incidentally, throughout the national economy.

"What Russia, which has embarked on a path of radical reforms, needs today is not a pitiful 200 tonnes of gold but at least 2,000 tonnes! Can this be provided by 'Rosalmazzoloto' [Russian diamond and gold extraction administration] with all its ramified bureaucratic apparatus, which produces only paper orders? If it can, let it do so. If not, let it move over and stop being a monopolist. America, incidentally, has increased gold production sixfold since 1975 without any state monopoly..."

There is no disputing the fact that gold is precisely the commodity that can serve as yeast for the future cake called the "market economy." It would be both a lifeline for the ruble, which has plunged into an abyss, and a guarantee for foreign investors and creditors. But the level of the metal's production recently has, alas, not been gratifying. It is worse than that: The prospectors' artels, these prime movers and, at the same time, stepchildren of the sector, are falling apart before our eyes. It is said that in Magadan, for example, the line for containers for those wishing to leave the Kolyma fields already extends for two years. To reassemble them under Vadim Tumanov's banners—this is an idea which hands the reformers a serious chance.

Joint Development Envisioned

LD1411103891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1001 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 14 Nov (TASS)—Soviet gold producers are seeking Western partners for the joint development of deposits of the precious metal, says Valeriy Rudakov, head of "Glavalmazzoloto" in the latest issue of the weekly 'MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI'.

His organization, which is engaged in the extraction and refining of gold, has taken several deposits in Yakutsk, Magadan Oblast, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan off the secret list, making available information about their geography, about the gold content per unit of ore, and the gold stocks at each deposit. One of them in the north is capable of producing 350 tonnes of the precious metal, Valeriy Rudakov said.

"Glavalmazzoloto" is now selecting foreign partners for the joint development of the deposits concerned, Rudakov observed.

Moscow Oil Exchange Adopts New Trading Rules

LD1411110291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1833 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 Nov [TASS]—New provisional rules covered today's regular trading on the Moscow Oil Exchange [MOE].

According to figures from the (CORTES) Agency, 102,000 tonnes of oil were sold for a total of 175.6 million rubles [R]. In all, deals worth R191.5 million were concluded during trading.

The new provisional rules for trading were adopted by the MOE market council on 5 November with the aim of creating more favorable conditions for brokers. The same session of the market council and a meeting of the founders of the MOE, (CORTES) reports, decided to increase initial capital to R180 million. The results of a closed auction selling MOE shares were also made public. With a starting price of R500,000 per share, the average price amounted to R1.26 million [as received].

At the first MOE auctions which took place a month ago 295,000 tonnes of oil were sold.

Decline in Tourism Attributed to Rising Crime

OW1411062291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1235 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A senior USSR Interior Ministry official, Aleksandr Kotlyarov, says that the nunber of foreigners who will have visited the Soviet Union in 1991 will be 1-1.5 million lower than last year. The official said at a briefing in Moscow on Tuesday [12 November] that the decline had begun already in 1990, when half a million less foreign tourists than expected visited the country.

Kotlyarov said the soaring rates of crimes against foreigners were the main reason for the decline. He added that there was a shortage of resources to finance the struggle against crime. Besides, the USSR has no treaties with other countries on legal assistance in such cases. The Interior Ministry official said international crime syndicates were very active in the Soviet Union. The massive sale of forged contracts for employment abroad to Soviet citizens brought a net profit of 170 million roubles.

Illegal operations with foreigners' credit cards are quite common. In many cases foreigners themselves sell their credit cards to criminals and then turn to the authorities for help saying they have been stolen. They do so in a bid to receive a compensation the Soviet side is obliged to pay. Kotlyarov says that as a result, the treasury has lost 2 million hard currency roubles in January through October.

Railroad Costs Increase; Use, Profits Decrease

OW1411015691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2202 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet railroads carried 8.2 percent less freight from January to November of 1991 than during the corresponding period of last year. Passenger traffic was also down by 10 percent.

The utilization of rolling stock declined, as did the average weight of trains, while the cost of carrying freight rose. For the year as a whole, profits earned by the railroads will be 21 percent less than in 1990.

Military

Shaposhnikov Provides 'Essential' Information

AU1411113891 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 14 Nov 91 p 5

[Report by Lothar Ruehl: "Moscow Sees Its Need for Security Satisfied"]

[Text] The visit by Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to Bonn has provided some essential information about the Soviet Armed Forces' composition, leadership, and supplies and on its relationship with the individual republics. Several Western assumptions seem to be confirmed by this information, while the situation of the Soviet Armed Forces remains ambiguous concerning other issues. This applies, in particular, to Soviet nuclear weapons, to the major part of heavy conventional equipment, and to arms production. The current distribution of power between the remaining Union authorities and the republics is also still unclear. Shaposhnikov's information seems to be permeated by optimistic personal assumptions and assessments on some critical points.

In contrast, information about the Union's strategic weapons, including its nuclear arms depots, seems to be relatively certain. According to concurrent information, they are still under the control of the Union—guarded by the KGB and under military protection with operational control by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow and the supreme command of the strategic missile forces. A political double authority between the Union president and the Russian president for all these parts of the Armed Forces on Russian soil seems in the process of being organized, involving electronic release codes to release the electronic locks on the weapons systems themselves.

There are 17 of the 22 ICBM launch pads in the former USSR (for strategic intercontinental missiles) on Russian territory, mostly along the Trans-Siberian railroad; two are in the Ukraine, two in Kazakhstan, and one is at the Russian-Kazakh border. The 22 Air Force bases of the strategic bombers with nuclear arms depots are mostly in the Ukraine but also in Belorussia, in the Baltic states (Tartu in Estonia), and on Russian territory. The withdrawal of Soviet forces with nuclear arms from the Baltic states has started in the meantime. These consist of 177 strategic bombers, 1,394 strategic missile launch systems (396 of them mobile on land), and 912 strategic sea missiles on nuclear-powered submarines. These submarines are all stationed in Russian ports.

The matter is different regarding the nonstrategic nuclear weapons for "operational-tactical" short-range weapons systems, which have so far spread over 40 to 50 depots in the former 14 military districts. The number of these weapons is currently being estimated at 25,000 to 33,000, since there is no official Soviet information on them. The Soviet defense minister did not provide any detailed information on this issue. Of particular interest are the about 760 nuclear-capable medium-range bombers, the 200 medium-heavy navy combat planes and about 2,200 nuclear-capable fighter bombers, about 1,400 short-range missiles, and 8,800 nuclear-capable artillery guns of various kinds of the Army. The approximately 3,800 nuclear-capable antiaircraft missile systems also pose an international security problem in the border area because of their warheads. Information about the actually existing controls is by no means sufficient. Thus, it is not clear whether there are central release methods for releasing the lock on these weapons and how effective these methods are.

A fundamental piece of Soviet information is that on 4 November in Moscow a basic understanding was achieved between the Union and Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus [Belorussia], and Kazakhstan on the preservation of central Union Armed Forces and their joint upkeep with the principle of a nuclear arms monopoly and the attribution of the mass of Navy and Air Forces to these Union forces. In Shaposhnikov's view, this sufficiently satisfies the general need for the security of the union and the republics, as well as that of the international community of states.

Commentary on 'Unified Armed Forces'

PM1411123391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

["Commentary" by military correspondent N. Burbyga under the general heading: "Soviet Army: The Republics Break Ranks"]

[Text] Apparently the former Union republics that have declared their independence have decided to swiftly take the Armed Forces on their territories in hand without even having properly agreed among themselves on their status.

The Georgian and Azerbaijani presidents' decrees, which talk of transferring the property of the Soviet Army to republic ownership, are not the first in the process now under way of dispersing army property along ethnic lines. Similar steps have already been taken by the Ukraine and Armenia, and recently Latvia unilaterally decided to assume ownership of all USSR Defense Ministry and border forces' real estate. The debate on this in parliament took up no more than 30 minutes.

Who is next? Is this process now irreversible? In that case, how do we view the announcement by USSR Defense Minister Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, who only recently told Soviet and foreign journalists that all members of the country's State Council favored the preservation of unified Armed Forces, that this important decision had finally brought to an end the long-running arguments about the army and ways of reforming it? Moreover, it was decided at a State Council session that civil defense units, military commissariats, military departments at higher educational establishments, and defense technical sports societies would switch to republic jurisdiction. As for national guards, it was planned that they should be locally funded and based on subunits of Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops under republic jurisdiction and their primary purpose would be to guard important state and government facilities. All other military formations remain in the charge of the center, but there is no longer any certainty that the State Council decision will be implemented. The statement by Azerbaijan Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov at the conference of commanders of Baku garrison units that the republic Council of Ministers has decided to start compiling an inventory of the equipment, armaments, and military property of Soviet Army units stationed on the republic's territory and that force could be used in the event of noncompliance is evidence of this. It is a short step from compiling inventories to privatization, depending on the political situation or even the political ambitions of a particular republic leader. There is no need to say what follows.

New Pay Rates for Army Workers, Employees

PM1311152991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by TASS correspondent S. Ostanin: "Army and Navy Workers and Employees Get Higher Wages"]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov—In accordance with the USSR Minister of Defense Order dated 1 October of this year, the existing wage rates and salaries of Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees have been increased.

The TASS correspondent was told at the USSR Ministry of Defense press center that the wages of staff in leading professions at military medical establishments, rest homes, boarding houses, dispensaries, tourist bases, military training establishments, schools, boarding schools, hostels, children's preschool establishments, adult education and cultural enlightenment establishments, theaters and visual arts enterprises, sports organizations, and archives have been raised by 20 percent. All other working people, and also all workers and employees at military units, institutions, military medical establishments, and USSR Ministry of Defense enterprises and organizations located on the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia get a 50 percent raise.

Payment of the new wage rates and salaries will come into effect in November of this year and will be backdated to October.

Strike Threat Prompts Higher Pay for Civilians

LD1211133791 Moscow TASS in English 1144 GMT 12 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vasiliy Belusov]

[Text] Murmansk November 12 TASS—The civilian personnel of the auxiliary ships of the Northern Fleet threatened to go on strike over a demand for higher pay. The threat of a strike that would have had an effect on the country's defence capacity prompted the president of the USSR to make concessions to the Fleet's civilian personnel. Their pay has been raised by 50 per cent by presidential decree.

The wage levels of civilian personnel working on naval ships are getting closer to those of their counterparts on merchant ships under the authority of the Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Marine.

Civilian personnel on auxiliary ships and coastal defence facilities are now entitled to all privileges granted to people who work in northern areas of the country. Previously such privileges were out of reach for this bracket of working people.

Would-be strikers have won the first round. However, the civilian personnel do not consider the struggle finished, a spokesman at the trade union committee of the Northern Fleet logistics told TASS. The liberalisation of prices lies ahead. It may reduce to nought all the gained rights to a life worthy of the human being, the spokesman said.

Prosecutor's Office Reform Plans Outlined

LD1111153491 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 11 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—"A concept for reforming the military prosecutor's bodies, drawn up by USSR Prosecutor-General Nikolay Trubin, has been submitted to the State Council of the USSR," present head of the chief Military Prosecutor's Office, deputy prosecutor-general of the USSR Yanis Dzanitis told TASS.

"The purpose of the reform is to help the Military Prosecutor's Office acquire material independence in addition to procedural freedom," he noted. "Thus, if the Union Procurator's Office and the single Armed Forces are left as they are, it is planned to abolish the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office and its apparatus. Plans are afoot to set up a central board to see to the observance of Soviet laws in the armed forces. It will be part and parcel of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Its members—officers and generals— must be excluded from membership in the Armed Forces, I believe, and the USSR Prosecutor's Office should finance and provide the new board with everything it needs at the expense of the USSR Defence Ministry and other ministries, which have servicemen on their staffs."

* Disputes in Servicemens' Protection Groups

92P50036A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 24 Oct 91 p 2

[Report by Irina Kochetova: "When There Is No Agreement Among Parents"]

[Text] The All-Union Council of Servicemen's Parents has organized an initiative group to recall Vitaliy Urazhtsev, chairman of the Shchit council, from his post as a Russian people's deputy. This was announced at a press conference dedicated to the results of this organization's second congress. Lyubov Lymar, chairman of the Mothers of the Soldiers of Russia movement, was removed from the leadership of the All-Union Council of Servicemen's Parents by a decision of the congress delegates.

In the opinion of Anatoliy Alekseyev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet chairman's commission to evaluate the causes of deaths and injuries of servicemen, the activities of these leaders were directed to splitting the movement for public protection of servicemen. The congress judged them to be ambitious and anti-human.

A. Alekseyev was given full authority as chairman of the USSR president's committee on the affairs of servicemen and their families.

Baltic Affairs

Industrialized Countries To Provide Aid

OW1311234591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1700 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian news agency ELTA reports: At a meeting in Brussels foreign ministers from 24 most industrialized countries of the world decided to grant 15 million ECU [European Community Unit] in economic aid to the three Baltic states: to Latvia - 4 million, to Lithuania - 6 million and to Estonia - 5 million. 1 ECU - U.S.$1.25.

ELTA says the foreign ministers agreed to hold an economic conference in one of the Baltic capitals for a more detailed discussion of the issue.

Meanwhile, upon return from Brussels November 12th Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans said that the meeting ruled to give 5 million ECU in aid to the Baltics already this year to help them carry out economic reform.

Gunars Abols, economic adviser at the Latvian Foreign Ministry, who also took part in the meeting, said the British authorities had agreed that part of the "Baltic" gold belonging to Latvia and currently kept in Great Britain should be considered Latvia's property.

According to Mr. Abols, the cost of Baltic gold put in U.S., French, British and Swiss banks before the WW 2 rose ten times and currently amounts to $100-200 million.

"This is enough to ensure the introduction of the national currency", Mr. Abols noted.

Interior Guards To Leave Baltics by 1 Jan

OW1311180791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] All the USSR Interior Troops guarding transport, secret industrial facilities or prisons on the territory of the Baltic states are to be withdrawn by January 1, 1992. This has been given in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX correspondent by the Petersburg Interior Chief General Arkadiy Kramerev who is responsible for the units in question. The general commented that [it] could have been done even earlier, but the Baltic authorities were delaying it, interested in the services of the guards in the interim period, particularly in prisons.

General Kramerev explained the guards will be moved to Russia's northwest, mostly the Petersburg region. The general expects several divisions to bolster the city's law and order and combat organized crime.

Defense Ministry Official on Troop Withdrawal

LD1311121191 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 13 TASS—"There will be no planned withdrawal from the Baltic states soon," a spokesman at the Soviet Defence Ministry Press Centre told TASS on Tuesday [12 November].

The question of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region can be decided upon "only as a result of talks between the governments of the USSR and the Baltic states", the spokesman said in a comment on a report in the press about an alleged "withdrawal of a paratroop battalion from Estonia".

The spokesman specified that an assault combat battalion stationed at Viru had been disbanded recently under an earlier made arrangement with the government of Estonia.

The battalion personnel have been assigned to other units to bring them up to the full complement, the spokesman added.

No Customs Duty Demanded on Goods to Russia

LD1311164591 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Proceeding from international norms, we should be acting toward a number of states as we do toward other foreign states, said (Nikolay Yermakov), head of the USSR Customs Committee. He said that for the three Baltic states a preferential regime has been established, and that no customs duty is demanded for the goods transported from those countries to Russia. We left a window so that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could join the Interrepublic Economic Committee if they want; this is how (Yermakov) justified the lenient attitude to the Baltic countries.

(Nikolay Yermakov(reported to the Baltic News Service that the first steps have already been taken toward setting up customs posts along the borders of the Baltic states. According to what he said, the USSR Customs Committee is currently—in conjunction with Russian customs—preparing measures to set up about 50 border posts on the borders of Russia, Belarus [Belorussia], and the Baltic states. (Yermakov) stated that as soon as these posts have been set up and start functioning, the actual customs control will be implemented by Russia or Belarus, with Russian customs regulations in force.

The RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY [RIA] stated yesterday, however, that on 11 November customs were due to start work at Kingisepp. It noted that the duty of the customs at Kingisepp is to prevent export of those goods from Russia which are banned for export from Estonia. RIA reported that customs officials will be guided by both the Russian customs code and the treaties concluded between Estonia and Russia.

Black Market Exchange Rate for Banks Proposed

OW1411003191 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1940 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy chairman of Tallinn-based Hansa Bank, Mr. Rain Lohmus, said it is only normal that the exchange rates set by the central banks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should be identical to those prevailing in the "black market."

Mr. Lohmus believes that the exchange rate of foreign currencies will for some time be stable due to a shortage of ready Soviet money. The ruble's 25-50% plunge against the dollar last week is attributed by Mr. Lohmus to the fact that "the market had long been ready for a transition to a new level, and the changed political environment had only opened the floodgates".

In his view, the rise in the exchange rates was primarily influenced by the decision of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin to liberalise price and the rumours that Russia and Lithuania will soon be introducing their own currencies.

Israel Plans Envoys for Baltics, Other Areas

LD1211124491 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 12 Nov 91

[By correspondent Aleksandr Zhudro]

[Text] Tel Aviv November 12 TASS—Israel will soon open its embassy in the Latvian capital of Riga. An Israeli ambassador to Latvia will also be accredited to Lithuania and Estonia, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy told the country's parliament on Tuesday [12 November].

Levy said his ministry plans to open consulates general in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Kishinev.

Estonia

Soviet Army Ready To Leave if Ordered

OW1411130791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1115 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On November 13, Estonia's State Minister Mr. Raivo Vare met with Commander of the Baltic Military District Mr. Valeriy Mironov, the Estonian Government's press service reports. During the talks the two officials discussed the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Estonia. The government's defence adviser, Mr. Matti Pedak, told the newspaper Paevaleht that the schedule of withdrawal had not been discussed this time.

"Valeriy Mironov confirmed, however, that the moment the order was given from above, the Soviet Army would leave Estonia," said Mr. Pedak.

The talks also dealt with the transfer to the Estonian Government of the building which housed the air-borne battalion, recently withdrawn from Viru. Mr. Vare expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the withdrawal of another air-borne battalion, located in the Estonian city of Viliandi, has not begun yet.

Valeriy Mironov and Raivo Vare also agreed that the Estonian authorities would be informed in advance about the Soviet Army's military exercises in Estonia. "We agreed that from now onwards the Soviet Army's military exercises would be attended by Estonian observers," said Mr. Pedak.

Charges Dropped Against Military Deserters

OW1411174191 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1445 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the Estonian Government press office, Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar has received a letter from Commander of the Baltic Military District Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov. The letter says under the September 24 order of the USSR Defense Minister all citizens of Estonia serving in the Baltic Military District, including those who had earlier deserted from their units, were demobilized during September and October.

The Military Prosecutor's Office has stopped all legal proceedings against deserters drafted in Estonia.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Cuba

LD1311135691 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Today and yesterday Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, Cuban minister of foreign trade, has been staying in Estonia on a visit. As the press representative of the Republic of Estonia's Foreign Ministry reports through ETA, diplomatic relations were established today between the two states. Deputy Foreign Minister Rein Mullerson signed the protocol on the Estonian side.

At a meeting at the Foreign Ministry with the participation of (?Veiko Jurisson), the ministry's adviser for North American affairs, the continuation of economic and trade links was discussed, as well as the development of tourism between Estonia and Cuba. Cuba announced its intention to open an embassy in one of the Baltic states.

Trade Agreement With Taiwan Signed

LD1211142391 Tallinn Estonian Radio in English 2130 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Text] Estonia and Taiwan signed a trade agreement on Friday 8 November, according to which a trade delegation from Taiwan will be opened in Tallinn in the near future. The agreement was signed by Taiwan's deputy foreign minister, John Chang, and the director general of the Estonian Foreign Trade Department, Mehis Pilv.

John Chang's visit to the Baltics was unofficial. A spokesman for the Estonian Foreign Ministry said the agreement was purely an economic one, and that it didn't indicate that Estonia recognizes the independence of Taiwan.

Russian Customs Office Starts Work on Border

OW1311132691 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1130 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Director-General of Estonia's Frontier Guards Department, Andrus Eevel, said that on November 11 the Russian Federation's customs office started working in the town of Ivangorod on the Estonian-Russian border. Among the 46 types of goods which cannot be exported to Estonia are fuel, gasoline, and food stuffs. However, the Estonian side has not yet received the complete list of these items. The Russian customs office is expected to supply Estonia with more detailed information today.

Defense Service Draft Mirrors USSR Law

PM1411094591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Captain 2d Rank V. Vladimirov "Direct Line" report: "Your Draft—Our Ideas"]

[Text] Tallinn, 11 Nov—The government of the Estonian Republic has submitted to parliament a draft law on the defense service. Even a cursory acquaintance with the draft shows that it resembles our law on universal military duty.

So all males permanently living in Estonia (there is no law on citizenship yet) are liable for service in the defense forces. Citizens aged between 18 and 28 are subject to the draft. Just like in our country, the deferment principle applies, and deferment can be granted by drafting commissions. Service under contract is also planned.

The length of compulsory military service is 18 months. The government intends to exclude from this period absences without leave from the place of service and time spent serving disciplinary sentences under arrest.

Independent observers take the view that in the absence of base laws on defense, the submission of this particular draft is connected with the already announced drafting of young men into the border guard, the police brigade, and the rescue service. It is no accident that the Estonian Republic Supreme Council draft resolution on the enforcement of the defense service law, which has also been submitted to deputies, makes provision for administrative measures in the shape of a fine to be applied to draftees who fail to report for registration "to the local self-management executive organ" without a serious reason. Draft evasion is punished under the penal code by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or a 500 ruble fine.

Latvia

New Supreme Council Faction Proposed

LD1411053591 Riga Radio Riga International in Latvian 0530 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Latvian Supreme Council Deputy Rikards announced plans for forming a new faction at the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia. The faction will be called Satversme. It will be guided by three principles, as well as the 4 May Declaration, the 21 August Declaration, and the constitutional law being formed on citizens' and human rights. The second principle is that the bearers of sovereign power in Latvia are the citizens of the Republic of Latvia. Third, in the talks with the Soviet Union and Russia, those states must recognize that the occupation of Latvia has been illegal. The necessity of forming the new faction was substantiated by Deputy Rikards in that many deputies of the People's Front of Latvia faction did not regard at present the faction's decisions as compulsory. Rikards is also convinced that the necessary number of deputies for forming the new faction, namely 20, have already organized themselves.

Lithuania

Ex-KGB Officer Names Parliamentarian Agent

OW1411172991 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1445 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On November 14, the newspaper Mazoi Lietuva published an interview with an anonymous officer of the former Estonian KGB who said that during his 10-year service in the KGB he dealt with agents who were now members of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Among them, he said, is the current chairman of the Commission for Human Rights and Ethnic Affairs, Vergilius Cepaitis, who was known under the name of Jesef.

The former KGB officer said that Vergilius Cepaitis had been on the KGB's payroll since 1980 and had been mostly used for the work with Lithuanian and Soviet emigrants. He said that Cepaitis had reported on 40 people, among them painter Oleg Prokofyev (London), historian Aleksandr Stron (London), poet Tomas Vanclova (the U.S.) and Orientalist Aleksandr Pyatigorskiy (London).

The article was illustrated with a photograph showing Vergilius Cepaitis and Vytautas Landsbergis.

Article 'To Discredit' Landsbergis

OW1411173791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1445 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Commenting on this publication, Mr. Audrius Azubalis, the Lithuanian parliament's press secretary, said at a briefing in Vilnius, on November 14, that its purpose was to discredit chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis, and not the person interviewed.

"These are indecent games in relation to Vytautas Landsbergis," he said.

"As to Vergilius Cepaitis, commenting on such articles is his own business," he said.

Republic To Free Industrial Goods Prices

OW1411002491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1940 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Prices of all industrial goods will be freed in Lithuania on November 19. This move by the republic's government was reported in the evening edition of Panorama TV news programme.

The government's statement also says that wage adjustments will be carried out in the near future. Finally, in a move to protect the republic's internal market, further restrictions will be incorporated into existing regulations with respect to the shipment of goods out of the republic.

Prime Minister Protests Baggage Incident

LD1211233391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] The Prime Minister of Lithuania, Gediminas Vagnorius, has sent a protest telegram to Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Barannikov and Interrepublican Security Administration Chief Bakatin following a violation of diplomatic baggage immunity which occurred at the Sheremetyevo II airport, Moscow, at the beginning of this month, during Deputy Prime Minister Vaisvila's return from abroad.

Several items, including a French police badge, a gift from the general director of the French Police, were taken from the deputy prime minister's suitcase.

The protest telegram regards this as a political provocation and requests that the necessary measures be taken to clarify the [word indistinct] circumstances and to punish those responsible as soon as possible.

The hope is also voiced that the missing official gift will be returned to the Lithuanian Government without delay.

Prime Minister, Delegation Visit to U.S. Noted

PM1311163791 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Nov 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "Visit to United States Ends"]

[Text] Vilnius, 4 Nov—Lithuanian Republic Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius returned from the United States this afternoon.

Together with the premiers of Latvia and Estonia, Gediminas Vagnorius took part in an international economic conference of Baltic countries organized by the Hudson Institute in Indianapolis. At a meeting they had with U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle, the Baltic prime ministers signed a treaty on guarantees for foreign investments between the United States and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The delegation, which was headed by Gediminas Vagnorius, also met with George Mitchell, leader of the U.S. Senate majority; businessmen from the state of Illinois; and leaders of Lithuanian communities in the world, the United States, and Canada. It also participated in the congress of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania. Talks were held with other politicians and representatives of banks and various firms.

Group Meets Officials, Seeks Aid

PM1411112991 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 2 Nov 91 p 1

[Government press office report: "Meetings in Washington"]

[Text] The Lithuanian parliamentary delegation to the United States headed by Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius arrived in Washington 31 October. Gediminas Vagnorius and Vytautas Aleskaitis, minister of international economic relations, met with Senator George Mitchell, leader of the U.S. Senate majority. During their talk they discussed the possibility of U.S. aid to Lithuania.

The Lithuanian prime minister also met with Dayva Niderkhardt [name as transliterated], the leader of "SOS: Children of Lithuania," an organization that provides humanitarian aid.

V. Aleskaitis and Maryland's Governor William Schaefer signed a treaty of cooperation between Lithuania and Maryland, in which both sides pledge to maintain mutually advantageous cooperation in trade, economics, science, technology, agriculture, culture, and other fields.

That same evening Stasis Lozoraitis, Lithuanian ambassador to the United States, organized a reception attended on the Lithuanian side by Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius, Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicius, a group of government members and deputies, as well as Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis, representatives of emigre organizations, foreign diplomats, and employers.

Parliament Briefed on Visit

PM1411111391 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Nov 91 p 3

[By O. Rostov: "Parliamentary Briefing"]

[Text] C. Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, met with journalists at a briefing yesterday. He told them about the two-week visit to the United States by a parliamentary delegation from our republic. The program of the visit was prepared and financed by the U.S. Information Agency. Its aim was to get familiar with the work of U.S. parliamentary and government structures, as well as questions of cooperation and meetings with politicians. The program was extremely substantial, intensive, and useful, Stankevicius said.

It included meetings and discussions in Chicago, Illinois and the state capital, Springfield. There was a meeting with the mayor of Springfield, the state governor, and other officials. Stankevicius delivered a speech to the state's General Assembly, in which he expressed gratitude for the support for Lithuania and expounded the problem of the withdrawal of the Soviet Army and the position of the republic's leadership on this issue. Stankevicius also spoke about this when he addressed the Senate. We can expect political support from the United States in resolving this problem, Stankevicius said. Incidentally, the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania was raised in the U.S. Congress House of Representatives during discussion of a law on aid to the USSR, and an appropriate amendment to it was proposed.

In Chicago, meetings were held with businessmen and representatives of the association of industrialists and insurance companies. Questions of cooperation and investment in the Lithuanian economy were discussed. The Americans intend to take an active part in this, Stankevicius noted, but as yet they do not know much about us, and we gave them some information. Representatives of the U.S. Administration are planning to expand the personnel of their mission in Lithuania in order to gather fuller economic information.

In Washington several important meetings were held at the U.S. State Department, at which questions of economic and technical aid to Lithuania were discussed, and decisions were made in principle on this matter.

Stankevicius noted that as a result of the visit a lot of useful information and proposals had been received which will be passed on for discussion to the government and ministries with a view to establishing concrete ties.

On his return Stankevicius met with E. Shevardnadze in Moscow. During this unofficial meeting they discussed the upcoming talks between Lithuania and the USSR—what the object of the talks will be, the timetable, and so on. Stankevicius expressed the opinion that the provisions stipulated in the treaty with Russia should not be discussed at talks with the USSR. Despite our common conclusion about the usefulness of holding a consultative meeting, I do not believe that the USSR is ready for talks yet, and I doubt whether these will get under way in the near future, Stankevicius concluded.

Diplomatic Relations With Cuba Planned

LD1311140291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Summary] A Cuban delegation headed by Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, minister of foreign trade, is currently visiting Lithuania.

The delegation was received today by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. A letter from Fidel Castro to Vytautas Landsbergis was handed to Bronislovas Kuzmickas. Plans to establish diplomatic relations with Lithuania were announced.

The delegation also visited other ministries of the Republic.

Vilnius, Kaliningrad Plan Cooperation

OW1211133991 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1045 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis has met with the head of the administration of the Kaliningrad region, Yuriy Matochkin. Matochkin was appointed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Questions of economic and cultural cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region were discussed.

To decide these problems, work groups will be created to develop concrete plans for price setting, trade exchange, and working customs. The possibility of opening a joint Russian-Lithuanian bank in Kaliningrad is being investigated.

Democratic Leader Says Party To Continue

LD1111160791 Moscow TASS in English 0937 GMT 11 Nov 91

[By correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius November 11 TASS—Commenting on the law passed by the Lithuanian parliament to take over the property of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) and former communist organisations, deputy chairman of the Democratic Labour Party Gediminas Kirkilas told journalists on Sunday [11 November] the new law was undemocratic in its essence.

"Nevertheless, we have not yet lost all hope for a consensus with the republic's government on the enactment of this law," he said.

Apropos, the law refers to the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania as well, the former reorganised Communist Party of Lithuania.

"Even if the government seizes the last property we still have, Kirkilas continued, the party will exist and work. We are planning a meeting soon with the democratic left parties of the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Italy," he said.

"The purpose of the meeting is to set up a coalition body to coordinate our actions while in opposition".

Conference Views Foreign Policy Issues

PM1411114191 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Nov 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "Foreign Policy Issues Discussed"]

[Text] A conference on foreign policy issues chaired by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, was held 4 November in the Supreme Council.

Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, gave a briefing on his meeting in Moscow with Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Soviet delegation that will negotiate with the Lithuanian Republic.

Attention was focused on certain articles hostile to Lithuania that have appeared recently in the Polish press. It was noted that they are causing concern and do not correspond to those principles of relations which Polish Government representatives have been setting forth at the ongoing consultations between the two countries.

Questions of regularizing political relations with Belarus [Belorussia] and other former republics of the Soviet Union were examined at the conference.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas and minister without portfolio Aleksandras Abisala took part in the conference.

Teams for Treaty Talks With Republics Named

PM1411095391 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 5 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[ELTA report: "In the Lithuanian Republic Government. Negotiating Teams Established"]

[Text] With a view to implementing the Lithuanian Republic Law "On the Republic's International Treaties" and in order to define the basic principles and terms of trade and economic cooperation with the USSR, its republics, and other foreign states, the following teams, which have been given the authority to hold talks on these questions and prepare and coordinate the texts of the agreements, have been established by Directive No. 764 dated 25 October: the negotiating team for the USSR (led by Economics Minister A. Simenas); the negotiating team for Moldova (led by A. Simenas); the negotiating team for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (led by First Deputy Economics Minister V. Navickas); the negotiating team for the Ukraine (led by V. Navickas); the negotiating team for Kazakhstan (led by V. Navickas); the negotiating team for Kyrgyzstan (led by V. Navickas); the negotiating team for Belarus [Belorussia] (led by B. Zaikauskas, adviser to the leadership of the Lithuanian Republic Government); the negotiating team for Azerbaijan (led by Yu. Ashemberg, first deputy minister of trade and material resources); the negotiating team for Armenia and Georgia (led by C. Balsis, first deputy minister of trade and material resources); the negotiating team for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (led by R. Ramoska, deputy minister of trade and material resources); the negotiating team for Latvia and Estonia (led by First Deputy Economics Minister K. Seputis).

The team leaders are obliged to present coordinated draft agreements to the Lithuanian Republic Government before 15 November 1991.

Economics Minister A. Simenas, Trade and Material Resources Minister V. Zidonis, Agriculture Minister R. Survila, and Power Minister L. Asmantas are to be given the authority to sign agreements with the USSR, Union republics, and other foreign states on cooperation over questions that lie within the sphere of these ministries' competence.

'Armed Underground Organizations' Highlighted

OW1311130791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1130 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday [12 November] evening, the press centre of the Lithuanian Government held a press conference highlighting the incident on the Shumsky frontier post. Among the topics discussed was also armed underground organizations in Lithuania. The press conference was given by Lithuania's Procurator-General Arturas Paulauskas, Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Juozas Matonis and Deputy Director-General of the State Security Department, Viktoras Zedialis.

Mr. Matonis said that there had been evidence suggesting that underground terrorist organizations operated in Lithuania. These anti-state groupings, he said, are getting united, undergo training and establish communication systems.

During the incident on the Shumsky frontier post on November 7, at 10 p.m., 4 people were detained. The day before, leaflets urging the population to fight against the authorities had been circulated in Vilnius. On the night of November 6, red flags were hoisted in some of Vilnius's districts. There were even plans to broadcast an underground programme on November 7. The republic's Interior Ministry foiled these plans, however. Mr. Matonis said that all of those facts were links of one chain.

He also said that during the searches in 70 places on Tuesday, weapons, ammunition and explosives were confiscated. The persons searched were participants in the January events, among them OMON [special purpose militia detachment] men and former Communist Party functionaries.

The Procurator-General refused the give the names of those arrested on the Shumsky frontier post, but said that they were young people aged from 26 to 44. Among them were 3 Russians and one Ossetian. Mr. Paulauskas doubts that the incident on November 7 was politically motivated.

"So far, we can say that this organization is rather strong. We do not yet know who runs it. However, links between this organization and the former leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, who are in the territory of the USSR at the moment, are obvious, he said.

Asked about the documents stolen from the KGB building, Mr. Zedialis said that "the population of Lithuania had the illusion that the archives in the KGB building keep all the materials which had been piling up for years and that we shall learn everything if we find them. In his opinion, everything that needed to be taken out and destroyed had been taken out and destroyed.

Terrorist Organization Suspected of Operating

LD1311130191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Excerpts] Officials of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs and procuracy staff members conducted approximately 70 searches last night in Vilnius and the neighboring Salcininkay, Svencionys, and Trakay Rayons. Both the evidence collected and previous information make it possible to assert that a subversive terrorist organization is being established and is already beginning to function in Lithuania. This was stated at a news conference this evening by acting Internal Affairs Minister Matonis, General Prosecutor Arturas Paulauskas, and Viktoras Zedelis, deputy director of the State Security Department. According to these officials, the departments they head have already been observing for some time efforts that can be characterized as underground terrorist activity. [passage omitted]

A tape recording of an appeal attempted to be disseminated by radio on 6 November urges a struggle against the Lithuanian state order. This appeal is in the investigators' possession. According to the officials at the news conference, the evidence in their possession compels them not to question the political nature of the subversive terrorist activity. This is not even denied by the criminals involved themselves. According to General Prosecutor Arturas Paulauskas, members of the group follow a communist ideology, or a world view with communist ideology mixed in.

Those in charge of protecting law and order can only speculate for the time being about the numbers of those involved in the terrorist underground and its level of organization, but there is virtually no doubt that the group is strong and that its structures are continuing to be developed as ties are possible with similar groups within the other former republics of the Soviet Union.

It is also known for certain that the KGB, OMON [special purpose militia detachment], and Communist Party members representing the forces preparing a coup in January and August and who now seek to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union are part of this group. Institutions investigating the activities of the underground avoid for the time being talking about direct ties between the group and Moscow, although it is known to be carrying out the directives of former Lithuanian Communist Party leaders who still continue to hide on USSR territory.

An appeal to the Lithuanian people by Mykolas Burokevicius, former Lithuanian Communist Party section leader, was discovered along with the tape of the radio appeal.

Juozas Matonis, chief of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, speculates that subversive activity is not limited to Lithuania or the Baltic states only. One gets the impression that an attempt is being made to create a unified culture that will supposedly become a great force within the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Army Starts Draft in Silute Rayon 12 Nov

LD1211200591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Summary] Youths are being drafted into the Lithuanian army. The draft for service in the Lithuanian army started in Silute rayon today. About 400 youths will serve in the army and about 300 will be drafted for the alternative labor service.

Chechen-Ingush Situation

Liberation Army Member Warns of Terrorist Acts

OW1311170791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From "Bulletin 2" transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA reports that an unidentified man, who presented himself as a member of the Chechen national liberation army, called the editorial office Tuesday [12 November] to say a series of railroad terror acts was being planned. He demanded that within the next 3 days the government of Kazakhstan "make an objective assessment of the events in Checheno-Ingushetia."

The caller said explosive devices would be set off on the Russian side of the border between Kazakhstan and Siberia. He said he had addressed a similar message of warning to the republican Interior Ministry.

KGB Assails Murder of Chechen 'Operative'

LD1311174191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 Nov (TASS)—According to a report from Checheno-Ingushetia, the corpse of republican KGB Major Viktor Tolstenev was brought to the Groznyy morgue last night. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] KGB public relations department in this regard reminds us that recently a senior authorized operative [operupolnomochennyy] of the Shelkovskiy rayon department of the Chechen-Ingush Republic KGB, Major Viktor Tolstenev, who was carrying a standard issue weapon, was detained by officers of the Chechen-Ingush OMON [special purpose militia detachment]. In their opinion the presence of arms is evidence of a crime, since the KGB does not operate on the republic's territory.

In an item from Checheno-Ingushetia shown in a Central Television information program on 12 November, an officer of the "local" OMON categorically stated that Tolstenev would be judged by the people.

Noting that the development of events in Checheno-Ingushetia is at the center of attention of the whole world, the RSFSR KGB public relations department states: The concern of people is understood; it is possible to justify the vigilance of the guards of order in the Chechen revolution, but there are no explanations for the incidents of vandalism and mob law which are being tolerated in relation to republican KGB officers. They are being accused, without proof and without foundation, of storming Groznyy's central telephone exchange, of armed opposition to the new authorities, and of provocations. Now things have gone so far as to include murder.

Dudayev Gives Conditions for Talks With Russia

LD1311183491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russia 1700 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Excerpts] Dzhakhar Dudayev stated at a news conference in Groznyy today that as soon as it acknowledges the legally elected parliament and president of the sovereign Chechen republic, Russia can enter into talks on an equal footing. The news conference was conducted in Chechen, Russian, and English.

General Dudayev said that several days ago, he had laid down slightly different conditions for the talks to commence, but he said that by their resolutions, the Supreme Soviet had changed the circumstances. The president emphasized that Russia, in the given circumstances, proposed that its delegation should hold talks not with the legally elected bodies but with public structures and with different types of political movements. For us, talks of this nature are not to be countenanced. Dzhakhar Dudayev assured journalists that the Chechen Republic is determined to attain its freedom and independence exclusively by peaceful means, but he stated, this clearly does not suit Russia. [passage omitted]

The state of military alert declared by presidential decree on the territory of the Chechen Republic beginning 8 November is to continue until the situation is completely normal again, Dudayev stated, and this is the explanation he gave for the fact that at the ceremony when he swore his oath of allegiance he wore his general's tunic and why he appears now in field dress.

Touching on the problems of a possible economic blockade by the Russian side, Dudayev stated: Then we, too, will announce a blockade and Russia will not only have to drink tea without sugar, but will have to go without the tea itself. It is true to say that he did not explain specifically what he meant by these words.

Dzhakhar Dudayev said that the Chechen Republic is not planning, and has never planned to reject mutually beneficial economic, political, or even military cooperation with anyone, particularly with Russia. Once free, we will be far better neighbors to Russia than we were when we were embittered by political and economic oppression, he stated. Characterizing the current situation in the republic, the general described it as a period of calm.

Yeltsin Sacks Chechen Representative Arsanov

LD1311191891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1909 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 13 November (TASS)—By decree, Boris Yeltsin released Akhmed Arsanov from the post of representative of the president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in the Chechen-Ingush Republic for presenting misinformation which formed the basis for Yeltsin's decision to introduce the state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic.

Dudayev Praises Decision

LD1311222291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2200 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Groznyy: This is an incident when a genuinely democratic Russia and its president correctly assess their mistakes, a TASS correspondent was told by Dzhakhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic, expressing his opinion on the Russian presidential decree on removing Akhmed Arsanov from his duties as presidential representative in Checheno-Ingushetia. I always was convinced, he said, that Boris Yeltsin was being incorrectly informed about events in Checheno-Ingushetia and that the decree on introducing a state of emergency in the republic was practically forced on him. Dzhakhar Dudayev congratulated Boris Yeltsin on yet another victory on the way to justice and democracy.

I remind you that Yeltsin released Arsanov from his duties as his representative in the Chechen-Ingush Republic in connection with passing on disinformation, which became the basis for introducing a state of emergency in the republic.

Rutskoy Says Division of Republic 'Illegal'

OW1311212291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a meeting with journalists at the "White House" - Wednesday [13 November] Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy has stated that "the division of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was illegal since no referendums had been held". Speaking about the decree on a state of emergency, Rutskoy said that it had been designed to be in effect only for a month in full compliance with the Russian legislation. "All of our actions in relation to Checheno-Ingushetia were aimed at preventing bloodshed between Chechens and Ingushs and, consequently, blood feuds, unlawfulness and anarchy", he pointed out. According to the vice-president, over 8,500 people in the republic are armed with modern automatic rifles, most of which were brought "from abroad, possibly, via third countries" through various channels. In the opinion of Rutskoy, the situation is so tense that a serious bloodshed should be expected within a month.

Asked by IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent whether there are guarantees that the situation in Groznyy will not grow into the second Afghanistan for Russia, Rutskoy replied in the negative. The vice-president emphasized that in the present situation "the use of force is unacceptable". He expressed doubts about the possibility of a political dialogue "because conditions set by Dudayev are unacceptable". Rutskoy said that Dudayev is prepared to receive a delegation that he approves himself. "The main condition of Dudayev is his recognition as president without holding legal elections", Rutskoy said. He stressed his opposition to the idea of Russia's colonial domination. "I am not a supporter of the revived monarchy, but I am for the revival of the great Russia where each people will gain both economic and cultural independence", Rutskoy said.

Dudayev Says Assistance Coming From Turkey

LD1411011991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Report from Groznyy by Ratmir Lyanov]

[Text] The sociopolitical situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic was a subject for consideration at the first session of the republican Presidential Council, held on 13 November in Groznyy. The session was chaired by Dzhakhar Dudayev.

At the session it was noted that despite the fact that the decree on the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic was not approved by the Russian parliament, there is still a threat of outside military intervention by the Russian center. This stems from the resolution adopted by the emergency session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet where, under the guise of protective measures allegedly intended to prevent the importation into and the exportation of weapons from the Chechen-Ingush Republic, a first step has actually been taken on the way to an economic blockade of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.

Later in the evening at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, this correspondent asked Dudayev to clarify this issue, bearing in mind that Russia's parliament decided to set up a commission to hold talks to achieve a political settlement of the conflict. Dudayev replied, and I quote: We aim to resolve the issue only by peaceful means, but the Russian center is imposing on us political terror and provocations. There is no point in holding talks in such an atmosphere. Therefore, until Russia totally gives up its claims to sovereignty in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, we will retain martial law, end quote.

Asked about possible assistance for the Chechen-Ingush Republic from foreign states, Dudayev noted that such support right through to military, food, and humanitarian assistance has already begun to come from Turkey. We are seeking possibilities for the transportation of this assistance without it being via Russian territory, he said. An accord has been reached that such aid will come through the territory of Georgia, our neighbor.

If Russia declares an economic blockade against us, Dudayev added, instead of drinking tea without sugar, it will have no tea at all.

Executive Committee, Dudayev Supporters Meet

LD1411012891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Report by Azerbaijan News Service correspondent Vakhit Nakhysh from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A mass meeting of supporters of the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen people and of its leader, Dzhakhar Dudayev, president of the republic, which went on for nearly three months, has finished. It was preceeded by the unacceptance by the Russian parliament of the Russian president's decree on the introduction of a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushestia.

[Begin Dudayev recording] This is a victory by Russian democrats. They rejected political terror and provocations carried out by separate leaders in the Russian Supreme Soviet and Russian power structures. [end recording]

The criminal situation in Checheno-Ingushestia today continues to remain complicated. Over the last two days two people have been killed. The press center of the president of the Chechen-Ingush Republic stated that this was due to provocations and opponents of the Chechen-Ingush revolution initiated by former communists. The blockade of all units of the Soviet Army in the republic has been lifted by the National Guard, except for an Air Force regiment. The blockade of a military settlement and a convoy regiment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops continues. On the instruction of Dzhakhar Dudayev, special detachments have been formed.

[Begin unidentified serviceman recording] This is so Russian-speaking people are not offended here or told something silly, and so people do not walk around installations and remove cars or something else, and so that our property is not stolen. [end recording]

Georgian Foreign Minister Gives Support

LD1411013391 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Interview with Georgian Foreign Affairs Minister Murman Omanidze by correspondent N. Pavlov at the permanent Georgian mission in Moscow on 13 November; from the "Vesti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Pavlov] How would you characterize the current situation in Georgia?

[Omanidze] I feel that the current situation in Georgia is totally satisfactory as far as we are concerned, because it is calm. There are no shots, as they say, there are no clashes and life continues smoothly.

[Pavlov] On which principles are you planning to base your relations with the Caucasian people and with Russia?

[Omanidze] I think our relations with the people of the Caucasus will be built on the basis of preserving the sovereignty of the autonomous and Union republics and on giving priority to the ethnic minorities. As you are well aware, our policy and the policy of our president toward Checheno-Ingushetia is that we completely support the national liberation movement of the Chechen people and the victory of Dzhakhar Dudayev.

[Pavlov] Tell me, what shape will relations with Russia take?

[Omanidze] We have always had good relations with Russia, and we hope that the Russian parliament and President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin himself will maintain the relations which have been in existence up to now.

Rail Traffic Resumes on Groznyy Line

LD1411035891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0329 GMT 14 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Luzin]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Nov (TASS)—According to the principal traffic controller of the Railways Ministry, trains have begun moving again on the line to Groznyy in Checheno-Ingushetia. Traffic was interrupted on 7 November. Seven passenger and freight trains had already passed along the Beslan-Groznyy section by 0300.

Supreme Soviet

Resolutions Supporting Congress Decisions Passed

On Organization Management

PM1311121191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution dated 9 November: "On Internal Troops of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets, Moscow—For the purpose of guaranteeing the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies resolution of 22 June 1990 "On the Demarcation of the Functions of Management of Organizations on RSFSR Territory (Basis of the New Union Treaty)" the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. The RSFSR president's Decree No. 146 of 20 October 1991 "On the Transfer of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops Stationed on RSFSR Territory to the Jurisdiction of the RSFSR" is to be approved.

2. The RSFSR president is to be required to take measures without delay to subordinate the operational,

special units and educational institutions of the USSR MVD Internal Troops stationed on RSFSR territory to the RSFSR MVD.

3. Monitoring of the fulfillment of Point 2 of this resolution is to be entrusted to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committees for Security and for Questions of Legality, Law and Order, and the Fight Against Crime.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

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On Indexation Law

PM1311150191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 6

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet Resolution: "On the Procedure for Bringing Into Force the RSFSR Law 'On the Indexation of the Monetary Incomes and Savings of Citizens in the RSFSR'"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is instructed, within one month of the signing of this resolution, to:

Draw up and approve an instruction on the procedure for indexing citizens' incomes and with submitting to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the sources of indexation of the labor remuneration of workers of enterprises. establishments, and organizations which sell output (services) at state prices and rates, given a shortage of their own funds for indexation for reasons beyond their control;

Coordinate with the Interrepublic Economic Committee the sources of indexation of the incomes of servicemen and other categories of citizens equated with them, of state pensions and social benefits paid out of Union budget funds, and also of USSR state loans and USSR securities;

Determine, jointly with the RSFSR Pension Fund, the RSFSR Social Insurance Fund, and the RSFSR State Employment Fund, the procedure for reimbursing these funds for the additional expenditure on the payment of state pensions and social benefits liable to indexation;

Draw up, jointly with the RSFSR Central Bank, and submit for approval by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium a draft statute on compensating the population for losses from the depreciation of incomes from RSFSR state loans and RSFSR state securities;

Revise expenditure on social services for the population in preventive treatment establishments, boarding schools, schools, vocational technical, secondary specialized, and higher educational institutions, homes for the elderly and the disabled, and preschool and other establishments in the social sphere funded out of the corresponding budgets, with a view to ensuring full compensation for any increase resulting from higher prices for goods and services.

2. The RSFSR State Committee for Statistics is to draw up and approve within one month of the signing of this resolution a statute on the procedure for monitoring the change in the prices and rates for goods and services and for determining the consumer price index used for the indexation of citizens' monetary incomes and savings.

3. The RSFSR State Committee for Statistics and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet publication ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA are to ensure the quarterly publication of information on the consumer price index before the 25th of the month following the elapsed quarter.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow, the RSFSR House of Soviets, 24 October 1991

On Economic Reform

PM1311155191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] A routine sitting of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium was held at the RSFSR House of the Soviets under the chairmanship of R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and S.A. Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

In implementation of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies' resolution of 1 November 1991 "On Legal Backup for the Economic Reform," the Presidium defined measures for the prompt examination of draft laws, resolutions, and decrees adopted to regulate the process of the economic reform.

The draft laws "On RSFSR Citizenship" and "On Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Law 'On Competition and the Restriction of Monopolist Activity in Trade Markets'" were presented and have been submitted to Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium appointed RSFSR People's Deputy V.O. Ispravnikov chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.

Documents on recalling RSFSR People's Deputy S.N. Baburin submitted by the Sovetskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee in Omsk City have been examined. In accordance with the law it has been decided to put the recall of RSFSR People's Deputy S.N. Baburin to a vote and instructions have been issued on forming a district commission to hold the vote.

The sitting also discussed other questions of the RSFSR's state life.

Highlights of 13 Nov Session Proceedings

LD1311212391

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 2043 GMT on 13 November broadcast a recording of the proceedings of the 13 November session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet in Moscow.

The recording began with Deputy Pochenok talking about the package of proposals on taxation prepared by his commission. He said that the president will have to approve or disapprove their proposals. He clarified questions which have arisen so far.

At 2047 GMT, Pochenok spoke about various amendments made to the package of proposals on taxation. The chairman warned the deputies about the importance of draft laws on taxation during economic reform. Pochenok explained various economic processes and types of taxation connected with them. He said that prices will be liberalized, but it should be decided who gets the profit: the state, those who produce goods, or those who sell them.

Pochenok advocated drafting a law on securities. Deputies voted on various laws on taxation which were adopted in the first reading.

At 2054 GMT, an unidentified deputy raised the question of supervising small entrepreneurs.

At 2056 GMT, Deputy Vedernikov took the floor and nominated Pochenok to the post of chairman of the budget and planning commission. Pochenok was elected and congratulated on his election.

The program ended at 2058 GMT.

Further on Taxation Laws

LD1311162491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Report by Yevgeniy Zherebenko from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet]

[Excerpt] A range of laws on taxation in the Russian Federation is being debated today by one of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of the Republics. As you know, radical reform of the entire taxation system in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] is planned, and the introduction of a whole range of new taxes awaits us.

The structure of the taxation system is envisaged as follows: There will be federal state taxes; republican taxes in the republics within the RSFSR; and local taxes. Some of these taxes will be universal and mandatory, while others can be introduced by local authorities. Among the new universal mandatory taxes are excise duties and value-added taxes [VAT], which should replace the existing turnover tax and the controversial presidential sales tax. VAT will be levied on RSFSR territory on [word indistinct] and upon import of goods. Payment of VAT will be at the rate of 20 percent of turnover. Excise is a new customs duty that is included into the price of goods and levied from the consumer of those goods.

The law stipulates the taxation procedure regarding liquor, beer, sugar, tea, chocolate, tobacco, private cars and tires, petroleum products, and jewelry. The excise rate in percentage on retail prices is planned as follows: on vodka—70 percent; quality dessert wines—50 percent; quality cognac—45 percent; champagne—46.7 percent; beer—11.7 percent; sugar—13.5 percent; tea—14 percent; chocolate—26 percent; private cars, and here the figure given is for a Volga GAZ 2410—40 percent; and on 93-octane—59.6 percent. The payers of excise duty will be the enterprises manufacturing and marketing these goods, but it will, of course, be included in the price. [passage omitted]

Federation Affairs

Kozyrev Says NATO Becoming 'Real Partner'

LD0911194491 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 9 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—"NATO is turning more and more into a potential and real partner," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told journalists today, commenting on the results of the session of the NATO Council, which ended in Rome. He said it would be desirable both for the USSR and the sovereign republics to receive a NATO invitation to cooperate.

According to Kozyrev, it would be expedient to create in the future a community of countries of the northern hemisphere, in which Russia could occupy a worthy place in case of the success of reforms started here.

The resolutions of the session of the NATO Council have a "large potential for the reduction of armaments, primarily nuclear arms," Kozyrev believes.

Further on Kozyrev Remarks

LD1311192191 Moscow TASS in English 1849 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Rome November 13 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said the Russian leadership was relying on its realistic assessment of the situation with regard to the nuclear arms control in the Soviet Union.

He was commenting of the apprehensions voiced in the West as whole lately and reflected in the recent NATO summit's final documents in connection with the threat of the loss of control over nuclear weapons in the USSR by the centre.

It would be too light-minded to dismiss the problem as non- existent and say that all apprehensions are groundless, the minister said. There are certain reasons for the fears. A revolutionary process of explosive nature is now taking place in the Soviet Union and its republics. Our firm intention is not to allow these apprehensions to acquire an addressed nature. We intend to take steps to retain nuclear weapons under the centre's control and rule out any possibility of its proliferation or unsanctioned use.

I think it is possible to say that we have attained this goal in conjunction with the USSR Defence Ministry and other republics, Kozyrev said.

The NATO Council session approved the decisions earlier made by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to radically reduce their nuclear armaments. We are going to do the same.

The Russian minister said it was pressing for Russia to join the mechanisms of cooperation and dialogue with NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, he said, proposed that the former Warsaw Treaty member-countries take part in establishing a North Atlantic Council. We are prepared to find corresponding forms for the Russian Federation and other sovereign states making up the present Soviet Union to take a direct part in information exchange and other work of this kind. We believe that this would be yet another contribution to the stabilization of the situation on the continent and facilitate the establishment of a new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Foreign Ministry Statement on NATO Session

LD1111150891 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

["Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Foreign Ministry Statement"]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov (TASS)—"The new NATO strategy reflects the profound changes for the better which are taking place in the world and primarily on the continent of Europe," says a statement circulated today by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Foreign Ministry on the new strategic concept adopted recently at the NATO Council session held in Rome at the level of heads of state and government.

Its adoption, stresses the document, marks yet another major step in overcoming the planet's split into two opposing camps. The creation of the new political atmosphere in the world, it goes on to note, has to no small degree been promoted by the policy of new thinking, by breakthroughs in the area of disarmament and strengthening security, and just recently by unprecedented unilateral initiatives by the leaders of the United States, the USSR, and Russia to reduce nuclear confrontation.

The RSFSR Foreign Ministry has highly assessed the fact that the members and leadership of NATO are searching for its place in the new Europe, which must finally reject bloc approaches and become truly united. The document positively evaluates NATO's readiness to make its contribution to the development of the Helsinki process, without attempting at the same time to somehow supplant it or push it aside. It is characteristic that in introducing a new element—cooperation with former opponents—NATO is declaring its readiness to implement this cooperation on the basis of the Paris CSCE charter. This, in the opinion of the Russian Foreign Ministry, makes it possible to begin the practical development of areas of potential interaction between NATO and East European countries.

The document pays particular attention to the fact that the NATO member states have again confirmed that their alliance is of a purely defensive nature and that they will never use their armed forces for purposes other than defense and do not regard themselves as anyone's opponent. "This stance also coincides with our doctrine of defense sufficiency," the Russian Foreign Ministry states.

Russia also supports the proposal to set up a North Atlantic council for cooperation and is prepared to directly participate in the work of this new body, the Russian Foreign Ministry statement says.

Official 'Grateful' for NATO Declaration

PM1211111091 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 9 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee, by Libero Lizzadri in Rome; date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lizzadri] As you will have learned from the final communique on the Soviet situation, the NATO summit set a number of conditions for extending aid to the republics of the former USSR.

[Ambartsumov] I do not think that the stances and proposals that emerged from the Rome meeting limit the USSR's chances of receiving "aid" from the West. The processes that the summit has called for are basically already under way in many republics, and especially in Russia, though we are not sure how long they will take and whether we will succeed in carrying them through to the end, bringing them to completion. Within this context Mitterrand was probably right when he said that the sixteen that met in Rome are not the USSR's governors, that they cannot issue orders. But there seems to me to be no overall conflict between France's stances and those of the United States and others. The crucial point is that

NATO must support the processes under way in the former USSR, the victory of the democratic forces after the attempted coup in August, the development of democracy, human rights observance, and the establishment of a market economy.

This is the general orientation of the process taking place in our country, and especially in Russia, which is in the vanguard of this process and which has determined the course of events. The essential thing, therefore, is that the NATO countries have pledged to support this enterprise.

[Lizzadri] But Mitterrand is right when he says that it is not clear to NATO who its interlocutor is in the USSR.

[Ambartsumov] This problem does exist, and Mitterrand expressed it in an even more drastic form: Who is in charge? But NATO cannot expect a clear answer, because we are in the midst of a process of huge transformations. Indeed, though it is true that the USSR as it was before no longer exists, on the other hand not only Gorbachev and Yeltsin but a whole large sector of the democratic movement are studying and trying to preserve what can be preserved, and especially to preserve the office of president of the union, which is the only legitimate institution left from those of the former USSR. It is clear, however, that other republics, starting with the Ukraine, want to destroy what is left.

[Lizzadri] But the Ukraine did sign the economic cooperation agreement.

[Ambartsumov] Yes, but it does not want a political treaty. And it is not only the Ukraine. Consider Azerbaijan, where the leadership group is aiming not only at the disintegration of the USSR but even at a merger with one of the bordering states—Turkey or Iran. In this connection I was amazed that when your prime minister received the Azeri premier in Rome a few days ago, he did not make even a veiled or implicit criticism of the Azerbaijani Government's aim to hasten the disintegration of the USSR. The NATO declaration talks about the USSR and the republics, whereas when Mr. Andreotti spoke with the Azeri premier he behaved as though the USSR no longer existed. Strange.

[Lizzadri] It certainly is strange; it conflicts with NATO's stance as it emerged from the Rome communique.

[Ambartsumov] When the NATO leaders speak not only about democracy, human rights, and the market economy but also about the observance of the international pledges made by the USSR, including the treaties on nuclear nonproliferation, conventional disarmament, Helsinki, and so forth, there is no problem for a republic such as Russia, because we reaffirm all our commitments, whereas Azerbaijan is making no pledges and has, among other things, refused to shoulder its share of the foreign debt and has tried to take possession by force of the military materiel of the Soviet troops leaving Azerbaijan. But to return to the debt, Russia is willing to take on also the debts of the republics that do not intend to pay; but if that happens, Russia is entitled to expect to be the legal heir of the former USSR and to demand special treatment from the West—a different kind of respect from that due to the defaulting republics.

[Lizzadri] So this is the policy that Russia intends to pursue.

[Ambartsumov] We noted that the Rome declaration does not mention Russia as a specific problem. We do not want to impose on anyone this recognition of Russia's status as the heir of the former USSR. But this is a not a matter of prestige, but a real situation that is becoming ever more firmly established.

[Lizzadri] Overall, the NATO meeting can be said to have met your needs.

[Ambartsumov] We are grateful, and will be grateful for the humanitarian aid. But we are well aware that the solution of the critical internal problems is our duty, our job.

Rutskoy Comments on 'Problems' in Republic

PM1411152391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 91 p 2

[Ye. Sorokin report: "Meeting With Journalists. Let the Law Prevail"]

[Text] Yesterday Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy met with journalists in the "White House" on the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment. Aleksandr Vladimirovich devoted the meeting mainly to events in Checheno-Ingushetia, but other problems troubling the Russian Federation were also discussed.

Opening the meeting, Rutskoy noted that he would like to consult with journalists on what is happening in the republic. In particular, he is very concerned about people breaking the law. For example, he received a telephone call from V. Stepankov, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] prosecutor general, and before that a call from R. Khasbulatov's office to inform him that a group of people's deputies from the Human Rights Committee had toured correctional labor colonies and establishments where criminals are kept. As a result of this tour of inspection, which had not been agreed with executive organs, a strike has been declared in colonies in 37 oblasts and 17 remand centers. No one can predict how such a strike may end. Why, if aspiring to a legal state, is the committee fighting for the rights of criminals rather than the rights of their victims, Rutskoy asked indignantly?

Continuing the rule of law theme, Rutskoy gave his views on the events in Checheno-Ingushetia. He gave a chronological account of events, providing documentary evidence of the correctness of the decision adopted by the Fifth Congress on the unlawful nature of D. Dudayev's election as president of the Chechen

Republic. He rebuked the mass media for not having published his report on the events in Checheno-Ingushetia.

PRAVDA's correspondent asked Rutskoy whether the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic was not a consequence of the disintegration of the Union and how he assesses the ban on the CPSU in light of the struggle to build a legal state? He replied that the situation in the Baltic republics was fundamentally different from that which prevails in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Whereas in the former everything took place essentially in a civilized fashion, in the Chechen-Ingush Republic the recourse to arms is prevailing. He agreed that a decision to ban a specific public organization should be based on a conclusion by judicial organs, but the decree was issued by the president and therefore this question should be addressed to him.

Role, Future of 'Democratic Russia' Weighed

PM1311112991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 2

["Parties and Movements" article by Igor Kharichev, member of the "Democratic Russia" Coordinating Council; "Does Russia Need 'Democratic Russia'?"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] In familiarizing readers with currently existing parties and movements ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is far from being a mere testing ground for their declarations. Each item prompts us to check our attitude toward a particular problem against the approach and motivation of those who believe their way to be the one true way. Do not be quick to say: "What are 'Democratic Russia's' concerns to me, since I am not a member?" The contradictions of this movement, which has a varied membership (it includes six of the eight parties registered by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Justice) and which, incidentally, is the largest of the movements that has been formed, are in many ways similar to those pertaining in the general democratic process throughout the country. It is a fact that representatives of democratic forces are currently having difficulty finding a common language. And, you know, this may be the conservatives' trump card at the present time.

We think that to some extent this article outlines an answer to the question: Why is this happening, and where are we to find the key to unity?

These are hard times for "Democratic Russia." Its former main aim has almost been achieved: The political power of the CPSU has collapsed and the communist empire has virtually fallen apart. Creative tasks have come to the fore. It is precisely here that the biggest problem is concealed. Whereas opposition to the CPSU and the notorious center used to rally the forces, the concretion of constructive steps divides them, since the approach of the movement's constituent forces to resolving urgent problems differs. This is the typical situation that the democratic movements and fronts in East European countries and the now independent Baltic states have already encountered. I think it entirely natural that two questions should arise: Is the existence of the "Democratic Russia" movement necessary in the future; and if so, what aims would be capable of rallying its constituent forces?

One of the most important components of civil society is the existence of parties that reflect the interests of all sections of the population. It is precisely through these that all the conflicts arising within society are relaxed or removed. By voting for parties, voters express their preference for a particular policy. When they lose votes from the electorate, party leaders are obliged to make adjustments to their activity. This is how stability is maintained in society.

There is not yet a real multiparty system in Russia. The parties that do exist are too small. (The largest of these—the Democratic Party of Russia—has slightly over 20,000 members. In terms of our federation this is insignificant.) However, if we are being exact, the present parties can only conditionally be described as such. Rather they are protoparties, of which one cannot say for sure whether they will turn into real parties in the future or whether they will leave the political arena, even though their activity is extremely useful. Meanwhile "Democratic Russia" has between 200,000 and 300,000 members (of which four-fifths do not belong to a party) and in a number of ways bears a greater resemblance, let us say, to the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States than their namesakes in Russia: The same flexible structure and same overall goal of electing local organizations. So that in future elections, which it would already be worth holding on a multiparty basis, "Democratic Russia" could take part as a parliamentary-style party while at the same time remaining a mass movement—a broader form of participation in political life for the politically active section of the population (particularly if we bear in mind that our fellow citizens are highly allergic to parties on an organized model which imply discipline and blind subordination). And in this form "Democratic Russia's" existence would be more than justified.

Russian citizens are faced with having to elect heads of local administration, people to whom they will entrust the leadership of executive power at local level. One hardly need mention the importance of these elections, which should lead to the wholesale replacement of the old structures and the former leaders nurtured by the CPSU. "Democratic Russia" has been preparing for the upcoming election campaign for several months now. Moreover, the movement advocates the need to hold elections for heads of kray and oblast administrations, who for the time being are appointed by the RSFSR president, and also the reelection of representative authority at all levels, including the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, preferably not later than next spring. (It is also important to secure legislative change in the structure and functions of the present authority—for example, the abolition of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and the conversion of the soviets into efficient and properly representative organs.) Aiming purposefully for elections means that it is necessary to select and nominate worthy candidates both for the post of executive organ heads and for deputies at different levels. Here it is important to understand that only deputies can be required to be directly responsible to the movement. Heads of administration need autonomy, and therefore at present "Democratic Russia" can only give them provisional support, that is to say support for steps that do not contradict the movement's aims and principles and criticism of steps that are deemed to do so. Incidentally, the Council of Representatives has already decided on conditional support for B. Yeltsin, G. Popov, and A. Sobchak. There will be plenty of election campaigns. But this activity cannot be put forward as the strategic goal—that goal which not only unites the movement's members but also defines its policy, priorities, and ultimately its very campaign program for the next elections.

One of these goals is the definitive dismantling of imperial structures. The Army and the KGB are still functioning, as is the former financial and credit system. It is clear that we must strive to establish a Russian Army on a professional basis, as well as intelligence and counterintelligence organs. It is clear that as long as four republics have nuclear weapons, it is essential that a unified strategic command come into function. All this has already become a commonplace. It makes sense for "Democratic Russia" to define its attitude toward nuclear weapons. Incidentally, eminent human rights defender Yuriy Orlov proposed this. As for specific aspects of building an Army and intelligence and counterintelligence organs, these are specialized rather than political questions and their examination and implementation demand the efforts of professionals.

The total transition to a market economy can be viewed as the movement's main task for the coming years. (Indeed, there can be no more important task now than to get the economy back on its feet.) The difficulty lies in the fact that the movement's members are united only in their support for the speediest possible introduction of the market. No sooner do matters turn to concrete programs than diverging approaches to key questions emerge not just among party members but also among people without party affiliation. What, for example, is the best way to carry out destatization? Should everyone be given an average share free of charge? If so, then in what form? Or only a part of a share? Then which part? Or should everything be sold? To whom? To foreigners as well? Or should it be classed as long-term credit...? Of course, it is possible to define a certain position to suit the majority of movement members and to expound this position—the Law on Privatization is far from complete, there is an absence of legally binding acts. It is possible to alter the law and introduce proposals for legally binding acts. The question is whether absolute clarity in one's position is more valuable than preserving unity. It is not expedient to strive for the stringent detailing of all aims. Sometimes it is better to "remain ambiguous." The method of destatization should not be considered Democratic Russia's pivotal task. Apart from that, there is some sense in restricting oneself to two general positions: destatization should be carried out as far as possible on the basis of the principle of social justice (we are dividing up what belongs to everyone); and there should be reliable protection against all possible abuse. (It is not acceptable to allow people to be deceived. This, frankly, could become explosive.)

What, then, can be categorized as questions of a strategic nature? Take, for example, the attitude toward state and individual, private ownership of major enterprises. From a liberal standpoint, it is necessary to reduce the first type of ownership as much as possible and to encourage the second. Liberals in general oppose interference in the affairs of entrepreneurs. The fact that other approaches are possible is seen in the example of developed countries. The British Labor Party and the U.S. Democrats not only favor limiting enterprise but also correspondingly place greater stress than their opponents on social programs. Democratic Russia needs to define its position on these questions, although this could cause a split in its ranks. Moreover, you don't have to be a fortune-teller to predict that the majority of movement members—like Russia's inhabitants—identify more closely with social democracy in their social ideals. And it cannot be otherwise in a country which has been reduced to ruin and humiliation. Liberal ideas have been poorly perceived up to now by a broad cross-section of the population. There is little sense in movement leaders and activists espousing such ideas to hasten with the organized formulation of a given political tendency. It is preferable to remain within Democratic Russia and propagate liberal values.

Another of the movement's long-term aims could be to assist the emergence of a civil society. Behind this general concept there are truly concrete things. Namely, as we have already noted, the existence of parties and other sociopolitical organizations expressing the interests of all strata of society; the ability of political forces to cooperate and compromise, and to set up blocs and coalitions; and the high political and legal culture of political personalities, activists, and the broad masses. This concept also incorporates both the ability of parties to channel the dissatisfaction of large groups of the population (which is particularly important for us now, given that discontent prompted by a deteriorating economic situation will increase), as well as work to overcome dangerous stereotypes of social awareness—in our case, Bolshevism and social dependence. Of course, a Russian Government program of aid in creating a civil society is needed. The appropriate resources must be allocated for its implementation—primarily for educating political organization activists, and for enhancing the population's political culture (such measures were implemented in the FRG after World War II). Democratic Russia could become not just the initiator of this program's adoption but also one of its direct executors.

Now a word about an information vote [spravochnoye golosovaniye] which has caused a lot of fuss. It was carried out at the Council of Representative's recent plenum on the question of transferring to individual membership of the movement. Regional representatives supported this proposal, which prompted a painful reaction from many party members. The final decision has been left for the movement's second congress. But the question demands a considered approach. Although the movement currently has far more unaffiliated members, it would not be sensible to alienate the parties. Their departure would be a loss to all sides, and it would complicate the political situation. At the same time, I cannot agree with the view that if individual membership is introduced then "Democratic Russia" will become a party (in our understanding of the word). The introduction into the statutes of a point which permits simultaneous membership of democratically oriented parties; the minimum possible number of programmatic documents; the general nature of the formulation of the main tasks; the maintenance of mild discipline—all this will allow the movement to remain as such. And nevertheless this step is likely to lead to many parties leaving the movement.

"Democratic Russia" can still serve Russia. At the very least, its collapse will complicate the political situation and render the holding of elections difficult—many of the electorate's votes which would be cast in "Democratic Russia's" favor are hardly likely to fall to the parties. But serious transformations of this mass sociopolitical organization are needed. Whether or not this happens is up to the congress.

Popov Addresses Democratic Russia Congress

PM1411114391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 2

[Unattributed account of speech by Moscow Mayor G. Popov at the second congress of the "Democratic Russia" movement: "G. Popov: The New Tasks of Our Democracy"]

[Text] I think that it is necessary to state that there has been a fundamental change in the situation, and, accordingly, a change in the strategy to which we adhere. If we think that, because the democrats are now in power, it is only a matter of implementing our old programs, that would be a serious mistake. Let us recall our program agenda with the aim of assessing to what extent our forecasts have been verified. Let us take the country's national structure: The democratic forces started from the idea of confederation—no one thought that the Soviet Union would disintegrate. We declared: "All peoples are free, any people can leave...." Nevertheless, there were virtually no doubts that all or almost all of them would remain within the confederation. In reality, we no longer speak seriously of confederation today. An altogether different situation in the sphere of state structure is emerging. And it is on the basis of this reality that we should proceed. The reality is that we must take as a basis the Russian Federation. Indeed, evidently we should not take even the whole Russian Federation as a basis....

In the economic sphere we put forward an extremely reasonable and consistent program. The main problem is to make people owners. We rejected the bureaucratic model of privatization. And we recognized privatization via auctions on a small scale: If bureaucrats acquire property in bureaucratic privatization, in privatization by auction it is acquired by those who have money.

We have neither the time nor a reliable executive mechanism: The chain of bureaucrats between property and people turns out to be too long. There is only one solution: to give state property to those who want it, purely and simply. The problem of social justice will be decided subsequently through the taxation mechanism. A further point. We proceeded on the basis that, if we have leveling [uravnitelnaya] privatization, the political mechanism should be normal democracy, and in this democracy the main organs would be representative organs of power. But if there is no equality in sharing out property, then the objective of making the representative mechanism the principal mechanism of democracy is left hovering in mid-air. In this way all three of our general objectives: orientation toward a confederation of republics, toward a leveling distribution of state-bureaucratic property, and toward representative organs as the main mechanism of power—all these three things do not work properly at the present time....

Regarding the political model. In the prevailing situation we must take the step of strengthening executive power so that the executive power begins to operate consistently and decisively.... This is important from the point of view of implementing privatization. No one will gain anything if some soviet or other changes the rules of the game every two or three months.

And finally, the question of the state structure. Complaints about the excessive powers of the current Russian leadership are on the whole justified. But it must be clearly understood: There are definite limits to rejecting the state machine and overcoming the bureaucratic state system. If we exceed this limit, we slide towards what has happened to Russia once already, when it disintegrated into a large number of small states. How this ended—you all know....

Therefore my position, at first sight unacceptable, is that we should immediately grant all autonomies who vote in referendums to leave Russia the opportunity to do so. That is the first point. Second. The same applies to the regions of other republics where Russians live—to clarify with whom they want to live. Then we will be able to abolish all autonomies within Russia: Those who wanted to go will have left, and the remaining peoples can live the way that nationalities live in the United States. Only in that case will we be able to create a state in which all peoples will be guaranteed what they need: the ability to learn a language wherever a person lives on Russian territory, the ability to develop one's own culture. The future of Russia does not lie with reservations inhabited by one people or another.

We must create in Russia a model which will once again be attractive to other peoples. And which did once exist in Russia....

Congress Assessed

PM1411154791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

[O. Voronin article: "Shift: Comments on the Second Congress of the 'Democratic Russia' Movement"]

[Text] As distinct from the first, founding congress, this forum of the biggest (300,000-400,000 activists) and undoubtedly most influential movement since the CPSU's departure from the political arena was more businesslike and calm: The formalization of the former "informals" is taking place pretty quickly.

Enormous inner tension could be felt on the very first day. The leadership's resolute refusal to recognize the credentials of the Coalition of Democratic Forces of Moscow (a splinter group from the city organization opposed to the capital's mayor's office) led to 46 people walking out, and disputes over credentials also took place within the Chelyabinsk and other delegations. Decisively exploiting the slightest slipups, the congress' working parties excluded all those who might have hindered the skillfully staged political show. Incidentally, we are not talking here about Lev Ponomarev or Vera Kriger—experienced functionaries; no, a far more significant figure was to be felt behind them. Yuriy Afanasyev, two days steadfastly spent on permanent watch on the captain's bridge, could celebrate a personal victory. His obdurate will was perceptible in the new wording of the statutes, in the resolutions on the political situation, and in the decision creating commmittees in support of the reforms (reforms, rather than the president!). L. Batkin's speech, which subjected the economic policy of the Moscow and St. Petersburg mayor's offices and the Russian Government to scathing criticism but drew from it the paradoxical conclusion that "tragic necessity makes us accept that there is no replacement for this power from the left," and the speech by Father Gleb Yakunin, who bitterly complained about the "sons of Israel's lack of faith in their leaders, Moses and Aaron."

These speeches also played into Afanasyev's hands. His own political report, where St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak (according to the polls, the most popular current politician after Boris Yeltsin) was the prime target, also showed that the captain has no intention whatsoever of handing over command of the "Democratic Russia" ship to the president or the leaders of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. G. Popov's speech on the need for referendums in national regions and the subsequent elimination of autonomous entities was listened to politely but no more than that. The concept of "single and divisible," first expressed by Afanasyev in the weekly MEGALOPOLIS EKSPRESS, seemed to enjoy greater popularity among the delegates than the federalist position of the "Popular Accord" bloc (the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) and the Constitutional and Christian Democrats). From the outset the latter were looking for an opportunity to walk out, and after suffering defeat on questions concerning the statutes, which give more rights to nonparty "Democratic Russia" members, consequently left the congress. The departure of some activists belonging to those parties did not result in a marked "thinning out" of Democratic Russia, as most regional delegations of the DPR and Christian Democrats remained in the hall.

Of course it is not just a matter of the political ambitions of the leaders of these parties—N. Travkin or M. Astafyev. The fault line goes deeper: The alternative of recreating the Russian empire or a wiser concept of a "world of worlds" (M. Gefter), albeit forming only with difficulty—a complex system of self-governing states, regions, cities, and lands. Of course, the simple is always more attractive, but it is here that the chief danger could lie in wait for Travkin. Russia's biggest political party will seem to various "national patriots" a desirable umbrella to shelter beneath (as has already happened in the East Siberian organization, where a Cossack troop captain has become head of the regional department). Given such a scenario, some kind of bloc with S. Baburin's "Rossiya" is possible. Time will tell whether the DPR will cross the line between the absolutely essential task of politically defending the Russian diaspora in the sovereign republics and the new imperial policy.

Strange as it may seem, economic questions took up less space at the congress than expected. V. Bokser's impassioned speech in defense of "independent enterprise" clearly came over as more lightweight than the joyless forecasts of the main drafter of the government program, Vice Premier Ye. Gaydar, who promised "visible 200-percent inflation and tough budget savings." The shadows of the powerful Congress of Exchanges and the lobbies of new property owners within the Russian Government loomed over the program, but the congress found no serious arguments for discussion. Essentially the "reform support committees" will, if organized, be condemned to pursue this line—rolling back social programs and restricting wages.

Thus the mass movement of "middle" strata, which is what "Democratic Russia" essentially is, is planning to turn against the mass movement of employees [nayemnniki], although many of them may not realize this. On the other hand, the attempts of the "Democratic Russia" leadership to continue exploiting the workers' movement and independent trade unions in their own interests were patently clear in the affiliation to "Democratic Russia" of the "Association of Flying Personnel" (the first trade union in the movement!) and in the new concept of the Ministry of Labor, which RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's

Deputy Leonid Volkov (Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation) essentially repeated to the congress, urging a war against "official" trade unions.

Of course there is little that is good in the trade union bureaucracy, but handing over the job of social protection to the government, leaving employees without their own structures (since the current independent trade unions are hardly in a position to cope with this function) is a route leading directly to the economic coercion of working people. Turning away from support for strikes to banning them by law—are the democrats not embarking on this path?

Anxieties Remain Following Cossak Congress

PM1411120791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 4

[Correspondent V. Sharov report under the rubric "The Cossacks: On the Way to a Renaissance": "During the Grand Assembly"]

[Text] Stavropol—The Second Congress of the Cossacks Union has been held in Stavropol. Participating in it were 563 delegates and approximately 200 guests.

For three days the people of Stavropol feasted their eyes on the dashing warriors in very diverse uniforms bringing to mind the 11 Cossack Armies that existed before the revolution. However, to whom do they bring them to mind? On seeing the marching Cossacks and knowing that there are two military schools in the city, a seven year old boy asked his mother: "Which school do they go to?" Alas, the level of knowledge about the Cossacks is not much higher among adult Russians. To a certain extent this also applies to the Cossacks themselves. It was not for nothing that the duty captain—the well-known poet and pedagogue Boris Almazov, hetman of the village of Nevskaya (city of St. Petersburg)—who opened the congress, was forced to speak in detail about the traditions and rules of holding a "Grand Assembly."

The Don Cossacks appeared the best prepared for the congress. The oblast hetmans council recently adopted a decision to create the Don Cossack Republic, and a package of documents has been drawn up to organize self-management and land use. This is not the first attempt to create their own administrative-territorial units. The "Grand Assembly" supported the idea. But the hopes of a positive decision in the Russian Supreme Soviet are not great, although the Cossacks' persistence is perfectly explicable. First, if the Cossacks have been recognized as a people under the law on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, then they need their own territory. Second, the interethnic conflicts that are flaring up in the republics which have emerged in place of the former national autonomies are obliging the Cossacks to stand apart territorially for the protection of their own rights, as the neighboring Russian regions are not incorporating them into themselves. The 12,500 Sunzha Cossacks, reduced to despair, intend to move to Stavropol Kray in the very near future, and land has already been allocated to them here. But where are others to move to?

This problem burst forth in earnest during a meeting of delegates with Stavropol Kray Soviet Chairman I.S. Boldyrev. Emotions were also fanned by the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic.

"Russia does not hear us," V.N. Tkachev, the Batalpashinsk (Karachayevo-Cherkessia) hetman, said with bitterness. "You cannot understand what it means to live abroad."

He was echoed by N.A. Lyashenko, hetman of the Zelenchuksko-Urup Republic (also Karachayevo-Cherkessia), which has been proclaimed but not recognized.

If the Russian Government is incapable of protecting the Russians on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, then what are the Cossacks to do who, by the will of fate, have ended up abroad? In the congress lobby I talked with P.S. Sazonov (Dubossary City, Dnestr Republic):

"This is the third year that we have been fighting. Against us are double-dyed nationalism and the national guard and police armed to the teeth with U.S. gas pistols and rifles. Seven of our people were killed and many wounded in October alone. We have asked to join the Ukraine—they will not take us. We have appealed to Russia for help. We have never felt any support."

The anxiety over the fate of the Cossacks and, generally, of the Russians who are on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic—about which much was said at the congress—is becoming understandable.

The program of the Cossacks Union was discussed and adopted during the congress, and changes were made to the statutes. A number of resolutions were adopted, of which the most important was on land, in which the Cossacks came out unequivocally against private ownership of land and for the restoration of traditional communal land use. "Hot spots" were not overlooked either. Calling for prudence and the prevention of bloodshed in Checheno-Ingushetia, the congress guaranteed assistance for brother Cossacks.

It will still take time to interpret all that was done during these three days, but it is already clear that the Cossacks are becoming stronger. A program has emerged which devotes a lot of space to the economy, economic activity, and the restoration of traditions and way of life. An association of Cossack writers and a Cossack cultural fund have been set up.

Nevertheless, anxiety remains. Because, if the Russian Government fails to extinguish quickly the hotbeds of interethnic tension in the south, the Cossacks will inevitably start arming themselves for purposes of self-defense. We will end up with a formidable militarized formation, but there are already too many weapons in people's hands. God save us from a new "Caucasian war...."

Decisive, emergency measures are needed—economic, juridical, political, whatever you like—to ensure that a person of any nationality on the territory of Russia and every Russian outside it feels that he is under the protection of a mighty state.

Congress Ends

LD1011172591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1606 GMT 10 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondents Nikolay Styazhkin and Vyacheslav Kazmin]

[Text] Stavropol (North Caucasus), 10 Nov (TASS)—The second All-Russian Great Cossack Krug, the Congress of the Union of Cossacks of Russia, ended here today by confirming that it remains true to age-old Cossack traditions. Delegates to the Congress representing all regions where there are large concentrations of Cossacks discussed their plan to bring about the historical and spiritual rebirth of the Cossacks. A decision adopted by the Great Krug declared the Union of Cossacks and its regional structures to be the rightful successors of Cossack national and state formations, which were illegally abolished in the past.

Delegates expressed their full support for the efforts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic president to overcome the explosive situation in Checheno-Ingushetia. An appeal was sent to Dzhakhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic, calling on him "not to allow bloodshed under any circumstances." The document draws particular attention to the "intolerable nature of human rights violations and of all manifestations of national oppression."

Decisions were also adopted reflecting the attitude of the Cossacks to events in South Ossetia, Pridnestrovye, and several other regions. There was support for proposals on establishing a "Don Republic."

New Appointees Assume Positions, Comment

U.S. Envoy Appointed

OW1111220191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2015 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to IF's [INTERFAX] sources, Yegor Gaydar, deputy head of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Government in charge of economic policy, has been appointed by President Yeltsin to the post of Minister of Economics and Finance.

Petr Aven will be head of the RSFSR Foreign Economic Relations Committee and First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.

Boris Satykov takes on as the RSFSR Minister of Science and Technological Policy.

Boris Yeltsin appointed A. Kolosovskiy to the post of Russia's special envoy to the United States.

Cabinet Appointments Listed

PM1311142791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

["Own Information" report: "Gaydar Steps Forward"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the formation of the new Russian Government is going ahead at full speed. The changes in the "White House" are very substantial—Ye. Gaydar has presented an energetic young team, basically made up of staffers from his own institute. He himself heads the Ministry of Economics and Finance with the rank of vice premier. A. Shokhin has received the portfolio of minister of labor and social questions along with the portfolio of vice premier.

Vladimir Lopukhin has been appointed minister of the fuel industry—one of the most responsible posts today. Anatoliy Chubays will deal with privatization as chairman of the State Committee. Andrey Nechayev has been assigned to head the Committee on Investments and Purchases. Konstantin Kagalovskiy is the new cabinet's representative in charge of questions of foreign technical assistance. Vladimir Moshits will represent the Gaydar team in the Interrepublic Economic Committee.

Ministers who are not involved in the economy have retained their posts. Although Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's tenure does, admittedly, remain in question for the time being.

The first sitting of the new Russian Government under RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President and Premier Boris Yeltsin is to be held in the Kremlin. The implementation of economic reforms is the main question submitted for discussion.

Decree Names New Officials

PM1411094191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Appointments"]

[Text] An RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential decree has appointed Yevgeniy Borisovich Komarov head of the Murmansk Oblast administration;

Leonid Yakovlevich Smolyakov has been appointed RSFSR plenipotentiary representative in the Ukraine.

With a view to coordinating the activity of executive organs in the RSFSR's krays, oblasts, and autonomous okrugs, the following have been appointed RSFSR presidential representatives: Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Delidov in Perm Oblast's Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug; and Grigoriy Mikhaylovich Oynvid in Kamchatka Oblast's Koryak Autonomous Okrug.

Vice Premiers Grant Interview

PM1211094191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

[M. Berger report, incorporating interviews with newly appointed Russian Vice Premiers Ye.T. Gaydar and A.N. Shokhin on 8 November with unidentified reporter; place not given: "End of Dacha Season: New Men in the White House"]

[Text] Exercising his new powers, the president of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], who now heads the Russian Government, has appointed two vice premiers who will be responsible for reform and economic policy as a whole. The two men are 35-year-old Yegor Gaydar, who directed the preparation of the new economic concept of Russian reform, and 40-year-old Aleksandr Shokhin, who also participated actively in that work. On 8 November they left Arkhangelskoye, the Russian Government's well known residence near Moscow, where the plan was formulated, and gave their first interviews to IZVESTIYA on their first day of work.

Yegor Timurovich Gaydar is a doctor of economic sciences. He graduated from Moscow State University Economics Department. After postgraduate study he worked at a number of economic institutions in the Academy of Sciences system. He directed departments at the journal KOMMUNIST and later at PRAVDA. Recently he was director of the Institute of Economic Policy. He was recruited as an expert in the preparation of documents, reports, and programs of the Ryzhkov government. This collaboration was not a cause of great satisfaction to either side.

[IZVESTIYA] Yegor Timurovich, what do you intend to do first? What can you tell us about your program? When will it be implemented and how?

[Gaydar] It is impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the present economic situation, and if you were to pick the worst moment for accepting responsibility for what is going on, that would be right now. The situation is worse than bad.

We have fundamental clarity on the diagnosis and on what needs to be done. First it is necessary to establish some kind of rules in the economy, the rules of the game as the saying goes, to enable people to stand on their own two feet. As for the program, it is impossible to imagine any detail now, any day-by-day schedule. There are common major aims toward which it is necessary to move: The stabilization of money circulation, strengthening the ruble, privatization...

[IZVESTIYA] And price liberalization, which we are expecting here any day now since Yeltsin's speech. By the way, when will it happen?

[Gaydar] Not tomorrow or the next day. Even if we wanted to do this quickly, it would be technically impossible. This is a very complex matter demanding major general economic and social research, which we are engaged in now. I am not going to give a precise date for price liberalization; that would be wrong. I can say one thing: For purely technical reasons the countdown now is measured not in days or weeks but in months.

[IZVESTIYA] Will the cabinet have advisers, economic experts?

[Gaydar] Undoubtedly. We would like academician Shatalin to agree to become a consultant, and others too, of course.

[IZVESTIYA] One last question: Is it not a daunting task?

[Gaydar] No.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shokhin is a doctor of economic sciences. He graduated from Moscow State University Economics Department. He worked at the State Planning Economics Scientific Research Institute, the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Progress Forecasting. In recent years he was an economic adviser to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and then chief of a Foreign Ministry administration. In August he became Russian minister of labor.

[IZVESTIYA] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, your group of ministries could be called the group of social discontent, and it is not anticipated that there will be any shortage of that in the near future. How do you intend to cope with it?

[Shokhin] Besides the "social discontent departments," as you call them, this group also includes the ministries of health, culture and education, and science, but the main workload, especially in the transitional period, is borne by the Ministry of Labor and Employment and the Ministry of Social Protection. We are not going to promise a quick or very rapid improvement of the living standard. The time for populist promises is past. Our maximum task is to maintain the present living standard until the reform begins to yield a real return. It is a very complex task but quite feasible.

We are now developing a so-called shock absorber system, which makes it possible to soften the blow of price liberalization. We used to say that we had achieved the unification of the advantages of socialism and scientific and technical progress, but now we can see that in fact we united market prices with that "advantage" of socialism, total deficit. Herein lies the enormous complexity of the work ahead.

Deputy Premiers' Tasks Outlined

*PM1311155591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
13 Nov 91 First Edition p 2*

["Instruction of the President of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic"]

[Text] Instruction of the President of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]

On the Distribution of Duties Between the Deputy Chairmen of the RSFSR Government

1. To instruct Comrade G.E. Burbulis, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Government, to carry out the appointment of deputy ministers and leaders of organs of management belonging to the structure of ministries and state committees of the RSFSR.

2. To task Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Government, with the direct coordination and organization of the work of:
the RSFSR Ministry of the Economy and Finances
the RSFSR Ministry of Industry
the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture
the RSFSR Ministry of Transport
the RSFSR Ministry of Fuel and Power Engineering
the RSFSR Ministry of Trade and Material Resources
the RSFSR Ministry of Geology and the Use of Nature
the RSFSR Ministry of Communications
the RSFSR Ministry of Architecture, Construction, and Housing and Municipal Services
the RSFSR State Committee for the Management of State Property
the RSFSR State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and the Support of New Economic Structures.

Decrees, Laws on Reform Drafted, Adopted

On Leadership Role

PM0811200191 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 1

["Decree of the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [RSFSR] on the Reorganization of the RSFSR Government"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 121-1 and Point 6 of Article 121-5 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Constitution and also on the basis of Point 2 of the 1 November 1991 Resolution of the Fifth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies "On the Organization of Executive Power During the Period of Radical Economic Reform," I decree that

1. For the period of the economic reform the RSFSR Government is to be headed by the RSFSR president.

2. The RSFSR vice president and RSFSR state secretary are instructed to submit proposals for the reorganization of the RSFSR Government within three days.

3. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is instructed to execute its duties until a new RSFSR Government is formed.

[Signed] RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin, Moscow, the Kremlin, 6 November 1991

On Constitutional Amendments Law

PM1211162791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 6

["Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Law On Amendments and Additions to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Constitution (Fundamental Law)"—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA headline]

[Text] With a view to improving RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] constitutional legislation the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies resolves:

The following amendments and additions are to be made to the RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law):

1. Part 2 of Article 8 is to be deleted.

2. Article 16 is to be deleted.

3. In Part 2 of Article 19 the word "USSR" is to be replaced by the word "RSFSR."

4. Part 4 of Article 92 is to be set forth as follows:

"Mentally ill citizens deemed incapable by a court and persons serving terms in places of imprisonment in accordance with a court verdict do not participate in elections."

5. Point 7 of Part 3 of Article 104 is to be set forth as follows:

"7) the formation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

6. In Article 107:

Part 2 of the article is to be set forth as follows:

"The RSFSR Supreme Soviet is formed from among RSFSR people's deputies by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and is accountable to it;"

in Part 4 the words "the Soviet of the Republic is elected" and "the Soviet of Nationalities is elected" are to be replaced by the words "the Soviet of the Republic is formed" and "the Soviet of Nationalities is formed" respectively;

after Part 4 the article is to be supplemented by a new part as follows:

"If it is impossible for the republics within the RSFSR, the autonomous oblasts, the autonomous okrugs, the krays, and the oblasts to be represented on the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities by deputies from national-territorial districts, then people's deputies from territorial electoral districts may be included in the

Soviet of Nationalities following a submission from territorial deputies' groups;"

Parts 5, 6, and 7 are to be considered Parts 6, 7, and 8 respectively.

7. In Article 118:

in Part 2 the words "may be released" are to be replaced by the words "are released;"

Part 3 is to be set forth as follows:

"An RSFSR people's deputy may not have criminal proceedings instituted against him or be arrested or subjected to measures of judicially imposed administrative punishment without the consent of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies or, in the period between its sessions, without the consent of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

8. Part 2 of Article 121/3 is to be set forth as follows:

"The RSFSR president has the right to suspend the operation of enactments by the head of executive power (president) of a republic within the RSFSR, as well as of decisions by other organs of executive power on RSFSR territory, if they run counter to the RSFSR Constitution and RSFSR laws."

9. In Part 1 of Article 128 the words "decisions and ordinances of executive committees of kray, oblast, and city (of cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies or of executive committees of soviets of people's deputies of autonomous oblasts" are to be replaced by the words "enactments of a kray, oblast, or city (of cities of republic subordination) administration or of an administration of an autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug which run counter to legislation."

10. The RSFSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) is to be supplemented by a new Chapter 15/1 as follows:

"Chapter 15/1. The Head of Executive Power (President) of a Republic Within the RSFSR

"Article 132/1. The head of executive power (president) of a republic within the RSFSR is the republic's top official and head of executive power in a republic within the RSFSR.

"The head of executive power (president) of a republic within the RSFSR is part of the unified system of RSFSR executive power headed by the RSFSR president and acts as the guarantor of personal rights and freedoms to observe the RSFSR Constitution and laws and the constitution and laws of the republics within the RSFSR and defends the sovereignty and the economic and political interests of the RSFSR and of the republics within the RSFSR.

"Article 132/2. The powers and the election and operating procedure of the heads of executive power (presidents) of the republics within the RSFSR are determined by the constitutions and laws of the republics within the RSFSR."

11. Article 133 is to be set forth as follows:

"The Council of Ministers (Cabinet of Ministers) of a republic within the RSFSR—the government of a republic within the RSFSR—is an organ of executive power headed and formed by the head of executive power (president) of a republic within the RSFSR."

12. Article 134 is to be set forth as follows:

"On the basis of and in execution of the laws of the RSFSR and of a republic within the RSFSR, other decisions of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet of a republic within the RSFSR, decrees of the RSFSR president and the head of executive power (president) of a republic within the RSFSR, and resolutions and ordinances of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers of a republic within the RSFSR issues resolutions and ordinances and verifies their execution. Resolutions and ordinances of the Council of Ministers of a republic within the RSFSR are obligatory for execution throughout the territory of the republic within the RSFSR."

13. Article 166 is to be set forth as follows:

"Civil and criminal cases are examined in courts collectively and individually; in a court of first instance with the participation of jurors and people's assessors or by a collegium of three professional judges or judges individually.

"A citizen has the right to have his case examined collectively in court, with the exception of instances laid down in law."

14. Article 181 is to be set forth as follows:

"The state flag of the RSFSR is a rectangular strip with equal-sized horizontal bands: the upper band white, the middle one azure, and the bottom one scarlet. The ratio of the flag's width to its length is one to two."

15. Article 182 is to be set forth as follows:

"The national anthem of the RSFSR is approved by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

[Signed] RSFSR President B. Yeltsin

Moscow, The Kremlin, 1 November 1991

On Indexation Law

PM1311113591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 6

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Law "On the Indexation of the Monetary Incomes and Savings of Citizens in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic"]

[Text] This law lays down the procedure for indexing the monetary incomes and savings of citizens in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in connection with the growth in prices of consumer goods and services (hereafter—consumer prices).

Article 1. The Concept of Indexation

Indexation is the mechanism laid down by the state for increasing the monetary incomes and savings of citizens in connection with the growth in consumer prices. The purpose of indexation is to maintain the purchasing power of citizens' monetary incomes and savings. Indexation may be combined with, and in certain cases be replaced by, other methods of state regulation of the population's incomes (revision of the level of labor remuneration, of the size of pensions, social benefits, etc.).

Changes to be made to the mechanism for maintaining the purchasing power of citizens' incomes are examined by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet when approving the law on the budget for the corresponding year.

Article 2. Objects of Indexation

Indexation applies to:

labor remuneration for workers of enterprises, establishments, and organizations (hereafter—enterprises), apart from workers of enterprises which independently decide the prices of the goods that they produce and the services that they provide;

state pensions, grants, and social benefits (for families with children, for unemployment, temporary incapacity, and others), apart from one-off ones;

citizens' deposits at the RSFSR Savings Bank;

RSFSR state loans and other RSFSR state securities, payments to RSFSR state insurance organizations.

Sums paid out in accordance with the prescribed procedure for impaired health, the death of a citizen, and other harm caused to him are subject to indexation on a par with state pensions at the expense of the enterprises or citizens who caused the harm.

Article 3. Consumer Prices Index

The index of consumer prices for foodstuffs and nonfood goods and also for paid services (hereafter—the consumer prices index) is used for the indexation of citizens' monetary incomes and savings. It is calculated as a cumulative total quarterly from the beginning of the year on the basis of statistical data obtained as a result of monitoring the change in retail prices in state, cooperative, and private trade and also in the services sphere on the basis of the level of consumption which actually took shape in the RSFSR during the preceding year in respect of a fixed range of basic consumer goods and services (not counting optional goods and services).

The change in consumer prices is monitored by a special state service operating as part of the republic and local statistical organs.

Article 4. Indexation Threshold

The indexation threshold is the consumer prices index at which the indexation of citizens' monetary incomes and savings commences; the threshold is set at 6 percent.

Information about the consumer prices index is published quarterly in the official publication of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA.

Article 5. Deciding the Extent of the Increase in Citizens' Incomes

The monetary incomes of citizens in the form of labor remuneration, state pensions, grants, and social benefits are liable to indexation as follows:

the first part of the incomes, equal to 150 percent of the minimum monthly labor remuneration in the RSFSR—by the [full] consumer prices index;

the second, subsequent part of the income, equal to 150 percent of the minimum labor remuneration—by 50 percent of the consumer prices index.

The monetary income increased in connection with indexation is determined by multiplying the first and second parts of the income liable to indexation, accordingly, by the full index or by 50 percent of the consumer prices index.

Incomes in excess of 300 percent of the minimum monthly labor remuneration are not liable to indexation.

For persons living in regions and localities where regional coefficients are applied to labor remuneration in accordance with the prescribed procedure the size of the minimum labor remuneration liable to indexation is determined with due regard for these coefficients.

Article 6. Indexation of Citizens' Savings

RSFSR state loan bonds and other RSFSR securities are liable to indexation by means of altering the interest rates with due regard for the prices index in accordance with the procedure approved by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Citizens' savings in the RSFSR Savings Bank are indexed by banks by means of altering the interest rates.

Article 7. The Procedure for Paying Incomes in Connection with Indexation

The payment of funds in connection with indexation is made on a monthly basis at the place where the incomes are received, starting with the month following the one in which the consumer prices index was published.

Payments received by a citizen as a result of indexation are totaled with the basic incomes and are taxed according to the prescribed procedure and the current scale of normatives. The size of the monthly labor remuneration and the sizes of citizens' other incomes not liable to taxation are increased by the consumer prices index.

At the end of the calendar year the total of the payments in connection with indexation is incorporated in the corresponding wage rates and salaries, state pensions, grants, and social benefits.

Article 8. Sources of Indexation

Funds for indexation of the labor remuneration of workers of budget enterprises (health care, public education, scientific, cultural, and other establishments) and for the indexation of social pensions and of benefits are derived from appropriations from the corresponding budgets:

for the labor remuneration of workers of enterprises which sell output (services) at fixed state prices and rates, given a lack of funds for labor remuneration for reasons beyond their control—budget funds in accordance with the procedure defined by the RSFSR Council of Ministers;

for the labor remuneration of workers of enterprises which independently decide the prices of goods that they produce and services that they provide, of public organizations (associations) and their enterprises—the enterprises' and organizations' own funds;

for state labor pensions—the assets of the RSFSR Pension Fund, including assets transferred to this fund from the Union budget for the payment of pensions and benefits to servicemen and their families, as well as to categories of citizens equated with them in this connection and to their families;

for social benefits paid out of the RSFSR Social Insurance Fund—the assets of this fund;

for unemployment benefits—the assets of the RSFSR State Employment Fund;

for state grants—appropriations from the corresponding budgets;

for citizens' savings in the RSFSR Savings Bank—the bank's revenue;

for incomes from RSFSR state securities and RSFSR state loans—appropriations from the RSFSR state budget;

for payments to RSFSR state insurance organs—the income of the RSFSR Main Administration for State Insurance as a result of increasing the interest rates on the assets placed as a result of these payments.

[Signed] RSFSR President B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the RSFSR House of Soviets, 24 October 1991

On Citizenship Law

PM1311150991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report from the "News" column roundup: "Obliged To Be a Citizen"]

[Text] For the first time since 1922, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] has prepared a draft law "On Citizenship in the RSFSR." It was presented by Russian State Counselor Sergey Shakhray at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's 11 November sitting. The draft envisages abolishing the deprivation of Russian citizenship and broadening the basis on which it may be acquired. For the first time legislation establishes citizenship in the republics within the RSFSR. The draft law has been sent for examination by the Russian parliament's chambers.

On Fund for Servicemen

LD1111224291 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Text] Today Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree on setting up the Garantiya public and state fund for social guarantees for Russian servicemen.

Interior Ministry Locates, Freezes CPSU Funds

LD1211191991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Russian Interior Ministry personnel have located and frozen funds in the sum of 6 billion rubles [R] and the equivalent of another R13 million in foreign currency, belonging to the CPSU. These funds were held in the accounts of various commercial businesses. A TASS correspondent was told this by Andrey Dunayev, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister for internal affairs. He noted with irony that the CPSU Central Committee's resolution on the party's commercial activities and ways of finding reliable sources to fill its coffers had been conscientiously put into practice.

Further on Funds Transfer

LD1211233391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2138 GMT 12 Nov 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A total of 48 hours have passed since the Yeltsin law on banning the CPSU has been issued. Two procommunist parties—The Party of Free Russia and the

Socialist Party of Working People—have already proclaimed themselves successors of the Bolshevik heritage. Constituent congresses of several more Marxist groups will be held in November.

There is information that the Russian Government is drawing up another decree which will put an end to any claims to the party's gold. For the time being the party coffers have been transferred from Staraya Ploshchad to the Russian White House and it is not clear what the money in them will be spent on.

More Reaction to Yeltsin's Reforms Reported

Filshin Comments on Prices

LD1111155191 Moscow TASS in English 1110 GMT 11 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Khodiy]

[Text] Irkutsk November 11 TASS—"The situation in individual regions may become uncontrollable during the first stage of the switchover to free prices. Hence, it is necessary to accumulate material and financial resources already now in order to be able to influence the situation," Russia's Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Gennadiy Filshin told leaders of the Irkutsk region the other day. Filshin is visiting the region as USSR people's deputy, elected in one of the local constituencies.

If social unrest occurs in such areas as the Urals, Tyumen, Kuzbass and eastern Siberia, the Russian president's reforms will be doomed," [no opening quotation marks as received] the minister said. The reserve fund is particularly necessary to support budget-sustained and subsidized branches of the economy, in addition to the entire social sphere. The laws in force and the government's decisions allow for the flexible maneuvering of available resources in the interests of the regions. The new terms of foreign economic activity also pursue this purpose. "Starting from December 1st, all the borders will be flung wide open for the import of consumer goods and technologies necessary for their production, as well as for the import of food products," Filshin said.

"It remains to be seen how participants in foreign economic transactions, numbering 30,000 in the Russian Federation, will be able to use this chance. In order to survive during the switchover to free prices, every town, region, territory and republic must have a detailed plan of actions for the coming winter and spring," Filshin noted.

Resistance to Yeltsin Appointees

PM1211144991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 91 Union Edition p2

[V. Shchepotkin article: "Very Loyal. To the Cause or the Person? How Conflicts Are Arising During the Reform of Local Authority in Russia"]

[Text] The other day I caught sight of a small framed photograph of Yeltsin standing on a manager's desk. However, one picture of the Russian president was apparently not enough for the owner of the office. A large portrait hung on the wall. In the same style and on the same scale as previous portraits of Gorbachev and, before him, Chernenko, Andropov, Brezhnev, and so forth. "Do you respect Yeltsin?" I asked him. "He is my last hope," the manager—a member of the military not so long ago—replied emphatically. "He is many people's last hope. If he does not instill order, we are done for. I just hope he is not relegated to the sidelines."

The Russian president is now perhaps the most prominent figure on the political stage of the transformed community of sovereign states. Some hear his words with hope, others with disapproval. The response to his actions is even more mixed. One confirmation of this is the response in a number of krays and oblasts to the reform of local executive power and to its being strengthened with the president's own men, who are given unfamiliar titles: presidential representative in one case, head of administration in another.

Our correspondents now describe this response.

"V. Malafeyev was appointed head of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Administration by Russian presidential decree," IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Razboynikov reports. "Although decrees are not discussed, an extraordinary session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies was held. Normally obliging, deputies rebelled on this occasion, because the nomination for head of administration had not even been discussed with the oblast soviet. Indeed, the presidential decree had come as a complete surprise to everyone in Ulyanovsk Oblast.

"So sleepy Ulyanovsk finally began to be rocked by 'revolutionary' events. On the day of the session many people came out into the streets. They held slogans demanding the suspension of the presidential decree and the appointment of Oblast Soviet Chairman Yu. Goryachev to the post. Especially as a group of deputies had previously gone to Moscow to ask that the opinion of the people of Ulyanovsk be heard. The envoys were told that there would be no appointments in the oblast in the immediate future. Then suddenly the decree was issued....

"The prospect of a strike instantly loomed large over the city and the oblast. Villagers were up in arms, transport and power workers put forward some demands of their own.... Passions spilled out into the streets.

"With few exceptions, deputies at the extraordinary oblast soviet session voted in favor of Goryachev. In the end, the session adopted a document which said that the head of administration's appointment was in breach of the Russian president's own decree and that the people of Ulyanovsk could not agree with a method of approach that ignored the opinion of the oblast's population of 1.5 million."

Many deputies in Chelyabinsk Oblast Soviet have disagreed with the president's choice as well. This is what IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Shcherbina has to say on the subject.

"Receiving a decree on the head of administration's appointment, the oblast soviet presidium immediately sent a telegram to the head of the Russian Federation expressing its 'bewilderment.' It then included the question of the new appointment—affecting the vital interests of the oblast's population—in the agenda of an emergency session.

"The fact is that, a month before, the oblast soviet had voted overwhelmingly to recommend its own chairman, P. Sumin, for the post of head of administration and had asked the president to consider this opinion. But the president opted for a different candidate—V. Solovyev, chairman of the Chelyabinsk City Soviet—who did not have the support of the oblast soviet."

We will stop quoting correspondents' reports for the moment and turn our attention to some similarities in the situations they describe. In one case, representatives of local authority (whether we like it or not, the present deputies of oblast and other soviets are our representatives—on the basis of the election results) asked that their opinion be considered, and, in the other, the same request was made, only the "other way around." Why? The president's administration gave me to understand that, first, the oblast soviets had failed to propose several candidates for the president to choose from; second, that these and a number of other oblasts are the Russian equivalent of Vendee [seat of counterrevolution] in that they are resisting the far-reaching, revolutionary reforms. If that is so, we should not doubt the existence of opposition to B. Yeltsin in local bodies of authority. The appointment of his representatives—particularly heads of administration—therefore requires a great deal of thought as well as determination. Those with any influence over the people at local level will gladly seize on any mistake or blunder by the president and his team, however those mistakes may manifest themselves. In the appointment of someone who is unpopular, for example, or, conversely, in the removal of a working person who has succeeded in winning authority in our difficult time through action rather than words. For example, in his report from Ulyanovsk, V. Razboynikov writes that the oblast soviet session which discussed the head of administration's appointment was sharply critical of V. Malafeyev. The correspondent quotes from his report about Malafeyev when the latter, as plant director, belonged to the party nomenklatura. Without repeating his report, I will just say that the facts cited by the correspondent are worrying.

Of course, the man could have changed in the meantime, but, according to the IZVESTIYA correspondent, recent events show that V. Malafeyev has remained true to himself and merely perfected the "methods of administrative bone-breaking." He has closed down the plant cooperative and fired dozens of people. Previously obedient to the director, even the trade union committee has rebelled, and the public prosecutor has instructed Malafeyev to reinstate the people he fired.

I now know how a "revolutionary" situation is created, our correspondent concludes.

They have also found this out in Khabarovsk, where, according to IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Reznik, a conflict is brewing. It, too, is connected with the appointment of a presidential representative in the kray. Interpreting this as a vote of no confidence in him personally, N. Danilyuk, chairman of the kray soviet, has asked to be allowed to resign. However, two sessions in succession have refused the soviet chairman's request. Why? The IZVESTIYA correspondent explains:

"I am probably not alone in feeling ambivalent toward the chairman of the kray soviet. N. Danilyuk's work methods seem unacceptable to me: He essentially carries the weight of the kray's numerous problems alone, having washed his hands of apathetic deputies and the chairman of the kray soviet executive committee, who only looks after his own interests. It sometimes really pains me to see the head of the local parliament so slow and cautious when it comes to adopting important decisions.

"However, this is offset by his great honesty: In all the years he has worked in the kray, he has never sullied his good name—unlike many other leaders. It is thanks to Danilyuk that the Far East will be able to keep one-third of the hard currency it earns, and this will be used to meet people's needs. It is thanks to Nikolay Nikolayevich's tireless efforts that, at this time of scarcity, Khabarovsk Kray has hardly any problems with its supply of butter, flour, sugar, and other food, the taste of which has been forgotten elsewhere.

"Even to the most prejudiced eye, Danilyuk's pluses outweigh his minuses. There is no worthy substitute for him among the leaders of groups eager for power—and I do not think one will be found. The long, hard Far Eastern winter lies ahead. So the possible resignation of the kray soviet chairman encourages somber thoughts. Among them the idea that the appearance of a presidential representative in Khabarovsk Kray could be linked to the obstinate behaviour of N. Danilyuk, who has criticized some of the Russian leadership's actions."

The situation in these three regions alone shows that we cannot take a bull-in-a-china-shop attitude to the problem of reforming local executive power in Russia. Yes, renewal is needed, and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies has given the president the powers he needs to independently tackle the problems of reorganizing local authority. But we must not be naive. The president will certainly not get to know all of his representatives personally and will certainly not have time to check out every head of administration thoroughly. They will be recommended to him. By members of his own team, by local authorities, and by voters. It is important not to succumb to the temptation to trust only "one's own." It is important for everyone, including the president, to learn to value practical qualities above all else—and only then personal loyalty. We have already been through the personal loyalty stage in our history. We would not want history to repeat itself.

The last point I would like to make is this: Anyone's opinion can be useful to a politician—particularly a journalist's opinion. IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Razboynikov communicated his views on the events in Ulyanovsk immediately after they began, making it clear that the president had come unstuck, crudely speaking, and that some "backtracking" was therefore possible.

While this report was getting ready to go to press, B. Yeltsin received a representative delegation of Russian people's deputies from Ulyanovsk Oblast. Even those in opposition to Yu. Goryachev spoke in his favor. The decree on appointing V. Malafeyev head of administration has been suspended as a result.

Sobchak Critical of Reform

OW1311183391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] St. Petersburg's Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak has described as a mistake the decision by Russia's president to take over personally the heading of the federation's government for the period of reforms.

Speaking before the workers of the Kirov plant on Tuesday [12 November] morning Sobchak said that the time for shock economic therapy "had largely been lost", and in that context Yeltsin's intention to take on himself the entire responsibility for reforms was "near-sighted and dangerous".

Sobchak went on to say that the crisis in the Russian Federation was widening with the situation destabilized in the Muslim autonomies, the latter also the result of "rash" policies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] administration. Touching on the relations between his mayor's office and the city council he warned he would resign if the law on the status of St. Petersburg ratified by the RSFSR parliament provides for the city council confirming the Mayor's decisions on appointments in the city and its district adminstrations.

Reform Called 'Courageous'

LD0811183991 Moscow TASS in English 1647 GMT 8 Nov 91

[By TASS analyst Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow November 8 TASS—Russia's President Boris Yeltsin on November 6 issued a decree on organizing the work of the republic's government under economic reform, announcing as it were that he was calling all fire from disgruntled Russians upon himself. This is an undeniably courageous step on the part of the man who took over as the Russian Government leader a few days before it was due to decide on unpopular measures. Yeltsin thus made it clear he would shoulder the full responsibility for the consequences. Even members of the new Russian Government will be unable to share this responsibility with Yeltsin in full measure as the list of ministries and state committees was approved by the same decree.

It seems the Russian president, who is also prime minister now, is left the single option of moving ahead, as there is no way to retreat.

It is not immediately clear what reaction will be evoked by Yeltsin's decision to call the fire on himself by proposing a plan for radical economic reform and shouldering the burden of its fulfillment.

An answer may be prompted by the situation at the fifth meeting of the Congress of Russian People's Deputies which ended last week.

The Democratic Russia faction supported Yeltsin's plan unconditionally in the belief it offered the only possible way out of the economic and political chaos.

The Communists of Russia faction, strangely enough, also voiced support by a majority of the plan during the Congress session. If the plan fails, it is not ruled out that these forces will do everything possible to topple Yeltsin.

The question is now what Yeltsin's innovations are likely to give Russia—overall rationing and further impoverishment or a gleam of hope for a better life. Most people would like to believe that Yeltsin was prophetic in saying "everybody will find it harder the next six months" and normalization will set in afterwards. Hope is the last to die.

Commentary Questions Program

PM1211103991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 1

[Political Observer Yevgeniy Panov "Commentary": "Should We Rely on the Conversion Program?"]

[Text] B.N. Yeltsin's tough economic program probably appeared brutal rather than tough to defense complex workers.

Herein lies the horror of a situation where, in our country, natural measures—which are sometimes the only possible measures—are unnaturally drastic. The military industry is expected to transfer to a system of Defense Ministry orders—to a system which is normal for a market economy. At the same time, the president has warned of a significant reduction in military expenditures. So generous orders are not anticipated, and the promise to close some of the plants will probably be kept.

Certain parts of the military-industrial complex will have to be reoriented toward civilian output. A fundamental question: Who will choose which type of output? Will output be determined by the "deep conversion program" which, according to Yeltsin, Russia is elaborating, having set up a special committee to implement it? Or should enterprises independently look for areas in which to apply their efforts?

There are no conversion programs in countries with a market economy. Neither the government nor business circles support them. Usually, conversion in individual enterprises is dealt with by trade unions. They look for alternative types of output which would make use of their capacities and experience and the qualifications of personnel and would be profitable. This is not a one-time event but a constant quest. Understandably, it does not blend well with administrative diktat.

On the contrary, extensive conversion programs (state, republic, regional) rely on this very administrative apparatus. They are designed to be implemented by ideal agents within the context of a command economy, but as we know, such things are not to be found in our country. So much hope was pinned on the program created by the Military-Industrial Commission under Ryzhkov's government! This compulsory plan for producing civilian goods within the framework of the "defense industry sector" collapsed, and such were the repercussions that Pavlov's sensitive cabinet decided against even publishing its version of the program in view of its obvious utopianism.

So now here is the next—Russian this time—conversion program. It is capable of engendering definite hopes among defense complex workers. It is also possible that this is actually the best of the programs written at any time, but to whom is it addressed? The point is that not only are there no bad agents left, there is nothing at all left—as of 1 November the defense industry ministries are cut off from the state budget, and from 15 November they are being dissolved. The military-industrial complex in the usual sense no longer exists.

A swarm of corporations (former ministries) and concerns (former main administrations) has emerged in its place. The concerns include all enterprises which used to be subordinate to the central board [glavk]. Of course, both the corporations and the concerns bear specific traits of the former structures. Is it possible, for example, for a plant to refrain from joining a concern? In theory, yes. In practice, there are no refuseniks. Even though the obligations of the "subjects" to the apparatus are strict, reciprocal obligations are vague. It is not some kind of mystical force which is sweeping plants into the newfangled ministries but the frightening force of inertia. The "defense industry sector" simply knows no other kind of organizational structure. Fragmented ministries strive to conserve what remains of the only environment in which they can exist. For the enterprises, old links are valuable—without them they cannot survive—but today even the firmest links built up over decades within the defense complex are being severed, and here the concerns can do nothing to help. They reject administrative and supply functions. Admittedly, they retain a monopoly on foreign economic activity, but anybody with anything to sell is beginning to elbow his way into the foreign market, circumventing the monopolists; while those with nothing to trade frankly have no need of the good offices of a concern's foreign economic services.

The market will shatter the new-fangled ministries, and this is natural. It is not natural to further their preservation, and the Russian conversion program objectively does just that. It seemingly cushions the shock caused by the inevitable closure of plants and testifies to the government's foresight. In short, it offers a chance. What kind of chance? In essence, a chance to preserve the remnants of the military-industrial complex; that is, if nothing else, an illusory chance.

If, as the president announced, the program sets up a protective regime in the scientific research sphere and does not dilute the intellectual potential of the military-industrial complex, that is more than enough. Today it is almost the most important thing. It is the authorities' primary task. As for the production sphere and the assimilation and output of appropriate conversion goods, everything is against this: our own experience, world experience, and the inexorable laws of the market.

It is necessary resolutely and irrevocably to farm this sphere out. Here, former military-industrial complex enterprises are entitled to rely only on their own forces, on the horizontal links being established in the partners' mutual interest. It is not for the government to impose these links. Alternative structures like the International Conversion Fund, which is a nongovernmental organization operating on a nonprofit basis, exist for this purpose. This fund includes 36 defense enterprises, including big names like LOMO [Leningrad Optical Engineering Association], "Molniya," and "Istok." It is open for cooperation and offers concrete help to those entering the market: in the quest for orders, for example; in establishing international contacts; in access to technology banks; or in the switch from producing weapons to recycling them. In view of the tremendous complexity and the high technology involved, it is, paradoxically, this very task which may become a lifeline for defense workers.

Elements of a market infrastructure already exist in Russia, albeit in an underdeveloped form, and as yet it is not quite clear for whom they are intended. There is some sense in defense enterprises' using them. Under their powerful pressure these elements will immediately assume greater definition, but conversion under the aegis of the state is inefficient or even impossible. It will never fill the store shelves.

Communist Party Ban Viewed

PM1211163791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 1

[A. Frolov commentary: "Banning and Disbanding... On the Russian Presidential Decree Adopted on the Eve of October"]

[Text] So, without waiting for any "explanations," and evidently without needing them, President B. Yeltsin, having combined legislative, executive, and judicial authority in one person, has by his decree banned and disbanded the Communist Party on the territory of the Russian Federation, timing this event... to coincide with the Great October holiday.

The legal justification for this act will undoubtedly become the subject of specialists' constant attention. The question of the political and moral significance of what has happened will be raised no less pointedly either. All too transparent analogies with the actions of the authorities in Italy and Germany in the thirties and of the military junta in Chile suggest themselves. All this in no way lends the Russian leadership authority in the international arena.

As though wanting to soften the highly probable negative reaction, the president makes the proviso in his decree that the CPSU "was never a party" but merely a "special mechanism for forming and implementing political power by fusing with state structures or directly subordinating them to the CPSU. [no closing quotation marks published]

But a political party is indeed nothing other than a "special mechanism for forming and implementing political power," and the president himself, possessing the authority, clearly feels the need for such a mechanism and, addressing the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies, called for its formation in the form of a bloc of parties.

However much he may utter about the CPSU's being not a party but a state structure, the certain grain of truth contained herein cannot detract from the fact that millions of people belonged to the party and breathed its ideals, people who were not at all the voiceless cogs in the bureaucratic machine, people whose labor and self-sacrifice created and defended much of what the country can rightly be proud. Banning this multimillion-strong party undoubtedly casts a shadow of public suspicion, or even hatred, on all its deceased and flourishing members. Does the country need this on the eve of the most difficult radical transformations requiring the cohesion of society and civic peace—which, incidentally, the president never tires of repeating?

Yes, the party's existence was distinguished by extreme contradiction. It was as though two parties coexisted within it—an apparatus fused with the state structures and in many respects bureaucratized, and the mass of rank-and-file communists. It was just not possible to bridge the yawning gulf between them. In the period of the suspension of the Communist Party's activities it became even more obvious. The bahavior of the top leadership of the party and its apparatus (I want to stress—not individual people, but as an autonomous organism) showed that it undoubtedly deserved its inglorious end. I don't know about anyone else, but during this time the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Communist Party, especially those exercising deputies' rights, could quite easily have protested the authorities' actions at all judicial levels.

But nothing of the sort was undertaken. Their position was a direct continuation of the featureless appeasement line taken by the party leadership after the abolition of Article 6—the line of their own elementary survival at the price of breaking with the workers movement and the curtailment of the parliamentary struggle. A blatant compromise with the authorities became discernible: Don't touch us and we won't trouble you.

The whole tragedy lies in the fact that, in perishing, the apparatus party drags in its wake the mass party, the party of the working people, leaving it in the wilderness and depriving it of organization and the means to protect its own interests.

And yet the situation in which communists who are in no hurry to part with their party cards now find themselves is far from hopeless. They have been robbed, but they are also rid of much that has fettered them for decades and prevented them from living and developing normally.

The banning and routing of the party organization does not yet mean the liquidation of the party in the broader sense known since the time of the first steps of the class society. It is impossible to destroy by administrative measures an ideological and political movement, or even simply a mass sentiment which expresses well-known socioeconomic interests.

Ahead lies a serious social analysis, a complex and protracted process of the political self-determination of the working people and, in particular, of the objects of hired labor. Theoretical platforms for this self-determination are already being offered in abundance by the organizations emerging in the CPSU's place. The party of communists has not been destroyed, but today it has essentially regressed in its development 100 years into the past—to the epoch of "discussion circle," theoretical struggle and the primarily economic actions of the working people which in practical terms were not dependent on it. With the sole difference that it now possesses colossal experience both of a positive and negative quality. Will it know how to cope with this experience correctly?

Economic Reform Viewed

PM1211165191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 91 Union Edition pp 1, 2

[I. Demchenko article: "Team of Professionals in Russian Government"]

[Text] The new Russian Government's economic team has set to work. The main elements of its program were heard in B. Yeltsin's statement at the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies. The action plan has not gone beyond the working group.

Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar, who has been in charge of preparing the new economic concept for Russian reform, said that it would be simply absurd to present another program to a country that has already seen 11 drafts in the last 18 months.

He described the style in which the incumbent government has to operate as "crisis management," a style that requires a daily and hourly response to events and precludes any long-term planning, especially if tied to definite dates. This does not mean that the government has no action program, it is simply a working document that will be adapted to fit the situation.

In Ye. Gaydar's opinion, the classically correct premise that finances must be stabilized first, followed by implementation of privatization, and only then the implementation of price liberalization, "has no bearing on our economy." Prices will still break free and the longer attempts are made to restrain them, the more they will soar.

So, the new Russian Government's immediate plans are to liberalize prices although there is no question of this happening within the next few days. Freeing prices is technically a fairly complex operation for which preparations have to be made, and the Russian leadership has no intention of disregarding the need for this because liberalization has already been promised. The freeing of prices will be preceded by the preparation of certain technical measures and normative acts regulating the liberalization procedure and the formulation of regulations governing state regulation of those prices that will not be liberalized—for instance, the prices of railroad transport, communications, municipal services, and possibly the price of certain socially important commodities and some raw material resources. This does not mean that these prices will be stable, Ye. Gaydar stressed; they will also be raised, but not in an uncontrolled manner. Clearly, freeing prices over a fairly large area of the country will automatically cause them to be liberated in all other regions. So, the start of Russian reform will at the same time herald the start of the same processes throughout what was the USSR regardless of whether people there have had time to prepare or not.

What is more, the liberalization of prices in the RSFSR will be preceded by the introduction of minimum—that was stressed by all members of the government with whom I spoke—changes to the system of taxation. It is to be more responsive to the rate of inflation so that the budget deficit does not increase but diminishes, if possible. The extent of the price hike depends on how firmly it proves possible to check the state budget. Another preventive measure will be to prepare the reasonable liberalization of foreign trade, making it possible to counter—even if only partially—the monopolism of domestic producers. At the same time Ye. Gaydar said that all subjects of foreign economic activity will not be given total freedom in this sphere, as was originally planned in the draft RSFSR presidential decree that has been subjected to extensive discussion.

Members of the new Russian Government reckon that inflation will be very high, but it can be prevented from becoming hyperinflation and they intend to do just that. It is not only a firm budgetary policy that is important here, but also control over monetary and credit policy. If it does not prove possible to reach a reliable agreement with the other republics on control over all kinds of increases in the money supply, Russia intends to take this into its own hands. So, B. Yeltsin's statement on transferring USSR State Bank functions and assets to the republic's jurisdiction was evidently a test.

The new Russian Government has some preconditions for thinking that it will indeed succeed in implementing reform. For the first time in the last 18 months, a single team of like-minded professionals headed by Vice Premiers Ye. Gaydar and A. Shokhin forms the government's entire economic bloc. All posts in economic ministries and departments will be held by people whom they appoint. The team includes many members of the working group that developed the well-known 500 days program, including former RSFSR Finance Minister B. Fedorov, who worked in London in the European Reconstruction and Development Bank following his resignation. It is intended that he will now take charge of Russia's Central Bank.

Moreover, "Gaydar's team" reportedly has a firm agreement both with the other members of the government and with First Vice Premier G. Burbulis that their colleagues from other departments will allow them to resolve professional issues themselves. It can only be hoped that the Russian leadership will be able to draw lessons from the past when violation of the principle of politicians not interfering in purely professional matters cost the republic and the whole country very dear.

It has been said on many occasions that these reforms will comprise a package of extremely unpopular measures. Most likely they will not win support of the bulk of the population, one can even say the overwhelming majority of the population. They are backed by common sense—and conditionally at that—and we by no means have as much of that per capita as I would like. But, on the other hand, everyone seems to realize that we cannot carry on doing nothing or doing it badly.

However much I would like the situation to be different, it is as it is. And the time for regrets is already past. Ultimately, although this is poor consolation, we are not the first to switch to the market.

Republic Responses Noted

PM1211141791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 91 Union Edition p1

[Unattributed roundup: "Russian Reform Program—Mixed Response From the Republics"]

[Text] The reform plan formulated by Yeltsin on 28 October at the Congress of People's Deputies will not only affect Russians but all members of the former Union, including the independent Baltic states. The existence or absence of a Russian currency and customs control and the liberalization of prices will have a direct impact on the economic policy of all the republics.

Many politicians who have expressed their views on the Russian reform plan are understanding and supportive of Russia's efforts to move toward a market economy as quickly as possible. However, there have also been frequent expressions of concern that the effects of too sudden action could prove devastating for the economy and prompt a public outcry.

The possible prospect of switching to trade at world prices with republics which have not signed the economic agreement has aroused a particularly sensitive response. The danger is that, unable to find sufficient resources to obtain everything they need under the new conditions, those affected will resort to countermeasures and create currency difficulties for Russia.

No one wants economic reform to develop into an economic war, but you cannot say for sure that such a development of events is impossible. That is why we are so closely following the response to Russia's plans outside the republic.

L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet:

We have concluded and ratified a political union with Russia. Now we are working on economic agreements. We are going to closely monitor this question. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has instructed me to meet with Russian President B. Yeltsin and discuss all acute matters between our republics.

S. Shushkevich, chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet:

I do not think there has been any change in the Russian president's stand. His objective remains the same: a market economy. He has simply announced that he is going to move more decisively toward that objective. As chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet, I see nothing frightening in this announcement. However, I think our conditions are different to Russia's, so we are showing caution in our transition to a market economy.

The Belorussian Supreme Soviet's standing commissions are carefully studying the Russian president's speech. Obviously, the treaty on economic relations between our republic and Russia for 1992—work on which is now in the final stages—will undergo certain changes.

I. Karimov, president of Uzbekistan:

We are a republic of importers (Uzbekistan obtains approximately 60 percent of its goods from outside) and many of our imports come from Russia. Consequently, price liberalization in the Russian Federation will affect Uzbekistan and we will be forced to take protective measures.

A. Samadov, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tajikistan:

If we are really serious about transferring to a market economy, free prices are, of course, essential. You cannot argue with B. Yeltsin's statement at the Congress of People's Deputies. However, it is not possible to instantly unfreeze prices in one individual republic—even such a large republic as the Russian Federation. As our economy is so integrated, this will have very definite consequences for all the republics. Before Russia takes such a step, we must reach agreement on how it should be done. By "we," I mean at least the republics which recently signed the economic agreement.

For Tajikistan, with its raw materials-oriented economy, surplus labor, and large proportion of unemployed women and children, a new single, essentially unlimited price increase threatens unpredictable social consequences. Unfreezing wages will lead to a new spiral of inflation. In this situation, we cannot, we do not have the right not to think about mechanisms to accompany the freeing of prices. This is now more important than forecasting how long it will take to stabilize and improve the situation.

S. Abdildin, acting chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet:

Our republic's president and people's deputies have repeatedly suggested a similar approach—to the problem of national currencies, national armies, and the free movement of goods, for example. But, in any case, questions like these cannot be decided by the leader of just one republic: Decisions must be reached together, at the negotiating table, on a legal basis. Naturally the responsibility for any decisions must also be shared.

Let me give you an example: banking. It cannot be denied that we all have an interest in the ruble carrying weight, being convertible, and serving as our common currency. But can one republic solve this problem for all of us simply because it has the printing presses? Of course not. This attempt will lead nowhere—other than to fresh confrontation. We do not need diktat and ultimatums but mutual accords—and compromise, if you like. That is now the only way to achieve real success and extricate the country from crisis.

V. Kuplyauskas, commercial director of the Lithuanian Exchange:

Transferring to a free economy will bring stability to Russia sooner or later and, therefore, to its bilateral economic ties with Lithuania. It is particularly important that the process of liberalizing prices is going to run almost parallel in the two republics. With our close trade contacts, the existence of two price levels is contraindicated. There has been great confusion in the past, with some goods bought and sold at state prices and others at market prices. This contradiction will be removed with the introduction of free prices. Regarding basing transactions on world prices, our greatest concern is not the prospect of hard currency transactions (although this does pose a certain problem, but I am sure we can reach an agreement) but the opportunity to freely import and export goods without tough customs restrictions. If both republics introduce their own currency, the optimum solution will be to base transactions on the ruble and lit exchange rate, established on the basis of mutual accords.

R. Miller, Estonian minister of finance:

I am not going to talk about ways of dealing with the crisis. That is sovereign Russia's internal affair.

But I personally am disturbed by one proposition in Boris Nikolayevich's speech: his announcement that Russia intends to conduct trade with independent states—former Soviet republics which have not signed the economic agreement—on the basis of world prices and in hard currency. Of course, that, too, is a country's right: to look after its own interests and seek advantage. But, quite recently, at the sixth Tallinn meeting of the republics' heads and representatives of government, the Russian representative signed a declaration which stipulates that the ruble is to be the common currency throughout 1992. The common currency for all states, irrespective of their status. So B. Yeltsin's latest statement has aroused suspicions that Russia may complicate life for neighboring states as it attempts to overcome its own difficulties.

G. Kuznetsov, vice president of Kyrgyzstan:

Our views coincide in many respects: Regarding liberalizing prices and introducing our own currency and on the question of a national guard and a unified Armed Forces. We are in exactly the same situation as the Russian Federation: We simply have to make decisions on these and other matters, depending on how others act.

V. Pushkash, deputy speaker of the Moldovan parliament:

Yeltsin's stand is an example to all our other statesmen. That is how a strong politician should act: make crucial decisions—albeit at some risk to himself—without fuss and without fear of losing his position. We are lagging behind Russia as far as radical reforms are concerned. True, you get the feeling that Russia would not mind filling the role of the old center rather than being on equal terms with the rest of us. But time will tell whether that is really so.

TRUD on Economic Reform

924A0167A Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by L. Aleksandrova: "Let Us Lean on Your Shoulder, Citizen of Russia!: Russian President's Chief of Administration on the Conduct of Economic Reform"]

[Text] **RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] President Boris Yeltsin and his team understand the real situation in the country and know the mood of the masses; they do not have any illusions. Still, they are undertaking decisive steps, a "surgery," in the belief that dragging feet on the reform will only make the situation worse.**

The president's chief of administration, Yuriy Petrov, confirmed this yesterday in his interview given to a TASS commentator (for TRUD).

According to him, the Russian leadership is preparing for the possibility of an emergency situation, and is working on the mechanisms to avert it. A presidential food reserve to ensure supply of large industrial centers is being created; measures aimed at supporting the least socially protected groups and job placement for the unemployed are being worked out. In the near future, a decision will be made to create an information service under the president's administration. It will analyze the situation and forecast. According to Yuriy Petrov, the president charged this service with a task of forecasting the consequences of every decision made within the framework of the reform, and presenting proposals on corrections to the implementation of measures, their timing, and the reduction of social tensions.

In Yuriy Petrov's opinion, it is necessary to develop a feedback mechanism for the population, first of all through the press and television. The ideas to be implemented will need to be thoroughly explained, with an appropriate propaganda support.

The most important task, in the opinion of the president's chief of administration, is to "ensure the unity of actions, the unity of the nation, and the unity of all citizens of Russia in the struggle against hardships." He believes that in order to do this, it is necessary first and foremost to work with the democratic forces, parties, movements, and trade unions, and to develop a mechanism of coordinating with them in advance the most important decisions. "Unless we ensure peace and consensus, everything will be a waste of effort, and we will not resolve the difficult problems."

The representative of the presidential team believes that now is not the time to criticize the program of reforms. According to him, the reaction of various parties to measures proposed by Boris Yeltsin is mixed. "But if we get engaged in criticism and rejection right now, this will be the greatest gift to opponents of the reform," replied Yu. Petrov.

The head of the administration has faith in the future of the economic treaty between the republics. He believes that in the future other republics will join the eight that have already signed the treaty.

Abolition of State Council Noted

LD1211133191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] A report in the latest issue of KOMMERSANT weekly, citing unofficial information obtained from reliable sources in government circles, says that Boris Yeltsin has abolished the RSFSR State Council. Instead of the State Council, authorities plan to reactivate the higher presidential consultative council, though with a heavily changed membership. KOMMERSANT notes that the new consultative council—an analytical group resembling the U.S. Congress research service—will concentrate in its hands only a briefing capacity. State Council members will lose their apparatuses and revert to the status of traditional personal advisers to the president. However, as distinct from the old consultative council, they will give the president the benefit of their views not just like that but in return for an as yet undetermined salary.

Foreign Ministry on Rumors of Reshuffle

OW1211170191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1345 GMT 12 Nov 91

[From INTERFAX's "Bulletin 2;" transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The reports in some Soviet newspapers about the possible resignation of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his replacement by today's Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Yuliy Vorontsov, were a "complete revelation" for the Russian Foreign Ministry, one of its senior officials said in an interview for IF [INTERFAX]. He described the information as having nothing to do with reality. He said it was disappointing that some papers should make use of sensational rumors in order to win more popularity for themselves.

Republic Takes Over Metallurgy Ministry

OW1411114991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2202 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From "Soviet Business Report;" transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] To replace the former USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, Russia is establishing to [as received] state corporations, Roschermet and Rostsvetmet, as well as a department for metallurgy problems and new materials production, which will be a division of the RSFSR Ministry of Industry. The department will coordinate the corporations' activities and organize scientific research. Former director of Zaporozhye's metallurgical combine, Mr. Anatoliy Shevtsov, was named the department's director.

The corporation Roschermet pools the overhelming majority of ferrous metallurgy enterprises, while Rostsvetmet joins together Russia's nonferrous metallurgy enterprises. Former USSR Minister of Metallurgy Oleg Soskovets was elected Roschermet's president, and his former Deputy Minister Valentin Ustinov was chosen as Rostsvetmet's director.

The corporations' councils also approved regulations for a new trading house, Metallurgia, which will help furnish Russian metallurgical enterprises and associations with necessary material and technical supplies.

Preliminary data shows that over 40 large metallurgical enterprises and associations have already made agreements with the trading house. It is expected that, in the initial stages, most trading will be carried out through charter deals.

International Affairs

Najibollah Regime Termed 'Illegal'

PM1311135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union Edition pp 1, 5

[Report by A. Ivanko: "Former Enemies at the Negotiating Table"]

[Text] The IZVESTIYA editorial office has received through TASS channels a report to the effect that Afghan opposition delegation head B. Rabbani described the results of the first round of talks in Moscow with Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy as "constructive and promising." "Rutskoy put forward several interesting proposals which the Afghan opposition is prepared to discuss with him at the second meeting planned for 13 November."

A senior official at the Russian Foreign Ministry pointed out in conversation with IZVESTIYA's correspondent that what we are talking about is a meeting, not talks. Indeed, a new meeting is set for 13 November. The Afghan mujahidin also requested an audience with Yeltsin—a man whom they perceive as a fighter for freedom and democracy.

On 12 November talks begin between the Afghan opposition delegation and the foreign ministries of several former Soviet republics. The Union and Russian foreign ministers are to attend, plus representatives from the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, a Russian Foreign Ministry official announced.

As for the meeting with A. Rutskoy, it can indeed be described as "constructive." To use the verbose language of diplomacy, the meeting "took place in an atmosphere wherein each side understood the other side's position." According to the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, the Afghans said that the Soviet side had taken "certain constructive steps." Above all this relates to the Soviet-U.S. accord on halting arms shipments to the opposing sides as of 1 January 1992. B. Rabbani noted at the talks that, from his viewpoint, B. Yeltsin has "condemned the invasion of Afghanistan and the whole of the past Brezhnev policy in that region."

The Russian side stressed the priority nature of the question of "former Soviet servicemen in the hands of [nakhodyashchikhsya v raspolozhenii] detachments of the Afghan opposition." According to the mujahidin, they, as Muslimns, treat prisoners of war humanely. B. Rabbani's assistant M. Khalili [name as transliterated], who was contacted at midnight at the former CPSU Central Committee hotel in Plotnikovyy Alley, believes that the question of prisoners of war is not linked to continuing Soviet assistance for the Najibollah regime. Khalili talked primarily about the "technical problems" connected with our soldiers' return home. B. Rabbani promised to give the Russian vice president his assistance.

Hundreds of Afghan mothers are waiting for their sons who are in the Kabul regime's jails. This question, like the continuing Soviet supplies to Kabul, will significantly influence the resolution of the question of the fate of our prisoners of war.

When the flow of Soviet weapons to Afghanistan ceases, the Russian side will confine itself to humanitarian supplies, above all medicines and food, but this means, Khalili stressed, that Soviet food will only go to those who support the regime. The opposition sees Najibollah as an "Afghan Hitler" and does not intend to have anything to do with him. "He is continuing the policy of past regimes," Khalili believes.

We should not forget either that the KGB helped put Najibollah in power, being well acquainted with its Afghan colleague—the former Afghan minister of state security. The Afghans and indeed Soviet advisers repeatedly said that the man's "hands and arms are stained with blood," and people in Afghanistan will never forget this. It appears that no efforts by Soviet diplomats will keep the Najibollah regime afloat, and B. Rabbani's hard line is understandable.

Assessing the results of the meeting with Rutskoy, Khalili called them "friendly and productive." He even stressed that "practical steps to create an Islamic government in Afghanistan" were discussed.

For the Russian vice president, the meeting with the Afghan opposition was not only a protocol measure but also a return to the past. An Afghan war veteran and former fighter pilot, he told his former enemies that he had seen the sufferings and the tragedy of the Afghan people and would try to do his utmost to establish peace in that land.

We need that peace too; after all, we caused endless problems for a good neighbor and loyal friend. While the question of support for the Najibollah regime is still being discussed, it is worth noting—whatever way you look at it: This regime is illegal and was established by Soviet bayonets in close cooperation with the KGB. They tell us: It is not nice to reject old friends.

Friends? We are not talking about our "friends" but about "useful people" in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] who remained in power through the good offices of the CPSU Central Cpmmittee, the KGB, the Defense Ministry, and the operations group of future putschist Army General V. Varennikov, a man who was not much bothered about the fate of Afghanistan, but was always ready to let off two or three rockets at any target—sometimes even a civilian target.

The Afghan mujahidin are prepared to conduct a dialogue with us. There are very few controversial questions left, the main stumbling block being the Kabul regime. Is it really something we treasure, or are we reluctant to shed the old illusions? If they are PDPA, are they friends, and if they are mujahidin, are they dushmans, enemies?

The Russian authorities and the Afghan opposition will spend Tuesday and Wednesday talking. One can scarcely expect any breakthroughs, but the first step toward arranging good-neighborly relations will be made, and it is for the Afghans themselves to decide who comes to power in Kabul.

Yeltsin Interviewed on Upcoming German Visit

LD1311191291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1647 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Stepanov]

[Text] Bonn, 13 Nov (TASS)—The major aim of my forthcoming visit to Germany is to establish direct contacts between Russia and Germany, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] President Boris Yeltsin says. In an interview with DIE ZEIT weekly—to be published in tomorrow's issue—he notes that he is primarily talking about economic, agricultural, scientific, technological, and cultural contacts. Answering the question of whether he will arrive in the Federal Republic as an envoy for Russia or as a go-between for the future union of states, the RSFSR president stresses that he has no intention of acting on behalf of the Union or any Union bodies during his visit. I would like to act as a go-between for German and Russian business circles, he adds. You know that we are going through a crisis and perhaps the most difficult moment in our history in practically every sphere; however, we see that there is interest in the Russian market, in its exeptionally rich natural resources. Our cooperation could have great potential. The role of the republics is rapidly increasing, and the center's role is declining. We now mention the word "center" almost by habit; it is merely a coordinating body.

B. Yeltsin was asked about prospects for implementing past economic agreements concluded by the center. The RSFSR president assured that Russia guarantees paying off both its own and Union debts. If two or three republics of the former Soviet Union refuse to pay their debts, Russia will take responsibility for them to preserve the high reputation which the Soviet Union used to have. We will fulfill agreements which were concluded between Union bodies and German partners, he stressed.

On the future of the restoration of the autonomous republic of the Volga Germans, the Russian president recognized that this process will be a complicated one. The Volga region today is densely populated, which is why it is extremely difficult to find a place for pockets of German population. We supported the plans for setting up German settlements in Omsk Oblast and in a number of other rayons. However, this will resolve the matter only partially. Restoring autonomy can only be carried out step by step. It is possible that an appropriate document will be signed in Germany; however, all this must be thoroughly thought through in the future.

B. Yeltsin touched on the fate of former GDR leader Erich Honecker, reporting that he has begun to study this issue. Honecker, he adds, has not asked for political asylum, and you (the Federal Republic—TASS correspondent note) have certain rights to him. However, there is one further problem, namely the moral problem of relations between Honecker and Gorbachev. Gorbachev told me, B. Yeltsin continues, that he has moral obligations to Honecker which would be very difficult to ignore. I can decide many problems without asking Gorbachev, the RSFSR president says. However, there are other ones which I myself cannot decide. I cannot take Honecker and give him to you. The whole world would condemn me for this from the moral point of view. I am working in that direction, but I simply cannot give any guarantees today.

Touching upon internal political problems and the state of the economy, the Russian leader stressed that he does not intend to abandon the radical reforms which have been planned. The question of how the population will stand up to the forthcoming liberalization of prices is an extremely important one, he said. We must see to it that no widespread dissatisfaction arises which the reactionary circles could use to their advantage. Therefore, before prices are increased, it is planned to abolish wage ceilings. Those people engaged in the production sphere will themselves determine wage levels. The situation in the nonproduction sphere and with groups of the population earning the lowest incomes is a more complex one. Here, the Russian state must help. Before there is any price liberalization, we intend to determine the minimum scales of wages, pensions, and stipends and the level of material assistance. In this way, a system of social protection will be created.

Answering a question on nuclear arms control, B. Yeltsin said: I am in favor of their being controlled from one place, from one center, by the president of the country by means of consultation with the military. If a decision is adopted to bring out nuclear weapons from the other three republics and deploy them on Russian territory, we will have no objection. After all, this will simplify control, the RSFSR president stresses.

Kunadze Pays Working Visit to Japan 13 Nov

Views New Adviser to USSR Embassy

LD1311183191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0550 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo, 13 Nov (TASS)—Russia does not intend to set up its own, separate embassy, though a representative of Russia will be an adviser to the USSR Embassy in Tokyo. This was reported today in an interview by a TASS correspondent with Georgiy Kunadze, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] deputy minister of foreign affairs, who made a brief stopover in Tokyo en route from Seoul, where he paid a working visit.

Japan is no exception. The appointment of Andrey Kolosovskiy, former RSFSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, to the post of adviser [sovetnik-poslannik] to the USSR Embassy in Washington has already been reported. Mikhail Ivanov, who currently occupies the post of acting head of the Asian-Pacific Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is to become an adviser to the USSR Embassy in Japan.

"Maintaining a foreign embassy—Georgiy Kunadze said—is a pretty expensive luxury. One needs an infrastructure, land, premises, and, in addition, the embassy of a large country cannot be small in number, otherwise it cannot keep within its purview all questions concerning relations with a country such as Japan. From our point of view, then, it is absurd to create a separate Russian Embassy alongside the Soviet Embassy." Georgiy Kunadze said that he could neither confirm nor deny the rumors about the possibility of USSR Foreign Minister Boris Pankin resigning because of differences of opinion between the Union and republican Ministries of Foreign Affairs over the scale of staff cuts at the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since he has not been in Moscow for the last few days. He did, however, admit that between the Union structures and Russia there are "some differing interpretations" of the accords reached at the State Council. "These are not insuperable, however, the RSFSR deputy foreign minister said. But one should probably be speaking in the past tense here, given that there will be another session of the State Council tomorrow. This will perhaps cross the t's and dot the i's."

Comments on Peace Negotiations

LD1311142691 Moscow TASS in English 1318 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo November 13 TASS—"In conditions, when the Soviet Union has actually fallen apart, though still existing de-jure, we believe the peace treaty with Japan should be concluded by the Union. Russia will mainly determine, it is understood, the parameters of this document," Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze told TASS. Kunadze has made a short stopover here en route from Seoul, where he paid a working visit.

During President Gorbachev's visit to Japan last April, the sides agreed it was necessary to accelerate the negotiations. The same view was expressed in President Yeltsin's message, addressed to the Japanese prime minister in September," the Russian diplomat said. "All our efforts must be exerted in order to achieve this end. This is very important. If no necessary conditions to advance the solution of the territorial issue are created, if no necessary measures are agreed and adopted, the decision, achieved through negotiations, may prove unproductive," Kunadze said.

Touching on the prospects of Yeltsin's five-stage plan to settle the territorial issue, Kunadze noted that the first step, envisaging the Soviet Union's official recognition of this problem, has already been made. The second and third stages have been partially coped with and there is every chance to fully finalize them.

Touching on joint economic activity on the disputed islands, envisaged by the second stage of Yeltsin's plan, Kunadze said: "We have the Japanese stand, which rules out joint economic activity as long as fundamental problems of sovereignty remain unresolved, since they are linked with legal matters, and the Japanese see no way to resolve them. From our point of view, the started envisaged exchanges, even though still very timid, cautious and extremely limited in forms and numbers, are precisely the measure that may eventually lead to joint economic enterprise. The legal problems, arising from the Japanese stand, must be resolved in one parcel with all the others."

Turning to the third stage of Yeltsin's plan, providing for the demilitarisation of the South Kuril Islands, claimed by Japan, Kunadze said plans were afoot to cut the Soviet military contingent on the islands by 30 per cent.

"Subsequently, I believe, this will be done within agreed limits, not to lose pace. But we must bear in mind that even a minor withdrawal of troops, and a realy limited contingent is now deployed on the Kurile, poses a social problem, common for all our country," Kunadze noted.

Belorussia

People's Front Urges Parliament Resignation

LD1411062791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] The resignation of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet has been demanded in the republican parliament by 34 representatives of the People's Front, the parliamentary opposition. The opposition believes that all real power in Belorussia continues to reside with the communist nomenklatura. The opposition deputies called for the formation of a new government and the holding of elections to a professional Belorussian parliament.

Lack of Raw Materials Harms Enterprises

LD1311053791 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belorussian 0400 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Neftorgsintez association in Novopolotsk will receive 1 million tonnes of raw oil less in November than usual. Tens of installations have stopped here because of a lack of raw materials. The productivity of the remaining installations has been considerably lowered. Chemical industry workers and power engineering specialists of the republic will feel the decline in the Novopolotsk enterprise's production this week. Association workers are worried by the indifference of the government and are ready to take the further step of a full stoppage of the enterprise. Such a threat is real, because the supply of oil to Novopolotsk is not guaranteed by anyone.

Law on Chernobyl-Affected Areas Adopted

LD1411014591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] A law on the legal status of the territories that suffered radioactive contamination following the Chernobyl nuclear power station catastrophe will cost 130 million rubles. The law was adopted today by the Belarus [Belorussia] parliament. The document has been adopted, but, at the same time, a question of who will pay, and how, arises. The republic simply cannot afford the Chernobyl expenses exceeding 17 billion rubles altogether. The deputies adopted the following decision: Damage to property will be compensated through the means allocated in accordance with state, Union republican, and republican programs for eliminating the consequences of the disaster. It is significant that the damage will be compensated not by "wooden" rubles but by the construction of housing, amenities, and production facilities. The law establishes a regime of administrating the territories subjected to radioactive contamination and determines conditions of their use.

Moldova

OMON Member Killed in Village Clash

LD1411125591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] A clash between the police and local residents occurred last night in the village of Vulkenesht in the south of Moldova. Ivan Gurgudzhiy, head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Gagauz Republic, told the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY that a member of the OMON had been killed and that people, including a child, were injured on both sides. The premises of the rayon police department and the people's court were burned, as well as several police vehicles. The village has been cordoned off by the Moldovan police.

'Serious' Fuel Supply Problems Reported

AU1311200791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1914 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 13/11/1991—The government of the Republic of Moldova met in extraordinary sitting Tuesday 12 November to hear a report of the director general of the State Association for Fuel Production. As MOLDOVA-PRES informs, the information provided is not apt to inspire optimism: Moldova is confronted and will probably be confronted in future with serious problems in the fuel supply due to recent considerable reduction of deliveries from Russia and the Ukraine. Concrete figures show that petrol and diesel oil furnished to Moldova by these republics stood at only 35-60 percent of the planned quantities. Coal supplies, which come also from the Ukraine, are in a similar situation. However, deliveries in November were slightly better than October, mainly following direct barter agreements with suppliers. Apprehension rises from the decision of a number of producers to cut their oil extraction or to negotiate their products in terms of free market prices or against convertible currency.

President Snegur on Importance of Elections

PM1311121491 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with Moldovan President Mircea Snegur by special correspondents D. Sabov and I. Chernyak, as part of feature datelined Kishinev and Moscow, under the new rubric "Top People"; date of interview not given: "Mircea Snegur: We Can Hardly Find the Fuel To Send the Prime Minister to Moscow"]

[Text] A month before the presidential elections in Moldova, the main candidate for the post, Mircea Snegur, now acting president, was left in splendid isolation, with a clear advantage over his rivals. His opponents—G. Malarchuk, the writer (from the Ecologists' Party), and G. Yeremey, former leader of the former Communist Party (nominated from his native village)—withdrew their candidacies last week, whereupon the only remaining possible alternative to M. Snegur was the idea of boycotting the elections. But this idea is being propounded increasingly aggressively in parliament, in the streets, and in the press by the two most powerful and, strange as it may seem, mutually antagonistic political forces in the republic: the Moldova People's Front and the leaders of the Dnestr region and Gagauzia. So at the moment no one will venture to state confidently that the elections will take place—no one, that is, except... the main candidate.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Mr. Snegur, are you still convinced that the elections will take place?

[Snegur] Certainly. The fact of the elections, in my view, is far more important for the people than who wins. After all, we already have a legitimate president elected by the existing parliament—we could do without yet another vote... But in a multinational society (even without counting the Left Bank, 600,000 Ukrainians, half a million Russians, 153,000 Gagauz, and 82,000 Bulgarians live in Moldova) in times of crisis, consolidation is absolutely vital, and this should be confirmed by a collective act of election of the head of state.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But the People's Front, which has gone over to the opposition, finds the price of consolidation too high, at 5 million rubles. It is a lot, isn't it?

[Snegur] The 5 million is not the point—that means nothing to the country nowadays, if you convert it into dollars. In order to fully supply the market, Moldova needs to keep everything it produces, and then import something like 500 millions' worth...

You see, if you want to be as bold as Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] and to demand additional powers for the implementation of major transformations and take less notice of the opposition, you have to have a vote of confidence from the people.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But in that case how do you explain the fact that the People's Front, your ally yesterday, has today launched a fierce struggle against you?

[Snegur] I do not think there can be any question today of a confrontation between the president and the People's Front. I went into the elections together with the Moldova People's Front; we won together; the Moldova People's Front supported my candidacy in the elections for Supreme Soviet chairman... Even now many people in the front support my candidacy. In a number of cities and rayons it was the grass-roots Moldova People's Front organizations that nominated me. My relations with the front are fine. My relations with its leaders are another matter.

First, they cannot forgive me for relieving Druc of his duties as prime minister in May 1991. But what was I supposed to do? Druc had a whole year in which he could have demonstrated that his ideas were right.

Second, there have been major changes in the Moldova People's Front leadership. The front's former leaders, like Ion Khodyrka, for instance, took leading roles in parliament and the government. They were replaced by new ideologists, some of whom, incidentally, were not present in the republic when we were making our revolution—some of them were studying, some were writing poetry.

Of course, our positions are entirely different on questions of actual policy. I call for the republic's independence to be transformed from a declaration into a reality and for Moldova to be recognized by the international community. The front's leaders, after the proclamation of independence we fought for together, suddenly started using terms like "the so-called independent Republic of Moldova."

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So do you not agree with the slogan put forward by the Moldova People's Front of reunification with Romania?

[Snegur] No, I have never put it that way. I have always called on people not to forget that we and the Romanians are one people, we have one language, one history.

I am a realist in politics, and for the time being, I am only thinking about the immediate future. I am opposed to immediate reunification with Romania, because I know the view of the majority of the people and I regard this as unrealistic. Big politics must have a historical dimension—it must take account of what has happened to us. People here, between the rivers Dnestr and Prut, lived within the Soviet empire for half a century, while the inhabitants of the Left Bank of the Dnestr lived in that empire for 74 years—and in that time significant changes took place in their consciousness.

Anyway, if we are talking about the future, first we have to become independent, and only after that should we choose the path of development and partners. Stalin and Khrushchev chopped up Moldova into pieces. So what are we going to do, unite with Romania piece by piece? I have chosen the other path: independence, plus concrete steps to help our brothers in northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia (part of Odessa Oblast—editor's note), which, by the whim of history, ended up in the territory of the Ukraine.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You talk about realism. Why do you think the opposition will not accept this?

[Snegur] A politician who is responsible for something (and I think I am responsible for everything) is always more of a realist than his opponent.

When we reach the point where Prime Minister Muravski cannot fly to Moscow because there is not a drop of fuel available, when by some miracle we find a plane and get the prime minister a seat among the passengers and that plane barely makes it as far as Belts, where, by another miracle, we find some kerosene to refuel it, this does not concern the shouters and demonstrators. They have their own philosophy: Why do we need Tyumen, they ask? We will bring in oil from Kuwait, in barges and tankers. They do not consider the fact that Kuwait has to be paid in dollars, while Tyumen will still supply us in exchange for rubles; but I have to consider it, because I am not answerable to the front, but to all citizens of the republic.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The confrontation between the indigenous and Russian-speaking population of Moldova has unfortunately led to bloodshed more than once already. How do you intend to tackle this problem?

[Snegur] In my view, the confrontation is not the result of any real conflict between the indigenous peoples and the Russian-speaking population of the republic. It was created by politicians, created artificially.

Both sides have dug their heels in. Obviously what happened was inevitable, because the intolerance was largely whipped up by the center. Today this problem is easier to tackle: I, for instance, advocate a unified and indivisible Moldova, but I admit the possibility of such ways of resolving the problem as national and cultural autonomy for the Gagauz. As for the so-called Dnestr Republic, a republic whose population is 40 percent Moldavians, 26 percent Ukrainians, and 25 percent Russians is ridiculous, in my view. What kind of a republic is this? Another Moldavian republic? But there is one already. Russian? But there is the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. Ukrainian? What is the point, when the Ukraine is next door?

This question must be solved in a different way. We have set up Ukrainian and Jewish cultural societies and a Russian cultural center, and this year saw the opening of a teacher training college and a university in Komrat with instruction through the medium of the Gagauz and Bulgarian languages, and a university in Tiraspol where instruction is in Russian. I personally, incidentally, do not rule out the possibility of granting the Dnestr region the status of a free economic zone. We have also set up two state commissions that have been given the status of departments, and conciliation commissions have also been set up...

You will never find a single offensive word against anyone in any of my speeches. But yes, there was one: After the two so-called republics had been set up one after the other, I could not restrain myself from making an emotional outburst in parliament and saying that it is hardly appropriate for someone who only arrived in Moldova 18 months ago to form his own republic within it... I used the word "zombies," but I was referring to the Moldavians living there. The echo of this speech is still pursuing me...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What priority tasks would you set for the Republic of Moldova, as a presidential candidate?

[Snegur] The main priority is to uphold real independence. I believe that since the Moldova Declaration of Independence we have not been subjected to behind-the-scenes pressure from the center. Today I do not consider myself a member of the State Council. In my view, the council cannot be the leadership body of the Union because the Union itself no longer exists. Frankly, I do not understand why M. S. Gorbachev still exists as USSR president.

After Alma-Ata, however, where the new economic community of republics was formulated, I was very surprised to see Mr. Silayev again coming under pressure from Gorbachev, who tried to endow this treaty with a political character. Once again it began to be emphasized that we should go back to Novo-Ogarevo and sign a new political treaty there. So is it impossible to do without the empire? No, we will not go down that road. Mr. Valeriu Muravski only signed an economic treaty, because we do not want to be left without gasoline or electricity, we do not want all our enterprises to close.

Another priority for us is freedom of thought and action. We have done good groundwork for setting up autonomous relations with the West, although we have yet to be recognized by the West as an independent state. Bush and Mitterrand are still oriented toward Gorbachev alone and that is understandable: The Soviet Union has many debts and the West has to hold someone responsible for them. But the fact that Western business people are taking an interest in us is a good sign.

The third priority is to remove all obstacles from the path of integration with Romania. Not only within the framework of a cultural federation, but economically too. The slogan "100 joint enterprises with Romania!" is still on the agenda. We should, of course, have done more in this sphere, but the deterioration in the political situation in the republic prevented that. On the whole our relations are highly productive, and I can say that there is total mutual understanding between the leadership of Moldova and Romania.

We must not, of course, forget the priorities of democratization, privatization, and the creation and introduction of a national currency.

As for the interethnic problem in Moldova, I am optimistically inclined. I think that despite the threats by the Left Bank leaders not to take part in the elections, some of the Left Bank will in fact go to the polls. My tours of the republic have convinced me that not everyone in the Dnestr region and Gagauzia shares the ideas of separatism, especially after 1 December, when the Ukraine will become de facto independent and its leadership will have to tackle similar problems in regions inhabited by Russians.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] As far as we know, you intend to sign a bilateral treaty with the Ukraine. Is this document purely economic in nature, or does it also raise the problems of northern Bukovina and the southern part of Bessarabia, which once formed part of Moldova?

[Snegur] That is a question for the future. Politicians, historians, and parliamentarians are also working on a political treaty at present, but for the time being we must confine ourselves to an economic treaty. This is a delicate problem, and the Ukrainian side would not want to put it on the agenda.

But we know the problem exists. Bukovina has raised our tricolor, and we must help the Mihai Eminescu Cultural Society. We are not trying to finally settle this question now, but we would like to obtain recognition that the problem exists and can be resolved through talks. You need have no doubt that if Snegur and Kravchuk are elected presidents, they will continue to cooperate.

Snegur Outlines Election Platform

AU1311180191 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1458 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Chisinau [Kishinev] (ROMPRES) 13/11/1991—Professors and the representatives of the students in the "Nicolae Testemitanu" Medical School of Chisinau had a meeting with Mr. Mircea Ioan Snegur, candidate for the office of president of the Republic of Moldova in the elections due on December 8, "MOLDOVA PRES" reports.

Setting forth his election platform, Mr. Snegur formulated tangible proposals for the resolution of the difficult political, economic and social problems facing the republic, all while expressing his willingness to cooperate with the opposition along that line.

As is known, after Grigori Eremei, former first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party, and writer Gheorghe Malarciuc, representing the Ecology Party, withdrew their candidacies, Mircea Snegur remained the sole presidential candidate.

Snegur on Relations with Romania

OW1411074091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 13 Nov 91

["Diplomatic Panorama: Events and Analysis" report; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In politics, one should remain a realist and learn to recognize the existence of two Romanian-speaking states, said Moldovan President Mircea Snegur. However, he confirmed the republic's adherence to the policy of cultural integration and economic cooperation with Romania.

As the drafting of the Romanian Constitution continues, the interests of all Romanians, wherever they live, should be taken into account, say the leaders of the Popular Front and of nine nongovernmental organizations of Moldova, in an appeal sent to the president and the Senate of Romania. The authors of the appeal advocate the restoration of the united Romanian state, existing within the 1918 borders and encompassing present-day Moldova as well as North Bukovina and the southern parts of the Ukraine's Odessa region.

Popular Front Favors Unification With Romania

AU1211113091 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 8-9 Nov 91 p 4

[By Petru Antim: "We Are Not the Country"]

[Text] The news conference (7 November) held by a delegation of the Popular Front of Moldova contributed to the clarification of the great confusion in connection with news spread by official sources (MOLDOVA PRESS, television) in Bessarabia.

First, Mr. Iurie Rosca [leader of Popular Front of Moldova] says it is not true that a split has taken place between the Popular Front and the electorate. This has been invented by the propagandist system of the presidency. It belongs to the post-communist strategy to incite public opinion. Mr. Snegur has begun the election campaign by boycotting the Popular Front. A sign that the authorities in Chisinau [Kishinev] are afraid of any genuine autonomous syndrome would be that Prime Minister Muravschi agreed to sign the Economic Community Treaty with the Ukraine under the tutelage of the lifelong protector, the USSR, because the USSR president, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the chairman of the parliament of the Ukraine, Ivan Sylayev, as well as others were also present at the signing of the document. Mr. Rosca says that it is not an economic treaty, but rather a political document. To sign a document with the Ukraine, even (as claimed) an economic one, implies a lack of territorial claims on the part of the Republic of Moldova. However, we know very well there is no such thing. International public opinion is ready to recognize the independence of the Ukraine the way the Ukrainian authorities have drawn up their map, and any hesitation by the Moldovans can only cause harm. Although every politician is called upon to defend not only the interests of the party that he represents, but—especially—national interests, Mr. Muravschi, under President Snegur's patronage, agreed to sign that treaty, which could have multiple consequences. The most serious is the recognition of reality and the exclusion of possible territorial claims. The recently signed treaty talks about a financial, military, and cultural community and so forth. Genuine economic problems, indeed! To this we want to add: If the authorities in Bucharest had been more prompt and determined in recognizing Moldova as an independent state by condemning the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and if they had promptly informed international public opinion on the trend of the union ideas that inspire—behold!—the great majority of the Romanian public, maybe the Muravschi government would not have signed, with so much serene diplomatic calm, a treaty that is dangerous not only for the Romanians across the Prut River, but also for those on this side of the Prut.

A few days ago, the Popular Front of Moldova extended an invitation to King Mihai of Romania to visit Bessarabia. His majesty the king was unable to pay this visit. The main cause is also the equivocal position of the authorities: The king was told that he could come, but as a tourist. We have heard these words somewhere before! There is a secret contract between the republicans in Bucharest and those in Kishinev. Mr. Iurie Rosca tells us with regret: "And one does not know whether they would have let him cross the border." Asked what he thinks about how his majesty would have been received in Kishinev, Mr. Rosca smiled, saying: "It depends on who receives him.... We will welcome him as a king." For the Popular Front, the "abdication" in 1947 was an unconstitutional act. Although Mr. Rosca does not explain it this way, the fact that the Popular Front does not nominate a candidate for the presidency means the nonrecognition of the republic installed by force through Russian occupation. "We are not a country, Mr. Rosca says, we are Romania, how could we have a president?".... Starting from the premise that the history of the past 50 years was characterized by fraud, falseness, and illegitimacy, the Popular Front has no reason to consider a presidential candidate. Should it propose a candidate, it would implicitly recognize the republic. Mr. Iurie Rosca utters this word quite seldom.

Through his political attitude in the wake of the declaration of independence in August this year, President Snegur shows obvious signs that he understands and conceives of national independence not from the USSR, but from Romania. Immediately after the declaration of independence, the mass media of those in power began an anti-Romanian campaign. Thus there is talk about Romanians and Moldovans as two related nations. The union ideas of the Popular Front and of other associations are ridiculed in this election campaign by the representatives of the pro-union trend. In this context, the treaty signed by Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi (let us not forget that the Moldovan prime minister paid a visit to Bucharest before the signing of this document) has the same significance as the treaty signed by Ion Iliescu and Mikhail Gorbachev at the beginning of this year. And the significance is the negation of national interests. Mr. Iurie Rosca tells us that, during a meeting which our dignitaries had with a delegation of the Popular Front in Bucharest, he recognized fragments of the rhetoric used by the authorities in Kishinev. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dan Martian also seems unenlightened about the need for signing the Declaration-Appeal of the National Alliance, whereby the signatories appeal to the Constituent Assembly to bear in mind that "Romania was and should be the country of all Romanians." The authorities in Bucharest have not understood why they should "put an end to this state of detention," for, like Mr. Snegur, they are the advocates of the policy of "small steps." The current objective of the Popular Front is unification with Romania. This is going to be the purpose of the next meetings and events.

Economic Accord Signed With Romania

AU1311180391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1455 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] Chisinau [Kishinev] ROMPRES 13/11/1991—More and more consumer goods are expected to fill the shelves of stores in the Republic of Moldova in the near future as an effect of a cooperation accord signed by the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova and Romania, Mr. Valeriu Muravschi and, respectively, Mr. Theodor Stolojan, "MOLDOVA PRES" reports.

According to the document, Romania will supply consumer goods worth 4 billion lei to the republic which, in its turn will export to Romania farm produce worth 500 million rubles. The transaction was concluded at the official exchange rate of 8 lei to the ruble, "MOLDOVA PRES" also shows.

Ukraine

Prime Minister Defends Economic Treaty

LD1311223691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1730 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev, 13 Nov (TASS)—The Economic Community Treaty, initialed by the Ukraine on 6 November, not only does not make null and void the republic's path toward real independence, as some of our critics claim, but opens the road to fruitful cooperation between sovereign states: the former republics of the Soviet Union. This was stated at a news conference held in Kiev today by Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin. According to him, 26 individual documents, specifying and explaining Ukraine's position on the treaty, will be submitted for examination by the republic's Supreme Soviet. If the Ukrainian parliament does not ratify it, then in this way the question of my continuation in the post of prime minister will be posed, V. Fokin said. The initialing of the Economic Community Treaty has given rise to a contradictory and sometimes sharply negative reaction in the Ukraine. Thus, the Ukraine's Popular Movement Rukh and the Ukrainian Republican Party have made statements calling into doubt the expediency of this act. At the moment of the initialing of the treaty, the Ukraine had a negative balance between export and import output of $12 billion, Vitold Fokin noted. If we had not agreed on the initialing, he explained, then already today there would be 1.5 million unemployed in the republic, by mid-December there would be 3 million, and two to three months from now, the level of production would drop below the permissible level.

"Signing the treaty does not at all mean a return to the previous totalitarian system, Vitold Fokin said. We already felt the first fruits of initialing. It has opened the path toward signing a mutually advantageous treaty with Russia, under which there will be a sharp increase in the volume of deliveries of raw and fuel resources to the Ukraine."

The prime minister rejected the claim that initialing the treaty had been brought about by the economic blockade of the Ukraine. "I have always been in favor of the development of bilateral ties. The Ukraine has acted as one of the initiators of such contacts; however, under the present-day economic system, when all enterprises are linked with one another by thousands of threads, multilateral cooperation is vitally necessary. The Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, having instructed the government to initial the treaty, has adopted, in my view, the only correct decision," he noted.

Vitold Fokin also explained the position of the Ukraine's Government regarding the republic's participation in paying off the debt of the former USSR, introducing its own national currency, and on other vital matters.

Threatens To Resign

OW1311215091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukranian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin has threatened to resign unless the Ukrainian Supreme Council ratifies the Economic Community Treaty. At a news conference Wednesday [13 November] he categorically denied accusations made by the Ukrainian press and the democratic circles of the republic that the signing of the treaty will tie the Ukrainian people down.

Fokin pointed out that the Ukraine has a negative balance of $12 billion in settlings with the republics. Unless the treaty is signed, already in December, 1991, there will be over 3.5 million unemployed in the republic plus a sharp decline in production reaching 25% meaning full paralysis of state and economy.

Fokin denied the wide-spread opinion that the blockade of the Ukraine has been tangible lately. In his words, there have been only several cases of under-deliveries because of the reduced production in other republics. The prime minister said that the treaty was initialed, delivery of raw materials and components improved. He described the threats of Kuzbass coal miners to stop deliveries of coking coal to the Ukraine as not serious. It would mean that Russia will not receive 5 million pipes in exchange for the coal.

The prime minister stressed he would insist that the external debt should be shared by all republics. He believes the external market of the republic can be stabilized and the ruble can be preserved through the introduction of the national currency.

Kravchuk Comments on Economic Treaty

PM1311153191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 1

[By correspondent M. Odinets: "No Treaty Means Closures"]

[Text] Kiev—The initialing of the Economic Community Treaty by the Ukraine has produced a mixed response in the republic. Asked by a journalist whether this step constitutes a political noose for the Ukraine, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk explained that no signing of the treaty had taken place, it had merely been initialed. That is to say, the prime minister had—on the Supreme Soviet's instruction—given his assent to the Ukraine taking part in the treaty process.

The time of responsibility for carrying it out, however, will come only when the treaty has been ratified. Under an accord, it will be submitted for ratification along with all additions, which number more than 25. They concern the banking system, financial, customs, credit, monetary, taxation systems, and so on. This will all require an extremely long time to agree on.

Regional economic agreements will have greater or more fundamental impact. We will not sign, Kravchuk went on, nor will we ratify any agreement that is backed by central organs of any level. We favor the opportunity to cooperate with the republics, with either all or some of them. The need for the Ukraine to subscribe to the treaty is also dictated by the fact that many enterprises could soon close down without treaties with partners.

Rukh Critical of Economic Community Treaty

OW1411063391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1235 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian popular movement 'Rukh' [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka] has criticized the republican goverment for putting its signature to the Treaty of the Economic Community.

In a special statement 'Rukh' says that the government of the Ukraine has thereby demonstrated its unpreparedness to act as the full-fledged government of a sovereign country and agreed to remain a colonial administration.

The 'Rukh' movement argues that the treaty does not provide for a mechanism to resolve economic problems and is nothing but a political document aimed at preserving the Soviet empire.

The statement says that the treaty runs counter to the act of the Ukraine's state independence and republican laws and is fraught with the risk of economic expansion by neighbouring states and the destruction of the Ukraine's consumer market and infrastructure.

Russia Refuses To Deliver Coal

LD1411111591 Kiev Radio Kiev in English 0100 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] Kuzbass, a large industrial region in Russia, refused to deliver coke coal to Ukraine. One of the administration leaders of Kemerovo region, (Nikolay Kruzhinskiy), explained this action by two reasons. Firstly, Ukraine has not delivered 11,000 tons of sugar to Kuzbass since the beginning of this year; and secondly, Ukraine's representatives have to purchase the raw materials for metallurgy in Kuzbass at very low prices and to deliver sugar at commercial prices.

Tense situation is now also at the majority of coal mines in Donbass due to a shortage of pit props which almost entirely are delivered from Siberia. The bilateral economic agreement concluded a week ago between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the matter is not working so far. More and more miners' collectives of Donbass and Lugansk regions intend to convene the Ukraine's Congress of Miners. The congress would make the participants of the treaty, in this case the governments of two republics, be especially responsible in dealing with vital problems of the leading branches of economy.

Kravchuk Denies Confrontation With Russia

LD1411113491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk, candidate for the post of Ukrainian president and head of the republican parliament, has spoken in support of the equal use of the two state languages, Ukrainian and Russian, in the republic. During his two-day campaign in Donetsk Oblast, he met energy and metallurgy workers, machine-builders, and miners. Addressing the miners, Kravchuk assured them that from next year the mines will be provided with pitprops from Russia. At the moment there is a severe shortage of these. Ukraine and Russia have no grounds for confrontation, the head of the Ukrainian parliament stressed.

During the past few days the local press has published the candidate's pre-election program entitled: The Five D's of Leonid Kravchuk. These are: statehood [derzhavnost], democracy, prosperity [dostatok], spirituality [dukhovnost], and trust [doveriye].

Kravchuk Meets Donbass Miners, Notes Crisis

LD1311051291 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] One of the men running for president of the Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, has met with miners of the Donbass coal region. This is going through a crisis. One-third of its pits are staying idle. They have no [pit] props. Kravchuk said he is sure the situation will return to normal. On relations with other republics, he favored an economic and political alliance of the Ukraine, Russia, Belarus [Belorussia], and Kazakhstan. He pointed out there is no need for any force to monitor the Ukraine's relations with other republics. The elections will take place on 1 December.

Communist Party Holds Underground Meeting

OW1311213091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The underground plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Committee has taken place in the village of Goloskovo in the Letichevski District of the Khmelnitski region. The Communist Party has been banned in the Ukraine and its property has been nationalized. Speakers at the meeting called for the struggle against capitalization of the society and for the protection of workers' rights and denounced "the treachery of the CPSU and the country's leaders. [no end quotation marks received]

Transcarpathians Seek Special Regional Status

LD1311162691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1000 GMT 13 Nov 91

["Television News Service" report by correspondent V. Lyashko, including recorded remarks by I.M. Turenitsa, "Rusina Society" activist; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lyashko] By all accounts another nationality may soon be added to the officially recognized ones living in the Ukraine—the Carpathian Ruthenians [Karpatskiye Rusiny]. Along with this there may a change to the status of Transcarpathia.

[Turentsia] For more than 150 years the peoples of Transcarpathia have been raising this issue of a special status for the region—that is, Carpathian Rus, Ruthenia under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and then Carpathian Ukraine in the first years of Soviet power, with its own government, and so on. This status was cancelled, you see.

[Lyashko] The aspiration to achieve a special status for Transcarpathia as part of the independent Ukraine has also been expressed by the national societies of Hungarians, Slovaks, Germans, and gypsies living here. The organizations which are part of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] oppose this idea. For this reason, an extraordinary session of the oblast soviet has decided to hold an oblast referendum on the question of whether Transcarpathia should be an autonomous formation within the independent Ukraine.

Border Post With Romania Closed

OW1411075491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 13 Nov 91

["Diplomatic Panorama: Events and Analysis" report; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Authorities in the Chernovtsy region of the Ukraine have closed down the check-point Porubene on the border with Romania. The reason for their decision is the "deteriorating sanitary conditions caused by an influx of transit passengers." The ban does not apply to those who go abroad on business, for medical treatment, for the funeral of relatives, or as tourists.

Defense Minister Refutes Press Statement

LD1411023991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1035 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Nikolay Zaika]

[Text] Kiev, 13 Nov (TASS)—I have been personally insulted—this is how Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov commented on his own interview, published in early November in the weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. In the publication by G. Spektor, words are attributed to me that I did not use at all. Hiding behind my name, the author "unceremoniously insults" officers, the minister told an UKRINFORM correspondent. Morozov confirmed that he met MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent G. Spektor, but that acquainting himself with the text prepared for the press, he had categorically refused to give permission for its publication. I would never permit myself comments such as that for a high salary, or that "some of the officers will serve any regime," the minister stated. He also considers phrases such as "divorce from the USSR Ministry of Defense," "how the Soviet Army will get by without emigrants from the Ukraine is unclear at present," and others to be tactless. "What G. Spektor wrote has absolutely nothing to do with me," the minister summed up. He did not announce whether he intends to bring action against the weekly.

Officers' Union Voices Protest Over Checkup

OW1411022791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1930 GMT 13 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Colonel Vilen Martirosyan, chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, has voiced protest against the check-up of combat and mobilization readiness of troops scheduled for later this month. An address to the Ukrainian military servicemen says the check-up contradicts with decisions of the Ukrainian parliament and is a purely political action aimed at undermining the December 1, 1991 referendum and splitting the military. The Ukrainian Officers' Union has urged the Defense Ministry not to aggravate the situation, but to channel means for the social protection of military servicemen.

Interrepublic Affairs

'No Results' From Azerbaijan-Armenia Talks

Gas Pipeline Cut Off

OW1311185391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Another round of talks between Armenia and Azerbaiian lasting since Nov 12 has yielded no results, reports an INTERFAX correspondent. The two sides are discussing the resumption of gas supplies via Azerbaijan to Armenia and an exchange of hostages.

The Azerbaijani side has suggested setting up a 10 km buffer zone along the border with Armenia. Armenia is against it since it may even more sever Nagorno-Karabakh from it.

As to hostages, the Azerbaijani side is still holding a man from Armenia's Noemberyan region, and refuses to give up the bodies of four citizens of that region who were killed. Armenia is holding a hostage from the town of Kazakh. The talks are going on today, Wednesday.

Meanwhile, the gas pipeline supplying Armenia has been cut off. Since yesterday, Tuesday, gas has been supplied to Yerevan apartments from underground stores by order of the republic's acting Premier Grant Bagratyan. The daily consumption is planned at 1.5 mn [million] cubic metres. The measure is meant to relieve the energy shortage in Yerevan and the entire republic. The use of electicity for heating and cooking has resulted in over-consumption from many thermal power plants.

To save fuel the government calls for using all reserves to keep the daily consumption of heating oil under 5,000 tonnes. At present the republic has a reserve of 85 mn cubic metres of natural gas. Experts estimate that will last only 15 or 20 days for Yerevan alone.

Life at 'Standstill'

PM1311163991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by V. Karkavtsev: "We're in Charge of the Gate Valve"]

[Text] The supply of Russian gas to Armenia via Azerbaijan has dried up as of 4 November. Life in the republic has come to a standstill, T. Liloyan, TASS correspondent in Yerevan, reports. Workers at most of Armenia's industrial enterprises have been forced to take vacations.

While transmitting the report, the correspondent was forced to excuse himself and break off the conversation—the light had gone out at the correspondent's office.

Here is the comment on the situation by Vagif Rustamov, a staffer of the Azerbaijan president's press service:

"The village of Kheyrimli in Kazakhskiy Rayon came under heavy fire from Armenia for 24 hours. Several houses and a kindergarten were burned down, and village inhabitant Islam Nasibov was killed. The gas pipeline which had been damaged earlier was being repaired by Azerbaijani repair workers. But after this attack the village inhabitants decided not to allow repair workers back to the pipeline."

Grigoriy Chernetskiy, "Gasprom" concern dispatch administration duty officer, commented on the above as follows:

"As far as I know, the pipeline that has been damaged supplied Armenia with 1.5 million cubic meters of gas per 24 hours. But there is also another, more powerful string which runs through Kazakhstan. Its throughput is 10 million cubic meters. This pipeline is intact. All that is needed is to open the gate valve. The gas in question, incidentally, is Russian gas..."

In this energy war, just like in any other war, it is ordinary people who suffer. Meanwhile the big politicians's offices are warm and well-lit.

Armenia

Yeltsin Congratulates Ter-Petrosyan on Election

NC1311141991 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Congratulatory message sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan]

[Text] Esteemed President, on behalf of the citizens of the Russian Federation I personally congratulate you on assuming the lofty post of president of the Armenian Republic.

Through centuries-old friendly ties the Russian and Armenian people have shared joy and sorrow, are jointly resisting totalitarianism, and are struggling for democracy. The Russian people are closely and sympathetically following the rebirth of a democratic Armenia.

Let the longed for peace take hold in your much-suffering land.

Respectfully, B. Yeltsin

Azerbaijan

Helicopter Fired On in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1311135591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1245 GMT 13 Nov 91

[by TASS correspondent Elkhan Rustamov]

[Text] Baku 13 Nov (TASS)—A helicopter carrying passengers en route from the rayon center of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh to the town of Agdam was fired on today over the territory of Askeranskiy rayon in the autonomous oblast.

As reported at the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs, the pilot was wounded but managed with difficulty to land the helicopter in the town of Khodzhali. The passengers were unharmed.

A car was shot at near Nyugaryukh village in Askeranskiy rayon, and two passengers were seriously wounded. One of them died of his wounds in hospital.

Soviet Military Units To Be Inventoried

PM1411110791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent under the general heading: "Soviet Army: The Republics Break Ranks"]

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports that, at a conference of Baku Garrison unit commanders, Azerbaijan Prime Minister Gasan Gasanov said that the republic Cabinet of Ministers has decided to start today compiling an inventory of the equipment, armaments, and military property of Soviet Army units stationed on Azerbaijani territory. This was announced by the news service of the Transcaucasus Military District newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA. The premier stressed that force could be used in the event of noncompliance, the announcement says.

At the same time, an official statement was broadcast on republic television Sunday [10 November], warning the population against unlawful actions with regard to servicemen and members of their families.

Amoco Concludes Talks on Oil Exploitation

OW1311090391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2130 GMT 12 Nov 91

[From 'Soviet Business Report'—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The production company Amoco is finalising talks on its role in the future exploitation of the Azeri oil deposit in Azerbaijan. The deposit, on the Caspian shelf, has potential resources of 250 million tonnes of oil

In a meeting vith the corporation's President Patrick J. Erly, the president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutabilov, welcomed Amoco's participation in drawing up the project. For his part, Mr Erly said he was satisfied with the way the talks were going and is confident that Amoco would soon begin putting the project into effect.

Recognition at Islamic Conference Considered

OW1411063091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1235 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A delegation of Azerbaijan is going to bring up the question of the republic's early international recognition at the forthcoming session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC].

Azerbaijan's chief negotiator, chairman of the Muslim Board of Transcaucasia Shaykh ul-Islam Khadzhi Allahshiukur Pashazade [name as received] has said that the OIC session will take place in Karachi, Pakistan, shortly.

The chairman of the Muslim Board of Transcaucasia said that on the eve of his departure for Pakistan he would meet with the chief delegate of the Afghan antigovernment rebels Rabbani in Moscow in order to have talks on Azerbaijani prisoners of war.

Georgia

Foreign Minister on Recognition, Armed Forces

Considered 'Occupation Forces'

LD1411080291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] The current instability of the domestic political situation is the main obstacle in the way of recognition of Georgia's sovereignty by members of the international community. An INTERFAX correspondent was told this by Georgian Foreign Minister Murman Omanidze, who has been in Moscow for the presentation of SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA newspaper. Having disclosed that preliminary talks have already been held with representatives of about 20 countries, including Turkey, Iran, and Jordan, he noted that Georgia's independence has so far been recognized by Romania alone. At the moment it is envisaged that relations will be established with that state at the level of missions and consular departments, the minister added.

Omanidze indicated that the Georgian Foreign Ministry is not keen on the idea of attaching representatives from the sovereign republics which were members of the former Soviet Union to USSR embassies in foreign countries. We will only agree to cooperate if the central authorities officially recognize our country's state independence, the Georgian representative stressed. This same issue is also the key to resolving the problem of Georgia's accession to the Economic Community Treaty, he stressed.

Referring to the presence of detachments of the USSR Armed Forces in the republic, the foreign minister declared that Georgian authorities consider all these forces to be occupation forces. They must leave our sovereign country in accordance with a timetable that will be determined in talks with the center. Thereafter, decisions will be made on the number of men and branches needed for National Guard units, which will then be established, Omanidze said.

Nationalization Decreed

PM1411104991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent B. Urigashvili under the general heading: "Soviet Army: The Republics Break Ranks"]

[Text] Tbilisi—A decree by Georgian President Z. Gamsakhurdia has declared the weapons, ammunition, transport, military equipment, military bases, and other military inventory belonging to the Soviet Army and situated on Georgian territory the property of the republic. The preamble to the decree says that it was adopted out of a need to protect the interests of the Republic of Georgia, preserve its territorial integrity, strengthen its defense capability and ensure that any aggression is repulsed, and establish civic peace. The decree also says that the creation of the Republic of Georgia armed forces requires civic calm, and the working people of the Republic of Georgia have participated to a significant extent in the formation of the USSR Armed Forces.

The Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers has been instructed to begin talks with the relevant USSR organs of administration and state power for the transfer to republic ownership of the property indicated in the decree.

Cabinet Imposes 15% Taxation Rate

OW1311090291 Moscow INTERFAX in English GMT 12 Nov 91

[From 'Soviet Business Report'—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Georgia's cabinet has announced its decision to impose taxation, at a rate of 15%, on goods being conveyed or re-exported over the republic's territory. It was further ruled that at least 15% of each transit load must remain on Georgian territory.

Government To Cope With Energy Shortage

OW1411040391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The government of Georgia has taken a special decision to cut down the consumption of energy to cope with its shortage. Energy supply to industry as a whole will be curtailed by 20% beginning with this month and through the first quarter of 1992. Stringent norms will be set for particularly energy-consuming productions.

Kazakhstan

Further on Nazarbayev's Sole Candidacy

PM1311153991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Ardayev report: "Nazarbayev—Sole Candidate"]

[Text] The deadline for registering candidates for the post of Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] president expired 10 November.

A Central Electoral Commission announcement states that, apart from the documents presented by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet for N. Nazarbayev's candidacy, not one political party, trade union, or other social association, and not a single labor collective or voters' meeting, had submitted any documents proposing candidates.

As for the composer Kh. Kozhakhmetov, who was nominated by the "Zheltoksan" national democratic party, the Central Electoral Commission reported that nobody had addressed the committee with regard to registering him as a presidential candidate before the deadline expired.

TRUD Interviews Nazarbayev in London

92US0099A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 3

[Interview with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev by TRUD correspondent A. Burmistenko in London; date not given: "I Remain an Optimist: Interview With Nursultan Nazarbayev in London"]

[Text] **The first visit in history by the president of sovereign Kazakhstan to Great Britain at the invitation of the British Government has ended. Before his return from London to Alma-Ata, N.A. Nazarbayev graciously consented to answer questions from a TRUD correspondent.**

[Burmistenko] Nursultan Abishevich, are you satisfied with the results of the visit?

[Nazarbayev] Yes, completely. The interest in our delegation on the part of political and business circles in Britain was much greater than I had supposed. I hope that the visit will promote the development of all-around ties between Kazakhstan and Great Britain. We studied the experience of privatization and denationalization which have been carried out by the British Government over the past 11 years. We had a very interesting meeting with government advisers responsible for that work. I was particularly interested in the problem of privatization of large industrial concerns, of which, as you are aware, we have very many.

[Burmistenko] Kazakhstan is now moving ahead of many regions in making use of the experience of foreign experts and attracting foreign investments. Have British business circles shown any interest in the opportunities that are now being opened up in the sovereign republic?

[Nazarbayev] Many leading British businessmen with whom we had talks are ready to invest their assets in Kazakhstan, but they asked that this entrepreneurial activity be supported by the government in the form of insurance for capital that is invested. We have made a firm commitment to the British side to do this.

[Burmistenko] Were there any concrete proposals on the opening up of natural resources in Kazakhstan from the two major British companies British Gas and British Petroleum?

[Nazarbayev] Both these companies are already operating in Kazakhstan. I am acquainted with their leaders and have visited their enterprises that are recovering oil and gas. I was particularly surprised by the fact that while they are working in what is essentially a resort zone they are ensuring absolute environmental cleanness. British Gas and British Petroleum are now participating in the international competition we announced to open up the Karachaganak deposit, and I am sure that one of them will be involved in one way or another in work on this project.

[Burmistenko] It has been reported that during your meeting with the prime minister, John Major, you agreed to draw up a document on future bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Great Britain. On the practical plane, would you prefer completely independent diplomatic representation for Kazakhstan abroad or to operate with additional Kazakh diplomats at existing USSR embassies?

[Nazarbayev] In those countries in which we have already established extensive economic links we would like to open our own consulates or missions. In other countries in which we are interested we would like to have our own representatives in existing embassies. I think that it is a question of advisers who will represent Kazakhstan's interests.

[Burmistenko] At news conferences and meetings with representatives of the public, you were asked very often about the fate of nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan...

[Nazarbayev] In fact, both among us and in the West the fate of the enormous Soviet nuclear arsenal is a matter of special concern. For our part, I would like to emphasize that Kazakhstan does not lay claim to the role of nuclear power at either the global or regional level. At the same time we are not about to become nuclear hostages for the center or for Russia if it unilaterally declares itself a legal inheritor in the military field. In our opinion, resolution of the question lies in establishing dual control over nuclear weapons, by analogy with the "two-key" system which, as is known, has long been used with respect to American nuclear weapons on the territory of a number of countries in West Europe. I think that logically we have every justification for participating in any international negotiations that may in one way or another deal with the fate of nuclear systems located on Kazakh land.

[Burmistenko] How in practice will the control of nuclear subunits be handled under the new conditions?

[Nazarbayev] The nuclear weapons that are held on the territory of Kazakhstan will remain where they have been deployed. But that does not mean that we shall assume control of the missiles. I proceed from our agreement on a unified economic space in the community of republics, in which the army here will be a unified army and hence strategic nuclear weapons will be controlled from a unified center, while the republic Ministry of Defense will be part of the general staff of the unified armed forces, and the state's strategy and military doctrine will be worked out with their participation.

Here, step by step we shall cut back and destroy the nuclear weapons located on republic territory within the framework of the general world disarmament process. Properly speaking we have already taken the first steps to remove our land from the ominous nuclear orbit by issuing the ukase on halting nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site. By agreement with the Ministry of Defense it will be converted into a scientific center to work on fundamental and applied problems of nuclear weapons.

[Burmistenko] You were already in London when Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin spoke at the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, setting forth the program of radical reforms that has evoked such passions. What is your attitude toward this program and what might its consequences be for Kazakhstan?

[Nazarbayev] My relations with President Yeltsin are such that I was aware of all the main provisions of his program earlier. I fully support them because marking time is now much more dangerous than moving quickly to a market economy. People are now tired of all kinds of promises and empty talk. Everything he said about accelerated privatization, stabilization of the budget, and lifting price restraints corresponds with my views. It is a very good thing that he decided to assume all responsibility and initiate decisive actions. We should all act in that way.

[Burmistenko] But on some issues, in particular land reform, certain differences do remain...

[Nazarbayev] Yeltsin is doing the right thing with respect to Russia. Each republic has its own specific features, its own understanding of things. If we are really entering a market economy we must undoubtedly start with agriculture. I think that as time passes, understanding will grow and we shall also move away from long-term, lifetime leasing to the privatization of land.

I do not think that there are any problems of principle in the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. The main thing now is to pursue an agreed policy in all the republics that signed the economic treaty.

[Burmistenko] How are interethnic relations now taking shape in the republic?

[Nazarbayev] Kazakhs and Russians are the main nationalities in Kazakhstan: 7 million Kazakhs and 6 million Russians live there. We do not regard the Russians as immigrants or newcomers, and we proceed on the premise that they are all equal citizens of Kazakhstan. At least, my policy and the policy of the entire leadership in Kazakhstan is not to return the Kazakh nation to the nationalism of the Middle Ages but act before the entire world as a civilized nation that is building a democratic state.

Another 1.5 million Kazakhs live outside Kazakhstan and Russia, mainly in the vicinity of the territory of our republic. I think that people should be free to live wherever they want. The treaty signed between Russia and Kazakhstan and ratified by the parliaments of the two republics this year states that we shall preserve the historically shaped friendship between our peoples and that we have no border problems.

If we are truly building a market economy, trade should know no borders. Countries must trade with each other in order to raise the living standard of the population, and I shall do everything possible to prevent any economic border war and in general any conflicts between peoples and nations. It is possible to be sovereign and independent and at the same time not to erect border posts and customs barriers.

[Burmistenko] The situation in the country is now changing rapidly. Nevertheless I would like to hear your prediction about the development of the situation in the next two or three years.

[Nazarbayev] I look optimistically at the way in which events are developing. The desire of the republics for independence is quite natural after so many years of totalitarianism and imperial thinking. But I do think that common sense will still lead everyone to the creation of a unified economic space, without which it will be very difficult for each republic to survive on its own. And when we have set the economic Union firmly on its feet we will think further about what sort of political Union we may have. I am convinced that in the attitudes of people in our country loyalty to the motherland and to unity will prevail, and that politicians must orient themselves on what people think.

Tajikistan

Ministry Studies Joining Islamic Conference

LD1311170191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Nov 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] According to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA report, the Tajikistan Foreign Ministry is studying the issue of the republic joining the Islamic Conference Organization. The organization is based in Saudi Arabia, and has more than 40 countries as members. The newspaper reports that the Turkmen and Azerbaijani governments are already thinking about joining the Islamic Conference as observers, too.

Turkmenia

Supreme Soviet Relieves Prime Minister of Post

LD1311190891 Moscow TASS in English 1843 GMT 13 Nov 91

[By TURKMENINFORM correspondent Nina Chunakov, for TASS]

[Text] Ashkhabad November 13 TASS—A session of the Turkmenian parliament ended here today after passing 19 laws within two days. Some of these, including a law on entrepreneurial activity, privatisation, employment and public associations are expected to exercise a major influence on the development of the republic.

President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan addressed the session. He informed the parliament about the food and consumer goods situation in the republic.

"Despite the signing of the Economic Union Treaty, all republics have raised prices for goods Turkmenistan imports without preliminary coordination," he complained.

Niyazov also said he had sent a telegram to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, notifying him that in order to protect the interests of the population and the economy prices had had to be raised for raw material resources exported by Turkmenistan.

The parliament approved this decision.

The session considered some organizational matters. Valeriy Otchertsov was relieved of his duties as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan in connection with his appointment as a member of the republic's presidential council.

Aleksander Dodonov who was earlier the Turkmenian Communist Party Central Committee's second secretary, was elected deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Khan Akhmedov was relieved of his duties as the republic's prime minister and appointed chief of the Turkmenian railway, formed on the basis of the Ashkhabad and Chardjou segments of the Central Asian railroad.

Niyazov May Take Post

OW1311184191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It has been announced at the session of Turkmen Supreme Soviet over in Ashkhabad Wednesday [13 November] that the republic's Prime Minister Khan Akhmedov has been relieved of his duties and appointed chief of the Turkmen railway instead.

As INTERFAX has been told at the Turkmen president's press service, no successor has yet been named. President Saparmurad Niyazov may take on both posts.

The Turkmen railway was formed by a presidential decree out of the stretch of Central Asian line between Ashkhabad and Chardjou and the facilities attached to it.

Republic To Keep Currency Earnings in Fund

PM1111143991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Vladimir Kuleshov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Currency Will Remain in Turkmenia"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—Henceforth all currency profits from the sale of Turkmen carpets, gas, cotton, and other commodities and resources for export will be transferred only to Turkmenia's currency fund.

"Over 1.2 trillion cubic meters of Turkmen gas has gone from the republic for all-Union deliveries and what is the result? Never mind currency, we were not even given cover in rubles for our own expenses," says A. Charyyev, the republic's first deputy prime minister. "Everything was dispatched almost without payment yet after all these volumes, if they were sold directly abroad, could bring the republic over $100 billion..."

Now a decree of the republic's president has suspended the Union decision on the formation of currency funds in 1991 with regard to the sale of 40 percent of currency to the USSR Foreign Economic Bank to extinguish the USSR's foreign debt and the allocation of 90 percent of the remaining export profit to the Union-republican currency fund to form its own funds.

Official Comments on Market Transition Program

OW1211065991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 11 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Valeriy Otchertsov, deputy chairman of Turkmenistan's Supreme Council told IF [INTERFAX] that the program of reforms announced by Russian President Boris Yeltsin will urge Turkmenistan to introduce certain amendments into its own program of transition to a market economy. Mr. Otchertsov said that a group of economists attached to Turkeminstan's president is already dealing with that problem. "All the republics are closely linked to the Russian economy and it would be better if major steps are taken after consultations with participants in the economic cooperation treaty," Mr. Otchertsov pointed out.

Food Prices Frozen; No Union Debts Claimed

PM1311142391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 91 p 6

[Correspondent M. Volkov report: "Prices Frozen in Turkmenia"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—The Turkmen Government does not intend to increase food prices. This was stated at a session of the republic's Presidential Council broadcast on local TV. It was noted at the session that B. Yeltsin's program envisaging price liberalization in Russia has caused some nervousness among the country's population. Turkmenistan will not take such a step without thorough preparation. If prices are nonetheless allowed to float in the Union, Turkmenistan will protect its market by increasing the price of fuel, energy, and other exported resources, President S. Niyazov stressed. He also said that "the people should not suffer because of the political struggle currently under way at the center..." Touching on the foreign debt of the former USSR, the president noted that in recent years Turkmenistan had not received any loans from the Union, and is consequently not planning to repay any debts.

Uzbekistan

Economic Agreement Signed With Ukraine

LD1411040291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1700 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Text] In accordance with the treaty on the basis for interstate relations between the republics of Uzbekistan and the Ukraine, an agreement was signed in Tashkent today on economic and cultural cooperation, as well as on the exchange of products between the capital of Uzbekistan and Dnepropetrovsk. The Ukrainian town will deliver the rolled iron needed by the enterprises of Tashkent as well as provide television sets and other consumer goods which are in very short supply. In exchange for fruit and vegetables, the people of Dnepropetrovsk are to provide those living in Tashkent with a certain amount of the meat, milk products, and sugar which they require.

Deputies Want Direct Presidential Elections

OW1411043691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A group of people's deputies in Uzbekistan wants a direct election of the republican president to be held in the near future, and not put off until 1992. In a message to the chairman of Uzbek Supreme Soviet's committee for legislation, law and order, they say that the voters are angry about the "procrastination".

Independent observers have linked the message with the recent registration of Uzbekistan's popular movement 'Birlik' and the emergence of an opposition capable of competing against the incumbet President Islam Karimov.

Birlik Movement Registered in Tashkent

OW1311063791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A ceremony has been held in Tashkent today at which registration certificates were given to several public organizations, including Birlik, a popular movement of Uzbekistan.

Birlik's co-chairperson, Abdurakhim Pulatov, told IF [INTERFAX] that he saw the registration as "Uzbekistan's first step on the road of truly democratic reforms."

At the same time, Mr. Pulatov believes, Uzbekistan "is still ruled by a totalitarian communist regime, which, for three years, has not only been preventing the registration of Birlik but has also been obstructing its activities in every way." "We were opposed by the combined power of the Interior Ministry, the KGB, the courts, and the Public Prosecutor's Office," he said.

Abolishing Residence Permits Said 'Premature'

PM1311144791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1

[Untitled report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, RIA, REUTER roundup]

[Text] The absence of a political agreement between the republics renders the decision to abolish residence permits in Uzbekistan premature. This is the conclusion drawn by the Uzbek Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The Uzbek committee stressed that as a sovereign state the republic will itself define the procedure for recording and registering citizens. Committee members are of the opinion that there is a need for Uzbekistan not only to preserve the residence permit but also to adopt a Law "On the Passport System and the Registration, Accounting, and Residence Permits of Citizens."